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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
IN POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE
Georgeta V. Pourchot
Old Dominion University, 2000
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

Using the concept o f representation, this study advances a comparative interpretive
analysis which makes use o f hard statistical data and soft data to assess the direction o f
democratization in Eastern Europe between 1990 and 1998. Specifically, the study looks
at how governments in Eastern Europe chose to heed constituencies’ calls for the
institution o f a market economy, and analyzes the degree o f government responsiveness
towards constituencies. The study finds that the region is moving towards a more
responsible and responsive type o f governance, but at different paces and degrees. Poland
leads with respect to government responsiveness. The Czech Republic displays signs o f
elitist responsiveness. Hungary is also moving in the direction o f responsive governance.
Events in the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Romania have been too unsettled to conduct
a meaningful analysis o f government responsiveness at this time.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

From declaring Western democracy’s moral victory over communism in 1989,
to considering post-communist societies still far from joining West European
democracies, ten years after the collapse o f communism question marks remain with
respect to the direction of democracy in the region. Some countries from the former
communist bloc, like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have advanced
politically and economically towards a distinguishable form o f democracy and a market
economy, Others, such as the Slovak Republic, have witnessed contradictory trends,
from moving towards a more open political and economic environment to regressing
into authoritarian tendencies. Yet others, like Bulgaria and Romania, have witnessed
more regress than progress in their attempt to democratize. This situation left analysts
with two legitimate questions: What are the differentiating factors affecting
democratizing processes in Eastern Europe, and what analytical tools should be used in
order to draw meaningful conclusions about the direction o f democratization in the
region? This study uses the concept o f representation to address these questions.
Academic controversies persist around the concept of “representation,” with
one seeming point o f agreement: there is conceptual and methodological differentiation
between the American and the European understanding o f representation. The
American way focuses on a bottom-up approach to representation, with constituencies
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giving mandates to their representatives and representatives implementing those
mandates when they get elected.1 The European way focuses on a top-down approach,
with responsible and disciplined parties offering election agendas to their constituencies
and then attempting to carry out those agendas when they get elected.2
Between these two poles, a wealth o f literature focuses o n various aspects o f
representation: from the proper way to conceptualize the elements o f analysis to the
appropriate tools to carry out empirical research.3 Irrespective o f on-going
controversies, the notion that individuals elected or appointed to perform a public duty
have an obligation to “act in the interest o f the represented, in a manner responsive to
them” is widely accepted to be a basic tenet o f democracy.4
The choice o f representation as analytical tool to address the direction o f
political developments in Eastern Europe is grounded in two reasons.
First, it offers the researcher an ideal o f government behavior against which to
judge the direction o f democratization in the region. This ideal is considered very
important by this researcher; Eastern Europe spent half a century under totalitarian rule,
and many o f the leaders freely elected to office between 1990 and 1998 were raised in
beliefs incompatible with a liberal and representative type o f governance. To the extent
that these leaders manifested a willingness to adapt to the requirements of a
representative democracy, it is essential to acknowledge the change o f direction in East
European politics.
Second, analyses o f representative democracy in Eastern Europe are scarce to
nonexistent. Availability o f comparative data and uncertainty about what the data
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actually measures are two common reasons why this type o f analysis is not attempted
more often.
This study opens the door for an interpretive analysis of the direction o f
democracy in the region. The analysis combines the use o f soft and hard data to
interpret the conflicting trends in the region, rather than confirm or infirm known
models o f analysis. The study is therefore intended to encourage a statistically modest
approach to the study o f developments in the region. Given the uncertainties about the
actual meaning o f hard data, existing statistical analyses can be enriched with the
approach proposed in this study, to the betterment o f our understanding o f where
Eastern Europe stands and where it is headed.
The key issue o f representation is the relationship between government action
and constituency preferences on given issues. In the spirit o f this core issue, it is time
to ask if post-communist East European governments acted in the interest o f those they
represented, in a manner responsive to their constituencies in the past decade since the
collapse o f communism.
The policy issue selected for study is government policy on the question o f the
introduction of a market economy. The broad questions to be addressed are: Did
governments in the region heed to public calls for the introduction o f a market
economy? Is there an observable relationship between government policy-making and
opinion trends on the selected question? Does that observable relationship qualify as
representative o f constituency interests? The answers to these questions will be the
focus o f this analysis.
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BACKGROUND
The debate over Eastern Europe went through several stages within the past ten
years since the collapse o f communism. In so doing, questions o f democratic theory,
method, and regional specificity were touched upon either on purpose or in conjunction
with larger issues o f transition.
In the early nineties, the debate focused on the moral victory o f Western
democracy over communism. Implicit in that debate was the victory o f the Western
political and economic system over the command economy o f the socialist system.
Issues o f the superiority o f a market economic system were central to that debate.
If prior to the collapse o f communism East European leaders could claim the
superiority o f the command economy as a fair system which did not produce
unemployment and inequality, that argument could no longer be made once the Iron
Curtain was lifted. The widespread poverty and inequality found at all levels o f social
interaction in Eastern Europe, as well as the deleterious effects o f planning the
economy were too evident to be concealed or explained away. As a result, in the early
nineties, the debates moved away from the question o f which system was right, towards
the question o f how to make the political and economic system developed by Western
democracies more right. In other words, with the renunciation o f communism by
Eastern Europe, and a few years later by the Soviet Union, the debate pitched
advocates o f a market economy against critics of the downsizes and inequalities
inherent in the system, rather than against advocates o f the command economy.5
The main catalyst o f these debates was whether there was a right way to
democratize and to change the entire philosophic foundation on which a country’s
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system was built. While analysts and policy-makers alike agreed that there was no
cookbook to recommend to Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union states,
everybody also agreed that there should be some rough guidelines to follow that would
make the transition to a Western democracy and a market economy successful.
Political negotiating style, economic liberalization preceding political opening, and no
less important, the political culture of a particular country were all hypothesized to
account for a higher or lower degree of success in the democratizing process.6
All the former communist countries held free elections; could they be declared
democratic? Most former communist countries liberalized their economic policies,
albeit at different paces; were they to be considered market economies? In mid
nineties, the debate moved to analyze specific characteristics o f the East European
transition to a market economic system.7
By 1996, international institutions and other donors conceded that early
analyses misleadingly translated the success o f transition in some countries as the
automatic beginning o f growth. “Transition” and “economic growth” were not the
same thing, and a successful period o f transition did not really mean that a market
economy was established and functioning. In the 1995 Transition Report o f the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, development is defined as “the
enhancement o f the standards o f living o f individuals [through] command over
resources, education and health,”8 to be distinguished from “transition,” which is an
extensive process o f policies that take a market from a command to a market oriented
economy.
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Transition processes are socially painful, do not always produce rapid and
widespread well-being, and can be undermined by public distrust if they fail to be
conducive to economic growth. The 1998 Transition Report acknowledged that,
irrespective o f partial success or failure o f markets in Eastern Europe, there was a
growing gap between the degree o f market liberalization and privatization, and
institutional modernization that allows markets to function properly. Some countries
performed tasks such as market liberalization and privatization faster than other
countries; however they failed at establishing institutions that protected a market
discipline and established a business environment conducive to growth and economic
well-being for all. Additionally, there was an admission that the lack o f attention to
accompanying social policies to alleviate the effects o f transition was likely to erode
trust in democracy and a market economy. 9
The social turmoil caused by transition policies was legitimate and real in all the
countries in the region especially in mid-nineties, and raised questions about the
appropriateness o f adopting policies that hurt large numbers o f people in all these
countries. In mid-nineties, one o f the first critics o f governments’ “tough economic
policies” and “shock therapy” (where it applied) argued that the complex process o f
transition to democracy and a market economy had been left solely in the hands o f
economists and hence was only considered successful if the economists said so. In fact,
Przeworski argued, if only economists gave guidelines for the transition policies, the
social fabric that was to support the policies was likely to erode.10
Alarmingly, the mid-nineties witnessed the voting out o f popular figures
considered to be pro-market, and the voting in office o f former socialist and communist
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leaders or political groups. In Poland, Lech Walesa lost his bid for re-election to a
“communist,” Alecsandre Kwasniewski, while Solidarity lost the parliamentary
elections to the Democratic Left Alliance, the former communist party reformed; in
Hungary, the pro-market Hungarian Democratic Forum lost to the Hungarian Socialist
Party, which was oriented towards more state-control over the economy; and in the
Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic Party lost to the Social Democrats. In mid
nineties, Eastern Europe seemed to be turning towards the Left.
Ten years after the collapse o f communism, we witness yet another
metamorphosis o f the debate over the direction o f Eastern Europe. End o f the century
assessments o f the direction o f democracy in Eastern Europe, as well as in other
emerging democracies throughout the world argue that we are witnessing a new
political phenomenon, the “rise o f illiberal democracies” rather than the “globalization
o f democracy” as it was widely believed at the end of the Cold W ar." It has been
argued that free elections are being held in emerging democracies around the world, but
that they sometimes bring to power extremist power players, with little respect for
human rights or the rule o f law, such as in the states o f the former Yugoslavia.
Markets are being liberalized, but the process o f turning former state assets into private
property leads to increased monopoly over resources by former communist
nome/datura. Should countries in which such phenomena occur be called democracies
and emerging market economies? Or does the scholarly persistence in using established
models of analysis obscure aspects o f emerging markets that need a different analytical
scrutiny? These assessments challenged the results of analyses o f democratization and
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cast yet another big question mark over the manner in which the scholarship persisted
in their analytical orthodoxy.12

THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
The concept o f "representation" offers an attractive alternative analytical tool to
researchers o f Eastern Europe. It combines elements o f procedural and normative
democratic theory, and allows the researcher the luxury o f looking at different angles o f
the same political phenomenon, in order to assess direction and depth o f a particular act
o f representation.
Theories o f democracy and democratization fall largely into two categories:
those advocating the primacy o f the democratic procedure (i.e. free elections), and
those capitalizing on normative requirements (i.e. equal participation in political life,
just distribution o f resources). At stake is the relationship between governments and
their constituencies in the pursuit o f some general goal. Advocates o f the procedural
definition see constituencies as instrumental in the election o f a governing body which
decides social and political priorities. Promoters o f normative approaches see
governments as instrumental in the pursuit o f people's aspirations for freedom, the
achievement o f the common good, and social justice. Both categories then analyze a
political system polarized around "the people's representatives" and their activities.
Even when government responsiveness is largely accepted as a key indicator o f
a democratic society, defining the right tools to measure responsiveness empirically
remains an unsettled issue in both North America and Western Europe. Few analysts
o f democracy would disagree with Key's observation that "governments ... must
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concern themselves with public opinion ... they do not maintain their authority by brute
force alone";13 many also argue that conclusive causality between public opinion and
government behavior, and/or policy-making has yet to be demonstrated.14
The difficulties in determining the appropriate analytical tools to measure
causality eventually led the debate down a less ambitious path o f assessing opinionpolicy “direction.” 15 Is there a popular mandate in a representative democracy that
makes the system such a distinctively preferred form o f governance? Do policy-makers
tend to heed their constituencies' mandates? Or are there accidental instances o f
linkage between the public mandate and the policy-making which mask a manipulative
political system that is no more representative than a totalitarian one? The policy
makers' disposition to act in accordance with, or in response to, public opinion, that is
their “responsiveness” to public views replaced the debate over causality as a yardstick
o f representativeness o f a government.16
A finding that policy-makers actually manipulate constituencies in what appears
to be an act o f representation o f constituency interest may not shatter the foundations
o f a Western democracy. However, similar findings in a region that lived through more
than four decades o f government manipulation may indicate that constituencies in
Eastern Europe merely traded one set o f authoritarian leaders for another, albeit with
more liberal views o f political and economic rights. An assessment o f the progress o f
democracy in the region must take into consideration government responsiveness to
public opinion. The present project concerns itself with the direction of democracy in
Eastern Europe from the standpoint o f governments’ willingness to “heed” the
opinions o f their citizens.17
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To date, assessments o f democracy’s progress in Eastern Europe have paid
surprisingly little attention to the question o f government responsiveness to those they
represent, their ‘disposition’ to implement policies largely favored in public opinion
polls.18 As previously noted, a large body o f literature was spawned after the collapse
o f communism that focused on traditional analyses o f transition to a new political
regime over consolidation o f political processes and institutions.19 Occasionally, the
need to create new analytical categories to account for the post-communist changes has
been signaled.20 Opinion research concerned itself with mass reaction to transition
processes rather than with policy response to public opinion.21 Occasional and isolated
studies signaled that commitment to representation may be perfunctory in the region,22
but were not followed by analyses o f government responsiveness to their publics.
The seeming absence o f representation analyses in post-communist Eastern
Europe may be due to the valid objection that the application of “idealist standards” o f
analysis are inappropriate at this stage in the historical development o f the region.23 It
has been argued that representative democracies are upgraded, modem stages o f
democracy honed by centuries o f political development through trials and tribulations,
and that evaluating emerging democracies by the same standards as older ones is
misleading.
A similarly valid point can be made that Eastern Europe’s forty-year legacy o f
government without accountability makes it doubly important to evaluate the direction
o f the public-govemment relationship. A political culture that worshiped the state as
the sole guarantor o f political, economic, and individual rights is in itself a threat to
democratization processes that foster liberalization, decentralization, individual
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enterprise and human rights. Schopflin and others have argued that political culture is
the main obstacle to democratization in the region, and that some countries in the
region would require several generations before any progress could be made towards
democracy o f Western flavor.24
The difficult process o f economic transformation observed in the region since
1990, the recognized inertia o f government institutional structures, and evident human
rights abuses in some countries are good indicators that caution and modesty should
guide any conclusions about the direction o f democratic transformation o f the region.
Observed developments also indicate that government responsiveness to their
constituencies should not be taken as a given.
The analysis o f representation in Eastern Europe in this study is cross-country
and cross-regional, drawing largely on Western conceptual and analytical models while
allowing for regional and country specificity. Progress towards a representative
democracy is evaluated by the examination o f how governments in Eastern Europe
represented their constituencies’ mandate in one particular policy, the shift from a
central-planned economy to the introduction of a market economy.
The selection o f the introduction o f a market economy as the benchmark policy
to be addressed in relationship with public opinion support has strong domestic and
international underpinnings.
After half a century o f experiments with the central-planned economic system,
the countries o f Eastern Europe demanded radical change o f their economic
environments. They demanded a change for a better life, through the introduction of
the economic system that was successful elsewhere. That was the market economic
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system known in traditional democracies. The level o f poverty o f the populations
across the region unveiled when the Iron Curtain was lifted, the lack o f competitiveness
o f the planned economies, the widespread corruption brought about and maintained by
the practices o f a central system which sustained itself through deceit and fraud, were
all reasons for the constituencies o f Eastern Europe to strongly support the
introduction o f a market economy as a government priority, ahead o f other government
policies. It is then doubly important to analyze how and whether policies conducive to
a market economy were introduced, and what their outcomes were in relation to the
constituencies of the region.
Additionally, all the former communist countries have officially expressed
interest in joining the European Union and some wish to join the Atlantic Alliance. For
accession to occur, the member countries o f these two powerful international players
set criteria that need to be met by applicant countries before membership can be
considered. The creation o f a market economy is a top requirement for accession in
both o f these organizations.25
Within each country, public opinion support for the introduction o f a market
economic system is compared with policy outcomes in the actual introduction o f the
desired system over a period o f eight years, between 1990-1998. Evaluation o f the
direction o f policy are made on the basis o f observed macro-economic trends and
direction o f transition, per available transition indicators.
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METHODOLOGY
Like many essentially contested political science concepts, political
representation has unsolved theoretical aspects that are best reflected by the variety o f
methods used to measure the concept empirically. If the outcome o f free elections was
indeed a body o f public servants that defended the interests o f the voters, then both
procedural and normative analysts would be satisfied that democracy were achieved.
Free elections would satisfy the former, defense of public interests the latter. However,
the large number o f studies that attempt to establish analytical categories to measure
representation empirically suggests that neither category o f scholars is satisfied with the
mere outcome o f free elections as a means and end result o f the democratic practice.
The theoretical dilemma reflects on the selection of measurement categories, and
analysts need to defend one course o f analysis over another.
A minimum o f two alternative working hypotheses can be derived from the
literature: either public opinion influences government conduct, reflected in variations
in policy or legislative outcomes in accordance with approval ratings on specific issues;
or policy and legislative outcomes, dependent on categories other than public opinion
result (or not) in popular support for the government.
It immediately seems apparent that the two approaches do not explain the same
thing. The former hypothesis assesses degrees o f government responsiveness illustrated
by the change in government conduct in relation to public opinion; the latter explains
government conduct in relation to social and political categories unrelated to public
opinion. The former fits in the large category o f “the American model” o f
representation. The latter hypothesis, the so-called “European model” o f
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representation, conceptualizes policy outcomes as results o f categories such a party
politics, social composition o f legislatures, personal opinions that MPs hold,
perceptions o f what voters actually want, etc.
In the first case, legislative accountability, executive responsiveness, or
leadership are the occurring analytical categories used to measure degrees o f
congruence (read causality) between the public and its representatives. In the second
case, socio-economic factors o f elected MPs, party loyalties, party recruitment patterns,
or personal perceptions o f public opinion are categories used to measure specific policy
outcomes. In the second case, the implicit and sometimes explicit conclusions are that
congruence between publics and representatives cannot be a realistic expectation on the
part o f the researcher, or o f the public, given that a host o f processes having little to do
with the will to represent are interposed between the public and their representatives.
The tensions between the two hypotheses go to the hard core o f the democratic
practice. If, as Americanists argue, the public merely reacts to policies and politicians
lead voter opinion as some West-European analyses indicate, then the system should be
characterized as elitist and non-responsive.26 Europeanists argue that this type o f
reasoning is simplistic, and neglects to address the “black box” o f intervening variables
between voter reaction and policy-making. If the relationship between voters and their
representatives is conceived and analyzed as a direct line between two poles, a
multitude o f processes that follow elections and precede policy outcomes remain
unaddressed. MPs, Europeanists argue, are influenced in their work by processes
taking place in the parliament, by party politics and protocols, by their own biases and
beliefs, or by their own perceptions o f what the voters want. If that is the case, then
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the analysis of representation should not focus on causality between public opinion and
policy outcome but rather on the strength o f various factors in the policy and legislative
process-making.27
Evidently, such arguments make the methodological decision even harder. How
is one to study empirically the relationship between government conduct and public
opinion? If the West-European researchers (and some American ones as well) are
correct, analyzing causality is the wrong approach to assess a society’s degree o f
democratization. The analysis o f party politics provides answers to the shape and
direction o f policy-making, and the analysis o f the manner in which M.P.s “sell” their
product to the public explains public support for policies.
However, even if we accept Lippmann’s position that the public tends to be an
ignorant and politically passive actor in the policy-making process, the above position
does not explain political representation, and changes the shape o f the analytical model
in a way that does not do justice to political processes that tend to fit the congruence
model. In this study, the view is taken that in order for a political system to be called a
representative democracy, some degree o f government responsiveness to public opinion
must exist.

Working Hypotheses, Variables and Indicators
If the intention of the present analysis was to measure degrees o f government
representation in a Western democracy, the following clusters o f hypotheses could be
inferred from the literature: if representative democracy, then responsive government.
If responsive government, then causality between government policy and public
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opinion. If causality, as approval ratings on specific issues go up (over a period o f
time), a government initiates or adopts policies to support and implement public
preferences on given issues.
However, this is not an analysis o f a Western democracy, and standards o f
representation should be applied with caution to countries with unsettled types o f
political arrangements. In Eastern Europe, all we can hope for is an indication that
public opinion and policy outcome trends go in the same direction, most o f the time.
Should that be the case, a modest initial assessment can be made that Eastern Europe is
moving in the direction o f building a representative type o f governance.
This study approaches the representation analysis in Eastern Europe from a
comparative perspective that borrows from Western models but allows room for
specificity in interpretation. Public opinion support for the introduction o f a market
economy is compared with actual government policy outcomes over a period o f eight
years.
Within each country and across the region trend analyses are offered, with
particular attention to domestic specifics o f opinion change. Trends in public opinion
are illustrated by line charts indicating direction o f change between 1990 and 1997.
Direction o f policy outcomes is charted based on macro-economic indicators o f
economic performance, and indicators o f progress in transition towards a market
economy are drawn from data available from the European Bank for Reconstruction
and European Union Annual Reports.
The line charts o f public support and policy trends are thereafter superimposed,
to observe whether the two variables are related in any manner. For each country, an
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opinion-policy line chart is designed, and observations on the nature o f the relationship
between the two variables are inferred. Across the region trends are also discussed,
especially in light o f the fact that some o f the countries under analysis started their
reform in a more aggressive and determined manner than others.
A final section within each country study looks at election outcomes over the
same period, to observe public reaction to government performance. Although election
results are means to gauge after-the-fact accountability and are not considered very
reliable indicators o f an opinion-policy relationship, they are important for the
assessment o f constituency maturity in Eastern Europe. Even in Western democracies,
constituencies tend to be regarded as immature and not knowledgeable o f political
processes. In Eastern Europe, such a reality would be deadly for the establishment o f
democracy. Electorate response to government performance is a critical component of
democracy-building and could easily become the driving force o f change in the region.
In this final section, we are interested to see whether the public is ‘punishing’ policy
makers for not fulfilling their mandate and voting them out o f office, or whether
mandates are renewed based on performance.

Data
For each o f the six countries, public opinion data is available between
1990-1997 on the pace and direction o f economic reform from the Central and Eastern
Eurobarometer.2% The New Democracies Barometer questionnaires did not ask a
specific question on the desirability o f the introduction o f a market economy.
However, the survey asked a variety o f questions to tap into the respondents’ views on
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market economy in general. These surveys are used wherever necessary to the analysis,
to complement Eurobarometer findings.29 The variation in methodology between the
two surveys does not allow the use o f some median value, but in cases where the
direction o f the trend is radically different, a discussion follows.
For the direction and outcome o f government reform, indicators o f progress o f
transition, as well as macro-economic indicators are available from the European Bank
for Reconstruction.30 Additionally, evaluations by the European Commission o f the
progress o f applicant countries towards a functioning democracy will be discussed.

PLAN OF STUDY
The analysis is pursued in six chapters. Chapter II presents a journey through
the concept and practice o f representative democracy into the twentieth century. Since
disputable agreement has been made regarding conceptual and analytical characteristics
o f representative democracy, a summary o f the main theoretical points o f contention is
useful in order to build a relevant analysis for Eastern Europe. Debates over the
meaning of representation are presented, with observations regarding the relevance and
usefulness o f several concepts for assessing democracy’s direction in Eastern Europe.
Chapter m addresses issues o f method in the study o f traditional representative
democracies, and offers an analytical framework to interpret the dynamics o f
government responsiveness and public support in Eastern Europe. The terms o f
analysis of policy-opinion direction are introduced, and models o f analysis are
evaluated. General trends in the East European constituencies’ demands for a market
economy and their governments’ policies to meet those demands are presented. The
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chapter sets the background for individual country analyses, and formulates hypotheses
that facilitate interpretation o f events.
Chapters IV through VII are country studies. The relationship between opinion
support and government policy is analyzed in the Czech Republic (chapter four),
Hungary (chapter five), Poland (chapter six), and the Slovak Republic (chapter seven).
These are the so-called ‘front-runner’ countries in the introduction o f reform o f their
economic systems, where the transformation to a market system took a more
recognizable shape. An analysis o f representation in these countries from the
standpoint o f the introduction o f a market economy is justified by the governments’
efforts to meet public expectations.
The same willingness to reform could not be observed in Bulgaria and Romania.
Economic reform was slow in both countries, and political indecision and instability
delayed economic transformation. Chapter VIII briefly addresses conditions o f
systemic transformation in Bulgaria and Romania, with the conclusion that an analysis
o f representation is not yet appropriate in these countries.
Chapter IX offers conclusions about representation in Eastern Europe based on
observed trends. Three kinds o f conclusions are offered. First, theoretical conclusions
address the question of the appropriateness o f applying conceptual assumptions
inherent in analyses o f traditional democracies to analyses o f Eastern Europe. Second,
methodological conclusions address the appropriateness o f using analytical models o f
representation specific to traditional democracies to analyze Eastern Europe. Third,
regionally specific conclusions identify variables affecting representation in the region
and offer predictions of future development o f representation based on observed trends.
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CHAPTER II
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BEGINNING OF THE JOURNEY

The difficulty in assessing democracy’s direction in Eastern Europe is both
conceptual and methodological. It is dependent on and sensitive to Western scholarly and
policy debates over meaning, method, and relevance. Democracy grew in Western Europe
and in the United States over a period o f two centuries, and developed differently in
individual countries. To defend the undertaking o f a representation analysis for Eastern
Europe is to defend the choice o f representative democracy over other models o f
democracy.
Two distinctive characteristics o f representative democracy make this model an
appropriate analytical tool to assess the direction o f democratization in Eastern Europe:
government accountability, and responsiveness. After living for a little less than half a
century under authoritarian regimes, Eastern Europe needs to do more than develop the
institutions o f free elections. It needs to develop a new understanding o f the role o f the
government and o f elected representatives towards the people. The development o f this
new understanding, characterized by government accountability towards constituencies,
and the inclination to heed to the people’s voice can be best assessed within the
framework o f accountable and responsive governance that representative democracy
offers.
As with many other politically contested concepts, inconclusive agreement has
been made to date about the overall conceptual and analytical characteristics o f
representative democracy. However, elements o f representation have been embedded in
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many political arrangements since the dawn of mankind, some o f which were not
democratic. A summary o f the conceptual journey o f democracy since its beginnings into
the twentieth century is useful and necessary in order to build a picture o f the available
theoretical dimensions for a representation analysis. It also helps the researcher track
down elements o f representation that have evolved over many centuries until they found
expression in a political system called representative democracy. Finally, this picture helps
with the identification o f elements o f analysis such as accountability and responsiveness
that need to be part o f modem analyses o f the nature o f emerging democratic political
systems.
The conceptual journey o f representative democracy presented in this chapter goes
back briefly to ancient Greece and medieval times, then moves on to Hobbes into the
twentieth century to offer insights into the main theoretical points o f contention over
meaning and methodology. Section one looks at the beginnings o f democratic ideas and
practice to see how and why the idea o f popular government came into being in ancient
times, particularly in Greece. Section two comments on the decline o f democratic notions
o f governance between ancient times and the middle o f the sixteenth century. The focus
o f the section is on the possible explanations for this decline and on the rejuvenation o f
democracy by the end o f the period. Section three discusses the revival o f democratic
ideas and the main philosophical approaches to govemment-by-the-people into the
eighteen century. Section four discusses the finalization o f democratic ideas and accepted
practices on the eve o f the twentieth century. A concluding section identifies major trends
in philosophical thinking and core analytical characteristics o f a representation analysis
that are thereafter used in the analysis o f the direction o f democracy in Eastern Europe.
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ANCIENT GREECE: WHAT IT MEANT TO BE A DEMOCRAT
Dahl calls the political process that started in ancient Greek city-states roughly in
the first half o f the fifth century B.C. and then spread among Romans and other Italian
cities the “first democratic transformation” in the history o f humankind. The core idea o f
this transformation had to do with governance o f the polis: after centuries o f rule by
tyrants and vicious rulers, the Athenian Greeks decided it was time to have a rule by the
many instead o f a rule by the few.1 They called that rule demokratia, etymologically a
combination o f two Greek words, demos, meaning people, and kratia, meaning rule or
authority. The first democratic transformation refers then to the historic shift from
tyrannic or oligarchic rule o f government to a government ruled by the people.
Despite scant primary sources to determine the nature o f this initial type o f
democracy,2 its main characteristics seem to have embodied both procedural and
normative elements o f political governance that are part o f the modem practice o f
democracy. In the recorded history o f the Peloponnesian war, we are told that all the
Athenian citizens met in regular Assembly meetings, to discuss and decide together on
laws and policies to benefit the largest numbers.3 Citizens took turns to serve in office
regularly, actively administering the affairs o f the city.4 Governance decisions were
motivated by concerns o f equality and fair treatment to all the citizens o f the polis.5 We
can easily recognize in this sketch o f decision-making processes desiderata for quality and
fairness for the polity advocated in modem representative democracies.
A few elements o f this initial democracy stand out as essentially different from
modem democracy in a manner that is relevant to the discussion o f representation. One is
the question o f citizenship.6 While the notion that ‘all’ citizens o f a city come together to
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make decisions about the common good sounds not only ambitious but also appealing
from a normative point o f view, the reality o f ancient Athens and o f other Greek citystates was that citizenship was restrictive and exclusive. Not all the inhabitants o f the
polis were citizens; slaves, children, women, and long-term resident aliens such as the
metics were excluded. Athenian citizenship was primarily a hereditary privilege conferred
only to males based on ties o f kinship, a feature hard to defend in the twentieth century.
Metic families which lived in Athens for generations and contributed to the general well
being o f the polis were denied rights o f citizenship and of land and real estate ownership.
They did enjoy a limited number o f rights to protection in legal courts. Participatory
politics were therefore restricted to a select group o f people within the larger group o f
inhabitants that essentially made up the polis. Since the decisions adopted by a select
group affected the larger whole, arguably Athenians had designed a type o f political
representation whether they acknowledged it or not.
Other characteristics o f the Greek democracy are simply anachronic and contain
the seeds o f a rule o f people by the people that builds directly into the procedural
representation model. The most evident anachronism of this kind is the issue o f size o f
popular assemblies. Commonly referred to as ‘small-scale systems’, the city-state
democracy o f ancient Greeks could be a direct exertion of the rule o f people precisely due
to its small size, a feature which by no means can be replicated in modem nation-state
democracies. Elections were performed in those times as well, but “from all among all.”7
Direct participation was possible due to relatively small political entities organized as
demokratias and was motivated by the belief that it would be unfair and unjust for some to
decide on the affairs o f all. Historians argue over the exact numbers o f Athenian citizens
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who must have been involved in the famous general assemblies.8 Even if the size o f the
polis was in the thousands, subtracting the non-citizens and absentees would still make
attendance fairly high. That feature evidently cannot apply to modem nation-state
democracies, and could not apply to populations even less numerous than the twentieth
century states, such as those o f the Middle Ages.
The fact that the Greeks’ organization was based primarily on the notion o f citystate rather than on confederations o f city-states allowed for direct participation in
government and was no incentive to delegate power to representatives. However, the
attractiveness o f procedural and normative elements o f government such as citizen
participation, responsible decision-making, and quality and fairness o f the political process
can be seen in these early political arrangements. These elements of governance were to
be revisited sixteenth centimes later, when the historical stage became ready for them.

A HISTORICAL GAP
Few analysts tackle heads-on the question o f where the “concept” o f democracy
went between ancient Greece and the seventeenth century. Whether due to the rise o f
Christianity as an alternative view o f authority, stratification of social classes, or a
combination o f political, social and religious factors, for more than sixteenth centimes
there is no record o f any government attempt to build a type o f governance remotely
resembling democracy.9 At the end o f the sixteenth century, it became apparent that
religion had become divisive and that the powers o f the state should be separated from the
duty o f rulers to uphold any particular faith. At this juncture, the question o f the
relationship between govemants and governed came to be considered from a radically
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different light.10 The Leveller Movement (1645-49) is recognized by critics as
extraordinary not because o f its achievements, but because o f the unprecedented nature o f
its demands in the middle o f the seventeenth century." The Levellers’ calls for equal
treatment o f all citizens and universal voting rights are principles o f democratic
representation commonly accepted at the end o f the twentieth century;12 they were
unheard o f and quite audacious only three hundred years before.
In the absence o f a Foucauldian-like study that deconstructs the political discourse
o f over sixteenth centuries, we need to allow for the possibility that the Leveller
Movement was a historical instance along the continuum o f democracy’s conceptual
journey.13 We can toy with the idea that Aristotle’s view o f democracy as the “tyranny o f
the lawless multitude” may have turned off historical valves with respect to the value and
appropriateness o f democracy as a form o f governance.14 We find enough references to
Aristotle’s profound influence on the beginnings o f civilization and long afterwards15 to
acknowledge this as a serious possibility as to why democracy needed to be “restored” or
“rehabilitated” in the eighteenth century.16
However, developments prior to the Leveller movement indicate that the idea o f
democratic governance did not just make a come-back but evolved to the point where the
Levellers’ calls marked a more clear-cut break with past traditions. In Europe, the Middle
Ages saw the rise o f representative institutional structures serving decision-making
processes that influenced and restricted the power o f lords and kings. Only nobles were,
however, worthy to have a say in these representative institutions.17 The age o f
absolutism that followed witnessed the effects o f unhindered royal power both in France
and England; power abuses in levying taxes and in waging wars gave way to revolutionary

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
ideas and revolutions aimed at restricting the ‘divine right o f Kings to rule as they saw fit/
By the end o f the Middle Ages, there was a strong feeling that within a political
community, power should rest with a legitimate authority recognized and accepted by the
entire community.18
The Levellers’ calls for equal treatment o f all citizens and universal suffrage did
not, therefore, come out o f nowhere; they did give the debate over the appropriate role o f
government a distinctive democratic thrust. That debate, formally initiated by Thomas
Hobbes and launched in the middle o f the seventeenth century emergence o f nation-states
continues to this day. The arguments and factors that sustain it are, among others, the
proper role o f a government, the duties and responsibilities o f both governed and public
officials, the relationship between electorate and its representatives, and the locus o f
decision-making.

FROM HOBBES TO MILL: DEFINING DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION
While few theorists o f democracy would dispute the fact that the history o f
democratic thought is hardly a model o f philosophical consistency and coherence, most
would agree to start the historical account o f democracy’s making with Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1679). Writing at the juncture between the sixteenth century emergence o f nation
states in Europe and the weakening o f the faith in the absoluteness o f the Christian model
o f leadership, Hobbes qualifies as the first modem philosopher.
Conversely, while most accounts o f the roots o f democratic thought start with
Hobbes, few o f them consider Hobbes’ view o f government fit to be mentioned in pages
dealing with representation or representative government.19 His famous theory o f the state
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o f nature being the state o f “war o f all against all” where “notions o f right and wrong,
justice and injustice have no place,” and “force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues”
cannot be accommodated within a theory o f the rule o f people by the people at first
sight.20 But, as Pitkin correctly makes the case, there is more to Hobbesian theory than
just a bleak image o f the future o f mankind in the absence o f the powerful protection o f
the Leviathan.
Hobbes’s theory o f government is in fact a theory o f representation with a strong
authoritarian bend. In this vision, human beings cannot escape loss o f life and property
unless they thoroughly renounce their personal power to make choices and yield to the
judgment and will o f the powerful Leviathan.
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from
the invasion o f foreigners and the injuries o f one another, and thereby to secure
them in such a sort as that, by their own industry, and by the fruits o f the earth,
they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly o f men, that may reduce all their
wills, by plurality o f voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint
one man, or assembly o f men, to bear their person; and everyone to own and
acknowledge himself to be author o f whatsoever he that so beareth their person,
shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and
safety; and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgements,
to his judgement.... A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude o f
men do agree and covenant, everyone with everyone, that to whatsoever man, or
assembly o f men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person o f
them all, that is to say, to be their representative.21
If we conclude our analysis o f the Hobbesian view o f representation at this
particular juncture, his theory translates into something that modem critics may recognize
as an acceptable, albeit incomplete definition o f representative government. In modem
terms, this theory can be enunciated as follows: the entire constituency agrees on the
necessity to have an institutional body or a person entrusted with the exclusive right to
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make decisions that affect the interests o f all concerned. Since everybody agrees with this
arrangement, free elections are superfluous.
The problem is, as some critics point out, that the Hobbesian theory o f
representation is inconsistent, not incomplete,22 and to a good extent deceiving.23 The act
o f bestowing all the rights to make decisions about one’s life to the Leviathan may seem
acceptable if, as modem thinkers would add, the Leviathan was committed and pledged to
carry out his obligations, a core issue o f modem representative democracies. But
according to Hobbes, that does not follow. In his view, those who entrust the Leviathan
with power over their lives and well-being are in feet also responsible for any action the
Leviathan might take in their name. The Leviathan is never accountable and has no
responsibilities towards those who entrusted him with their possessions and their lives, a
view repudiated for the next generations o f democratic theorists:
because the right o f bearing the person o f them all, is given to him they make
sovereign, by covenant only o f one to another, and not o f him [Leviathan] to any
o f them; there can happen no breach o f covenant on the part o f the sovereign; and
consequently none o f his subjects...can be freed from his subjection.24
What so much bothered subsequent theorists o f democratic governance was not
necessarily the immense power acquired by the Leviathan or the virtually unhindered
freedom to use it at his will; it was rather the absence o f any accountability for the course
o f action that the Leviathan might take towards his subjects, while being delegated [in
modem terms, elected] by them. Locke (1632-1704) in particular elaborated a view o f the
state o f nature fundamentally opposed to the Hobbesian one, in which individual freedom
is a given, and the constitution o f a larger community under one government is an act o f
individual freedom and general responsibility.
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For when any number o f Men have, by the consent o f every individual, made a
Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, with a Power to
Act as one Body, which is only by the will and determination o f the majority. For
that which acts any Community, being only the consent o f the individuals o f it, and
it being one body must move one way; it is necessary the Body should move that
way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent o f the majority, and
so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority?5 [emphasis
in the original]
Elaborating this theory as Hobbes was writing his, Locke pitched a more friendly
and flexible vision o f the state o f nature that was more agreeable to freedom, property,
and the will o f the majority by comparison to the immutable right to follow the will o f one
person.
Until the mid-nineteen century, when John Stuart Mill laid down a principle for
limiting government activity contrary to citizen will, a host o f other theories offered
alternatives to what Dahl calls the “second democratic transformation,” the shift from the
city-state to the nation-state. This second transformation would eventually lead to the
acceptance o f the concept o f representative democracy (sometimes called ‘representative’
sometimes called ‘liberal’) as roughly the most desirable type o f democracy into the
twentieth century.26
Two major ways o f approaching the dichotomy between governed and
governments can be identified among the early philosophical writings that make the mold
o f representative democracy: either the governed are believed to be incapable o f deciding
or ruling their lives and therefore need good governments to do that work for them (a
view sometimes called ‘guardianship’), or the government is seen as potentially infringing
individual liberty and therefore needing to be in check all the time (a view largely called
liberalism).27 Between these two poles, a host o f variations have tried to solve the tension
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between individual liberty and rights, and their attainment through an institutional body
called state or government.
Rousseau’s Social Contract tried to resolve the dilemma o f the government versus
the people by completely dropping the government out o f the equation and empowering
the citizens to be their own masters. That end could be achieved, Rousseau (1712-1778)
thought, in a unification o f the wills o f all conducive to the General Will.
Each o f us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme
direction o f the general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an
indivisible part o f the whole ... this act o f association produces a moral and
collective body, composed o f as many members as there are votes in the assembly,
which from this act receives its unity, its common self its life, its will. This public
person, which is thus formed by the union o f all other persons, took formerly the
name of “city,” and now takes that o f “republic” or “body politic.” It is called by
its members “State” when it is passive, “Sovereign” when in activity, and whenever
it is compared with other bodies o f a similar kind, it is denominated “power.”28
In this arrangement, everybody is free from the constraints o f government, but not
from the constraints o f following the general will, a view to be fiercely fought by
American liberals later on.
In order, therefore to prevent the social compact from becoming an empty
formula, it tacitly comprehends the engagement, which alone can give effect to the
others - that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to it by
the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free; for this is the condition
which, by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his absolute personal
independence, a condition which gives motion and effect to the political machine.
This alone renders all civil engagements justifiable, and without it they would be
absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.29
Late nineteen and twentieth century anarchists attempted to follow this trend of
thought, arguing that states were coercive by nature, therefore they should be abolished
and replaced with free associations o f citizens.30 Anarchism, however, never resolved
basic issues o f defection by a minority from the rule o f a compliant and responsible
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majority, nor did it get into the more mundane matters o f feasibility, mechanics o f
association, and o f responsibility.
Between Rousseau and the French Revolution, three historical developments
helped shape the two main directions o f the representative democracy continuum. The
Leveller Movement and early American ideas o f representative government contributed to
the notion that representation within a democracy can and should be conceived as an
institution in which governments are responsible and accountable to their constituencies, a
view called the ‘American model o f democracy’ in the twentieth century. In contrast, the
rise o f the Whig view o f representation in England launched the concept that
representatives were not and should not be bound by mandates from their constituents, but
rather represent the larger national interest in the best way they saw fit. This became
known as the ‘European model o f democracy.’ We shall return to these models.
The Levellers marked a distinctive and fairly unique moment in British evolution to
democracy through their ideas about Parliament’s composition and its relationship to the
people. The Tory traditional view, that the function o f M.P.s was merely to represent
local interests and seek redress for particular grievances while the King and his ministers
were responsible for interpreting the national interest was challenged by the Levellers’
demand for universal suffrage and equal representation o f all. The Levellers felt that each
man in England should have the right to send a representative to London to voice
concerns about their lives, a daring notion for a Parliament traditionally made up o f
members o f the wealthy middle class. Similarly, the Levellers thought that Parliament
should be the agent o f popular will rather than a mere tool for deciding when and by what
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means the King’s next campaign was going to be fought. These views turned into
demands on the British Parliament and challenged traditional views o f governance.31
By contrast, the English Whigs developed a view o f representation that echoed
Rousseau in some respects, and Hobbes in others, and which was as contested as the two
philosophers. An early expression o f that view was formulated by Algernon Sidney, and
the epitome o f it was given to us by Edmund Burke (1729-97). In essence, this view
argues that Parliament represented the whole nation, rather than aggregate separate
interests. In order for M.P.s to pursue the good o f the nation, they needed to be free to
do what they thought best in the national interest. In 1698, Sidney was writing that
It is not therefore for Kent or Sussex, Lewes or Maidstone, but for the whole
nation, that the members chosen to serve in these places are sent to serve in
Parliament. And though it be fit for them., .to harken to the opinions o f the
electors for the information o f their judgements...yet they are not strictly and
properly obliged to give account o f their actions to any...32
In mid-eighteenth century, we find Whig leaders postulating a fairly Hobbesian
view that representatives should be under no obligation to take instructions from their
constituents:
After we are chosen, and we have taken our seats in this House, we have no longer
any dependence on our electors, at least in as for as regards our behavior here.
Their whole power is then devolved upon us, and we are in every question that
comes before this House, to regard only the public good in general, and to
determine according to our own judgements.33
And in the later part o f the eighteenth century, as the French Revolution was
starting to loom on the horizon, we find Burke arguing that power “in the hands o f the
multitude ... admits o f no control, no regulation, no steady direction whatsoever.”34
Consequently, Burke argued that power should be naturally delegated to Parliament, the
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only body capable o f pursuing the “general reason of the whole,” that is the national
interest:
Parliament is not a congress o f ambassadors from different and hostile interests,
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents
and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly o f one nation, with one
interest, that o f the whole - where not local prejudices ought to guide, but the
general good, resulting from the general reason o f the whole. You choose a
member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member o f Bristol, but
he is a member o f Parliament.35
Implicit in the Whig view are two important aspects o f the govemmentconstituency relationship. In the first place, there is an identifiable national interest worth
pursuing, which takes precedence over all other personal, local or group interests. All the
composing parts o f the whole nation agree that this national interest (what Rousseau
called the General Will) must be pursued, and they delegate the Parliament to carry out the
job. Secondly, the Parliament representatives are under no obligation to consult with
constituencies before making decisions in the national interest, since they are singularly fit
to make those decisions (a view Hobbes would have gladly endorsed). Neither Rousseau
nor Hobbes withstood the test o f history; their theories, together with variations on their
political themes like that o f the seventeenth century Whig view o f representation came
heavily under attack by their contemporaries.
Early American views o f government marry the concepts o f representation and
democracy in a formal type o f government called representative democratic government
for the first time in history. In 1802, Thomas Jefferson was declaring in a letter to
Governor Hall that “We have the same object, the success o f representative government.
Nor are we acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race. The event o f our
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experiment is to show whether man can be trusted with self-government.”36 In 1816, in a
letter to I. H. Tiffany, he stated that
The full experiment o f government democratical, but representative, was and still
is reserved for us... The introduction o f this new principle o f representative
democracy has rendered useless in almost everything written before on the
structure o f government; and in great measure relieves our regret if the political
writings o f Aristotle, or any other ancient, have been lost.37
Evidently, the new nation on the rise on the other side o f the Atlantic was not
interested to inherit the Whig philosophical approaches o f the mother-country, nor was it
prone to continue its dependence on the British island, especially after King George III
tried to impose taxes on the colonists without their consent. One would have thought that
the British had learned from the lessons o f their own history not to try ‘taxation without
representation’ again; just as the former attempt ended with the crisis between the
Parliament and the Crown and led to the severance o f a king’s head, the attempt on the
American colony precipitated the latter’s severance from the mother-British island. The
Declaration o f Independence formalized the separation by appealing to general principles
o f governance, while the Federalist Papers formalized a view o f representative
government that is fairly close to what America eventually bred by the end o f the twentieth
century.
The concept o f democracy that lies at the foundation o f the American democracy
allows for the first time in modem history for a system o f checks and balances between
governments and their constituencies. The Founding Fathers expected members o f the
legislature to act as delegates o f their constituents and favored frequent elections to
prevent representatives from acquiring too much independence. Writing o f the House o f
Representatives in 1788, the Founding Fathers found it essential that a representative
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should have “an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.
Frequent elections are unquestionably the oniy policy by which this dependence and
sympathy can be effectually secured.”38 And J e ffe rs o n declared that members o f the
legislature should submit themselves to “approbation or rejection at short intervals,” to
preempt abuses o f power and the possibility o f losing touch with the real holders o f
power, the people.39 This was the first time when a philosophy o f governance addressed
directly and operationally the relationship between constituencies and their government
representatives, with elections as the measurable dimension of how governments lived up
to their constituencies’ expectations.
Somewhat paradoxically, the legacy o f the French Revolution is an approach to
governance that resembles more the Whig view o f representation than the American one,
despite the fact that the Revolution pitched popular government against absolute
monarchical power.
It is the approach rather than the facts o f the Revolution that is important to the
topic o f representation. Under the leadership o f Abbe Sieyes, the revolutionaries adopted
the view that the nobility and the clergy had no right to claim themselves as part o f the
nation since they possessed legal privileges and exemptions that relieved them from
abiding by the laws o f the land, therefore they made themselves foreigners in their own
nation. They were equally not entitled to stand for election as representatives o f the Third
Estate, the estate that was made up o f the largest number o f people of the land. In order
to secure that none o f those elected to the Third Estate would yield to pressure from the
nobility, Sieyes induced the Assembly to declare that deputies were not bound by the
instructions o f their constituents. This stipulation was included in the Declaration o f the
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Rights o f Man and o f the Citizen, in the summer o f 1789. The Constitution o f 1791
declared that sovereignty resided in the nation, that the National Assembly embodied the
will o f the nation, and mandated that “the representatives elected in the departments will
not be representatives of a particular department but o f the whole nation, and they may
not be given any mandate.”40 This view o f representation led modem critics to argue that
as soon as the French representatives were given the name o f ‘deputies’ they ceased (in
theory) to deputize for anyone.41
We can see from this abbreviated history o f theoretical developments that the roots
o f the controversy between the European and the American models o f representation go
as far back as the seventeenth century. The view that a representative derives his
legitimacy from the act o f elections and that he is not bound to heed to the instructions o f
his constituents became the European approach to representative government. In
contrast, the radical American view cherished the notion that representatives are the
people’s agents. Constitutional provisions prohibiting mandates and instructions from
constituents to representatives were included in the constitutions o f Belgium (1831), Italy
(1848), Prussia (1850), Sweden ( 1866), Austria (1867), Germany (1871), Switzerland
(1874), the Netherlands (1887), Denmark (1915), and later in the 1948 Constitution o f
Italy and the 1949 Basic Law o f the German Federal Republic.42 The view that
sovereignty rests with the people and that political representatives are the people’s agents
remained the American approach.
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UTILITARIANISM AND REPRESENTATION
Despite the strong influence o f the Whig view o f representation on British and
European political affairs, the British political system was challenged from within and led
to the introduction o f representative governments in Britain and France. Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832), James Mill (1773-1836), and their predecessors, Joseph Priestley (17331804), Richard Price (1723-1791) and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) challenged the British
parliamentary system on the grounds o f the franchise. Their influence can largely be seen
in twentieth century continental parliamentary arrangements.
In the beginning o f the eighteenth century, the British House o f Commons did not
reflect the social and demographic changes in an increasingly industrial England and a
disproportionately large number o f landowners represented an increasingly narrow range
o f constituents. The demographic growth accompanied by the booming o f industrial areas
created the unrealistic situation in which landowners served in a disproportionately large
number in the House while the emerging industrial areas were under-represented.43 For
the Whigs, this situation did not represent a problem: they argued that, as long as some
industrial cities had representatives in the House, virtually all industrial cities were
represented. The words o f a House member arguing this case are worth quoting: “It is not
more expedient that a large town should be represented rather than a small town because
its interests will be watched by its own delegates; but because it is more likely to send a
good representative to the national councils.”44
Two waves o f radical reformers challenged this view o f representation in England.
One group based their demands for legitimate, equal representation on a belief in natural
rights o f men resembling American ideas. They were largely inconsequential in the history
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o f parliamentary change. The other group developed its own philosophy called
utilitarianism, which achieved the change that the first group aspired to, but starting from
radically different premises and assumptions about human nature. Utilitarianism defended
a structure o f representation and interest that translated into a political arrangement similar
to the American one only based on a different philosophy.
Joseph Priestley and Richard Price were pioneer challengers. They developed
political ideas based on the writings o f Rousseau and forwarded the view that sovereignty
rested with the people, therefore all people should be entitled to political representation.
Thomas Paine added his efforts to theirs in his famous The Rights o f Man. The
revolutionary idea that a representative government should be based on a wide franchise
and that the citizens had the right to revolt against forms o f government that did not abide
by that rule was once again reiterated.45 Their arguments, however, were never really
popular in England.
It was utilitarianism, a philosophy developed in England, that was to challenge the
Whig foundation o f government in a more convincing and radical manner than the natural
rights philosophy, with the ironical results that utilitarians achieved the change that the
natural rights radicals advocated. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were the pioneers o f
this philosophy, with modernized versions o f utilitarianism to be developed later into the
twentieth century.
Jeremy Bentham, the father o f utilitarianism, was the first to advocate a simple
principle o f utility according to which laws were good as long as they increased the sum
total o f the happiness o f humankind, and bad if they decreased that happiness.
Consequently, the best kind o f parliamentary system was one in which legislators, in the
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course o f promoting their own interests and happiness, would automatically maximize the
happiness o f the whole population.
In order to achieve such a parliamentary body, manhood suffrage was necessary,
to insure that the personal interests o f the whole were represented in the legislature.
Annual elections were necessary to make sure that M.P.s were in constant contact with
their constituencies and represented their voices, and did not have the time to develop
personal, exclusive interests o f their own, a view Jefferson and the Founding Fathers
found appealing irrespective o f philosophical foundation. Any law supported by a
majority o f such a legislative body would be in the interest o f the majority and therefore
would increase the sum total o f happiness in society.46
Bentham's good friend, James Mill, set out these principles in a more clear manner
in his Essay on Government. Starting out from the basic assumption that men are
motivated in their actions by self-interest, he argued that any legislative body should
account for each individual interest in order to ensure that the sum total o f interests was
represented, therefore increasing the sum o f total happiness in a society. “It is indisputable
that the acts o f men follow their will, that their will follows their desires, and that their
desires are generated ... by their interests. [...Hence,] a legislative assembly must have an
identity o f interest with the community, otherwise it will make a mischievous use o f its
power.”47 In order to prevent representatives from abusing their power, a structure
needed to be arranged so that “in his capacity o f representative it would be impossible for
him to do himself as much good by misgovemment as he would do himself harm in his
capacity o f member o f the community.”4* That structure was identified as (frequent)
elections, which would preempt abuse o f power since “the smaller period o f time during
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which any man retains his capacity o f representative, as compared with the time in which
he is simply a member o f the community, the more difficult it will be to compensate the
sacrifice of the interest o f the longer period by the profits o f misgovemment during the
shorter.”49 This was the basic tenet o f utilitarianism that changed the premises from which
the British viewed their Parliament, and the basis to which later views o f representation
will return.
With the early utilitarians, then, we see the initial elements o f modem
representative democratic systems. Utilitarian advocacy for a blend o f procedural and
(almost) normative requirements for a reformed parliamentary system led to the
institutionalization o f elections and universal franchise a century and a half later. The
discourse on the necessity o f universal franchise, however, consumed much o f the nineteen
century. It was led by advocates o f utilitarian principles as well as advocates o f natural
rights for all, and eventually led to the introduction of universal franchise in the beginning
o f the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, the century-long battle for universal suffrage rights seems
to be one of the many historical accomplishments that tend to be taken for granted. It is
instructive to pause and reflect on its beginnings for a moment. The fact that early
utilitarians battled for procedural mechanisms such as frequent elections and universal
franchise to ensure profits and benefits for all rather than equal rights for all is somewhat
ironic, since their battle put the very issue o f equal rights under discussion. As James Mill
reassured his contemporaries that, if given the vote, the poor and the ignorant would go to
the enlightened, “most virtuous” part o f the community for advice, he also raised red flags
regarding the general understanding o f participation, responsibility, and governance.
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...the opinions o f that class o f the people who are below the middle rank are
formed, and their minds are directed by that intelligent, that virtuous rank who
come the most immediately in contact with them, ...to whom they fly for advice
and assistance ... to whom their children look up as models for their imitation ...
There can be no doubt that the middle rank ... is that portion o f the community of
which, if the basis o f representation were so far extended, the opinion would
ultimately decide.50
It was Mill’s own son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who cast the debate over the
role o f the government and o f equal rights for all in a light that took the role o f a
government towards its citizens to a new political dimension. Greatly influenced by the
ideas that Alexis de Tocqueville brought from America on liberal franchise, Mill advocated
the extension o f the franchise on the grounds o f its contribution to the vitality o f the
people. Mill believed that a political system which would engage citizens in political
activity would yield a high degree o f common good and therefore, is was highly desirable.
A government, he said, was “an agency o f national education”, and should be judged by
“its actions upon men ... by what it makes o f the citizens, and what it does to them; its
tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves.”51 This was hardly a utilitarian
position which took the controversy over rights and privileges to a different, higher level
o f political discourse. In the twentieth century, these terms o f discourse were dubbed
“normative.”
Universal suffrage was introduced in Britain only in 1918, after several Reform
Acts that gradually extended the suffrage but fell short o f including the working class. In
France, the Revolution o f 1848 brought about the change that the British were still slow in
adopting. The French introduced manhood suffrage and direct national elections, and this
system has not been challenged since. In the United States, property qualifications were
maintained until the mid-1830s, and by the end o f the Civil War they disappeared.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
A challenge to the system o f representation as defined so far came from Marxist
theory. For Karl Marx and his followers, the “end” o f humanity had a teleological
character, with the proletariat winning over the capitalist forces of the bourgeoisie and
effecting the necessary transformation o f the economic basis o f society. In a capitalist
society, the function o f the government was to preserve the capitalist system rather than to
disperse resources equitably. Representation was, therefore, understood to be a
procedural tool in the hands o f the working class who would bring about a revolution that
would set everybody free. For Marxists, representative democracy was a sham defined
and designed to further enslave masses in the name o f some liberal ideal.
Even if at the end o f the twentieth century there are few political arrangements in
the world that openly support an orthodox Marxist view, the reality is that at its time,
Marxism was a very powerful ideological tool which developed momentum in the hands o f
a few Russian and East European leaders. History proved that Marxism is not a functional
political arrangement. However, its appeal was enormous, and its consequences will be
with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for a long time.
Puzzling as this may sound on the eve o f a new millennium, several early thinkers
o f representative government treated representation in reductionist terms comparable to
the Hobbesian view. The concept that a representative is someone merely entrusted to
act, with no further stipulations o f responsibilities or duties towards those who entrusted
him with that authority, was shared as late in the conceptual journey as the mid-twentieth
century. Representation was said to occur whenever “one person is authorized to act in
place o f others ... with binding authority in the name o f others;”52 “...representativeswhatever the manner o f their investiture- are authorized in advance to act conjointly in
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behalf o f their constituents and bind them by their collective decisions;”53 and
representative government can be defined as “a form o f government whereby the governed
can be said to be responsible for their governors’ actions.”54 These views were, however,
quietly abandoned by a majority o f political thinkers.
By 1920, America built an image o f its political system as normatively “superior”
to European arrangements. The main elements o f that image were the responsible voter,
the accountable representative, and the constant flow o f constructive communication
between government and the public. That vision was eventually challenged not by an
European, but by an American. Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion (1922), and his later
The Phantom Public called into question assumptions about the citizen’s knowledge of,
interest, and participation in the political process. It also called into question the feasibility
o f having informed citizens and therefore responsible participants in the political process in
a world o f mediated information.
The world that we have to deal with politically is out o f reach, out o f sight, out o f
mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined. Man is no Aristotelian god
contemplating all existence at one glance. He is the creature o f an evolution who
can just about span a sufficient portion o f reality to manage his survival, and snatch
what on the scale o f time are but a few moments o f insight and
happiness...[Representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics,
or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis o f election,
unless there is an independent, expert organization for making unseen facts
intelligible to those who have to make the decisions... [PJublic opinions must be
organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case
today.”55
The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back
row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery o ff there, but cannot quite
manage to keep awake.-.public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They
are for the most part invisible. They are managed, if they are managed at all, at
distant centers, from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers... In the cold light o f
experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. He reigns in theory, but in
fact he does not govern... The actual governing is made up o f a multitude o f
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arrangements on specific questions by particular individuals. Government, in the
long intervals between elections, is carried out by politicians, officeholders and
influential men who make settlements with other politicians, officeholders and
influential men.56
Lippmann-like calls to an awareness o f the difference between the real life
'democratic process’ and the theory o f democracy gave rise to intensive studies o f public
opinion and its relationship to government action. Those studies did not salvage the
democratic vision either. At their best, they uncovered the immense conceptual and
methodological problems o f studying public opinion formation, development, or relevance
to politics. At their worst, they further weakened the vision o f people mandating
representatives to serve their interests in the government. It will be the task o f the
following chapter to look more closely into these difficulties.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY’S JOURNEY: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS
This brief historical account o f the evolution o f democratic ideas and o f
representation allows for a number o f preliminary observations regarding key elements o f
governance. The debate over the relationship between governments and their
constituencies, and further down the road over political representation, is evidently one o f
the oldest in political thinking. From ancient to medieval times, theoretical distinctions
were made between the “divine right” o f kings to rule over their subjects versus the
“delegated right” to rule.
Quality and fairness o f political decisions, and equal chances o f popular
participation in the process o f government, were desiderata before the beginning o f the
millennium. The prolonged period o f unaccountable governments during the Middle Ages

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
led to a rise in popular consciousness about rights to have a voice heard in the process o f
government. In the eighteenth century, the debate o f “natural law” versus “the state o f
nature” consumed much o f the political discourse, with the result that many political
arrangements were conceived in the name o f the general good, but with little leadership
accountability to the people. In the nineteen century, theorists struggled with the
“procedural” versus “substantive” conceptualizations o f democratic government, and in
the early twentieth century, “American” versus “European” models o f democracy were
further differentiated. Most recently, the debate pitches the concepts o f “representative
government” and “representative democracy” against each other, with arguments about
their distinctiveness and applicability.57
Historical debates take a lengthy, sometimes encyclopedic approach to the
development o f the concept o f representation since its inception. Conceptual arguments
use tools and sources from a variety o f disciplines to come up with the right and
incontrovertible definition. Methodological approaches attempt to measure the empirical
validity and applicability o f existent theories. The nature o f the controversies varies but a
common thread runs through them all: defining democracy’s core issue o f political
representation in a way that is accepted by the widest majority.
Rather than make conceptual arguments about “true” meanings, this study takes
the view that representative democracy has traveled a long enough journey to be
considered a valid and attractive system o f government. Because o f its attractive features,
representative democracy has become a model (not to be understood in a positivist sense)
o f governance to follow, and is a system towards which emerging polities aspire. As such,
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defining characteristics o f representative democracy should be part o f analyses o f
emerging democracies.
Current studies o f the direction and progress towards democracy in Eastern
Europe address typical representative democracy elements o f fairness o f elections, civil
freedoms, and popular participation in the process o f government. Elements o f
government responsiveness to public views, however, have not been addressed
systematically. It will be the task o f the next chapters to design an approach to
government responsiveness that sheds light on progress towards accountability and
responsiveness in the region.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1.

Dahl. Democracy, p. 13. Recent archeological evidence traces the first elements o f
democratic governance to well before the Athenian democracy, to the Spartans and
Phoenicians. However, the scope o f this study does not necessitate an in-depth
presentation o f these first symbols o f democracy. For those interested, see Simon
Homblower, “Creation and Development o f Democratic Institutions in Ancient
Greece,” in John Dunn, ed., Democracy, The Unfinished Journey: 508BC to AD
1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 1-16.

2.

Jones argues that “in the abundant literature produced in the greatest democracy in
Greece there survives no statement o f democratic political theory.” See A.H.M.
Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 41. However, the
problem with ancient democratic theory seems to be less the existence o f statements
per se as it is the internal consistency o f the theories which survived. Aristotle, for
example, differentiates between democracies and oligarchies as between the state in
which “the free are sovereign” versus the state in which “the rich are sovereign.” See
Aristotle, The Politics, trans., T.A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1981), p. 245. Yet in further defining how free men exercise their right to
rule in a sovereign way, he assigns that right only to full-fledged citizens (a discussion
is offered further on) who are not in fact the totality o f the free men in the state:
“...we must not give the name o f citizen to all the persons whose presence is
necessary for the existence o f the state..., the best state will not make a mechanic a
citizen...; what we have called the virtue o f a citizen cannot be ascribed to everyone,
nor yet to free men alone, but simply to those who are in fact relieved o f necessary
tasks.” Ibid., p. 184. It follows that Aristotle’s democracy is the type o f government
in which citizens—who could have been a majority, but not an inclusive one-have the
right to rule in a sovereign way, rather than all the free men in a state. This inference
comes into contradiction with his overall theory o f democratic governance, which is
perhaps the most complete o f the existing ancient theories in terms o f descriptions of
the methodology and practice o f democracy.

3.

Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War, trans., Rex Warner, with an
introduction and notes by M.I. Finley (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1985), p. 73; also Aristotle, pp. 205, 363.

4.

In Pericles’ funeral oration, the engagement o f the Athenians in the affairs o f the state
is spelled out quite unequivocally: “Here [in Athens] each individual is interested not
only in his own affairs but in the affairs o f the state as well: even those who are most
occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics-this
is a peculiarity o f ours; we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a
man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.”
Thucydides, p. 147.
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5.

Aristotle, pp. 195, 207-209, 298.

6.

Aristotle defines citizenship extensively yet inconclusively. Sometimes citizens are
distinguished from non-citizens by birth right (having both an Athenian father and
mother), other times by their virtue and sound judgement (“the citizen proper,
without any defects needing to be amended, the wise and virtuous”; “the experts,” not
the “inferior persons [who should not] have sovereign control over more important
matters than the respectable sort”), and sometimes by the capacity to hold office (“...a
citizen in the fullest sense is one who has a share in the honours [‘status,’ ‘respect,’
‘privilege’ gained from holding office]." Leaving aside the elitist aspects o f these
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fullest sense (i.e., allowed to hold office and make decisions). Aristotle, pp. 169, 171172, 184-185, 205.

7. Aristotle, p. 363.
8.

John V. A. Fine, The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), pp. 51, 75, 240, 408; also M. I. Finley, Politics in the
Ancient World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 73.

9. The Middle Ages were ideologically dominated by the rise o f Christianity, with its
accent on shifting the place o f secular authority to spiritual authority, an order
characterized by Bull as the "international Christian society." Hedley Bull, The
Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977), pp. 27-33.
10. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations o f M odem Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 352.
11. David Wotton, “The Levellers,” in John Dunn, ed., Democracy, the Unfinished
Journey: 508BC to AD 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 71.
12. ”... that the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the greatest he; and that
... every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put
himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not
at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to put
himself under.” From the speech o f a Leveller supporter, quoted in David Wotton,
ed., Divine Right and Democracy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex.: Penguin Books,
1986), p. 286.
13. Dunn’s collection o f essays makes this case. See John Dunn, ed., Democracy, the
Unfinished Journey: 508BC to AD 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
14. Wotton advocates this view. See Wotton, "Levellers," p. 73.
15. Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization o f the Middle Ages: A Completely Revised and
Expanded Edition o f M edieval History, the Life and Death o f a Civilization (New
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CHAPTER III
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: MEASUREMENT ISSUES
IN TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND IN EASTERN EUROPE

Before we design the terms of a government responsiveness analysis for Eastern
Europe, we need to highlight methodological aspects o f measuring representation in
traditional democracies, in order to decide what type o f methodological approach would
be appropriate for the region.
In the study o f traditional democracies, who is the ‘public’ with ‘opinions’ that the
government must ‘take into account’? How does the ‘public’ express ‘opinions’ in a
manner that allows the government to incorporate such opinions into ‘policy’? And what
institutions or tools are available with which to measure the intensity or value o f the
relationship between public opinion and government policy?

OPINIONS, PUBLICS AND POLICIES: THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA
There is conceptual uncertainty and usage inconsistency regarding ‘public’ and the
‘opinion’ held by such a collection, and the ‘policy’ that it influences. Until the mid-fifties,
it was popular to talk about the ‘public’ as a collection o f people who shared a common
interest and interacted based on that common interest.1 While frequently used, such
definitions told researchers little about common interest formation, the dynamics o f
interest change, the mechanics o f interaction, or the relation o f the public to political
decisions. Differentiations were made between ‘special publics' and ‘general publics’2,
and between ‘mass public’ and the ‘attentive public.’3 The concept o f opinion underwent
similar tribulations, especially when it was tied to the concept o f ‘public.’4 With the
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advent o f technology and the dissemination o f information through television, research o f
opinion formation relative to mass media flourished,5 with the resulting general impression
that the media had become a tool o f disinformation and propaganda.6
An equally ambivalent conceptualization and usage o f the relationship between
'policy’ and ‘opinion’ prevailed, with a tendency to analyze policy change primarily as
legislative action.7 Other indicators o f policy were government intention and purpose,
actual behavior o f public representatives, and policy outcomes.8 Policy-making was
occasionally seen as the product o f psychological factors, such as politicians’ perceptions
about constituency preferences;9 while studies in Europe found that M.P.s were critical
and skeptical o f voter interest or knowledge o f political issues, which diminished their
willingness to heed to publicly expressed preferences for policies.10
These differentiations were useful exercises at their time, but they were o f limited
help in finding out more about who the public was, which opinions were relevant, how
opinions were formed and which opinions mattered politically. As Bernard Berelson
ironically summarized the situation, “some kinds o f communication on some kinds o f
issues, brought to the attention o f some kinds o f people under some kinds o f conditions,
have some kinds o f effects.” 11

THE CONGRUENCE MODEL
In the mid-sixties, a pair o f American political scientists made an important break
through in the methodology employed to study the opinion/policy relationship. The
Miller-Stokes “congruence diamond,” as it later came to be known, analyzed the
relationship between constituency preferences and the final roll-call vote o f their
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representatives on given issues using the correlation coefficient. This model gave a new
impetus to the study o f the opinion-policy relationship and became the focus o f much
scholarly dispute.12
The basic model o f the Miller/Stokes “diamond” focuses on the degree to which
constituents’ views are represented in the legislature by their elected Congressmen. The
model explains the dependent variable, the Congressmen’s legislative vote via three
independent variables, “district sentiment” on a selected policy issue, the “politicians’
opinions” on the issue, and the “politicians’ perceptions o f district sentiment” on the issue
at a given point in time. Between and among these variables, sets o f relationships were
hypothesized and path-correlation coefficients were calculated. These four distinct
variables were related to one another according to Figure 1 on the next page.
Miller and Stokes found that the relationship between popular preferences on three
selected policies (social welfare, civil rights, and foreign policy) and the manner in which
elected representatives gave their vote in the House o f Representatives on those policies
(the AD axis) was strong in the case o f elected representatives from the state o f Michigan.
They concluded that causal links existed between constituents’ preferences for the selected
policies and the manner in which elected representatives represented those opinions in the
United States Congress.
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Figure 1. The Miller -Stokes “Diamond”
Based on Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (1963), p. 50.

Critiques o f the congruence model followed, with initial emphasis on the
conceptual difficulties posed by indicators o f public opinion and policy. Robert Weissberg
cautioned that too much emphasis on causality based on a model that used at best relative
measures o f public opinion preferences and approximations o f government policy
outcomes was a dangerous road to travel. He argued that the many complications posed
by concepts and the indicators selected to measure them should be a stimulus to maintain a
degree o f modesty about causality in analysis o f policy-opinion congruence. He argued
that an analysis o f trends or direction o f opinion and policy observed over a period o f time
was a much healthier and realistic analytical approach.13
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One o f Weissberg’s contributions to the question o f congruence was his
description o f the ‘time lag’ between publicly expressed preferences and the leaders’
reaction in the form o f policy. He argued that congruence should not be regarded as a
static phenomenon, measured at one time. In his view, publics express preferences for
policies during polls, elections, or referenda, at a given point in time (T l). Thereafter, the
representatives need time to analyze preferences and decide what they are (or are not)
going to do about them, say at T2. Finally, between raising the issue in the legislative
assembly at T3, debating substance and consequences o f policies at T4, and rallying
enough votes to pass policies that voters prefer at T5, time elapses and congruence (or
not) with the voters expressed preferences may be observed only at T6. Merely knowing
public preferences and policy at T l is not enough for a serious analysis o f how congruence
occurs.14
Further questions about methodology and the use o f the correlation coefficient in
the congruence diamond were raised. Cristopher Achen argued that the correlation
coefficient was virtually uninterpretable within the framework o f democratic theory and
that its use could generate misleading conclusions. He argued that if the model o f analysis
did not incorporate a measure of the diversity o f the sampled constituencies, the results
did not mean anything valuable for the study o f representation. He demonstrated that
when constituencies are diverse, large correlations resulted. These large correlations were
interpreted to indicate strong relationships between voter preferences and representative
action. These large correlations resulted even when voters were not necessarily sensitive
to a particular issue advocated by the representative, but merely reflected the wide
diversity o f preferences among the selected group.
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Conversely, when constituencies were relatively homogenous, correlations could
be small even when representatives favored and voted for issues o f interest to their
constituents. Consequently, he recommended that the use o f the correlation coefficient
be abandoned in studies o f representation.15
Converse and Pierce welcomed the diamond model and developed it further,
sensitive to previous critiques. The major contribution o f the French analysts was to
design a model of representation analysis that incorporated the measurement o f variance
between and within district constituencies on given issues. Their acknowledgment that
“constituency will and constituency interest can sometimes be discrepant [which] presents
a complication” to any methodological model led them to the use o f a new statistical
measure to solve the between-within variance: the “eta” statistic.16
The methodological fix that Converse and Pierce elaborated had a strong
theoretical underpinning. For the “who is to be represented?” question, they advocated
the use o f the “Anglo-Saxon” system o f representation, which equated popular
representation with geographic districts, in opposition to advocates o f “issue
representation” who preferred a representation system designed around interest
constituencies. They argued that territorial constituencies eliminate the problem o f
constituency identification, and made “issue identification” (the “what is to be
represented” question) more prone to analysis.
They found that even in districts where there was a large degree o f constituency
homogeneity on policy questions that directly affected the district (for example, farming
legislation in an agricultural district), homogeneity dissipated in regards o f remaining areas
o f policy dispute, which typically were more numerous than the dominant interest-driven

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
policy issue. While one district could display a significant level o f homogeneity on one or
two issues o f direct interest to the constituency--in which case the message to the
representative is loud and clear—the district could display significant disagreement on
issues o f more general or more polarized concerns, such as women’s rights, abortion
rights, unemployment, etc.17 Their model allowed for randomly distributed political
differences across the electorate, the so-called within-and-between district variance.
At the policy-making end, their model also accounted for the apparent “paradox”
o f representation, where constituency interest and representative action may range from
non-existent to perfect. They argued that between the two poles o f the congruence model
there were dynamic intervening processes, the “black box” o f intervening variables that
may turn the link into a very weak or very strong one. However, even in the absence of
an apparent link representation may occur. This paradoxical situation had to do with the
fact that people selected to run for office were designated by their parties on account o f
the views they held. Those views did conform with some constituency views, even if not
necessarily their own district constituency. The so-called “representative malgre lui” is in
effect representing constituency views, and the between-district variance was going to
account for that type o f representation.
In a detailed critique o f the Converse-Pierce model and theoretical assumptions,
Heinz Eulau further suggested that a new congruence model should be applied to the
study representative democracy. He argued that designs o f congruence models based on
the theoretical assumption that constituencies send signals to their representatives all the
time, on all issues were far-fetched and unrealistic. One o f the theoretical foundations o f
representative democracy is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to make democratic
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governance possible in large-scale polities, where ordinary citizens cannot participate
directly due to time and size constraints; hence, the need to entrust representatives with
the job o f everyday policy-making. “All one can require o f a representative democracy is
that elites do respond on those (few) occasions when the citizenry or parts o f it are in fact
aroused by the prior unresponsiveness o f the elites.” 18
To this day, disagreement over the appropriate concepts, indicators, and measures
to look at the relationship between constituencies and their elected representatives
persists. The diamond model continues to be used by some analysts, with refinements to
allow for constituency heterogeneity, time lags, and two-way shifts in opinion and policy.
There is, however, little indication that any one model is close to being accepted by a
majority o f analysts. Critiques, however, shed light on the dynamic character o f the
process o f representation and enhance an understanding o f just how difficult it is to
capture the essence o f what is happening between publicly expressed support for policies
and the actual policy-making through elected representatives.
The analyses o f congruence reviewed above yield three main ways o f looking at
the relationship between opinion and policy. These three ways were conceptualized as
“models o f representation” as follows:
1) A run-from-below representation model argues that there is a definite
relationship between public preferences and policy actions taken by the
government. This view conforms to definitions o f political representation which
emphasize governmental responsiveness.19 A radical run-from-below model holds
that elected representatives are responsive to voters' demands and that citizens'
groups are a source o f policy initiative. In the United States, several empirical
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studies have found support for the proposition that public opinion works as an
exogenous force on policy-making.20 This suggests that, for the American
democracy, a run-from-below matrix o f analysis is an appropriate analytical tool to
study representation.
2) A Responsive Party Model holds that there is a clear relationship between what
politicians say they will do and what policies actually result. Political parties "are
the major actors in the system that connects citizenry and the governmental
process...they are the major actors in representative democratic systems."21 This
model o f representation o f public opinion preferences is upheld primarily by West
European democracies, based on their strong party representativeness tradition. In
a study based on data from ten Western countries over 40 years, it was found that
parties compete for voter support on the basis o f programs they present to the
electorate during the campaign. The winner (one party or a coalition) takes the
majority o f seats in parliament and forms a government. During the government's
term in office, the program presented to the voters is carried out. At the following
election, voters get to hold the governing coalition accountable for what has been
accomplished and what has not.22 This finding suggests that for the West
European democracies, a responsive party matrix is a more appropriate analytical
tool in an analysis o f representation than the run-from-below matrix.
3) The Elitist run-from-above model o f representation holds that public opinion is
constantly manipulated by elite groups.23 A less radical elitist model argues that
voters can hold the government accountable only after the fact; the government
cannot and does not have any meaningful mandate from the voters.24 A third
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run-from-above model stresses that interests rule over elected politics. Votes
count, but it is resources that will eventually decide.25 A fourth elitist model
argues that elites set the policy framework to which citizens rea ct.26
The three types o f models are graphically captured below. Figure 2 describes the
responsive government matrix, with policy following roughly the same direction as
opinion.

Opinion-Policy Distance

T2

T3

T4
T5
Time Lag
Opinion

TB

T7

TB

Poficy

Figure 2. The Responsive Government Matrix

Figure 3 describes the responsive party matrix, with policy-makers setting the tone
and public opinion following. Policy here can be made by individuals, parties, or larger
bodies such as legislatures or executive branches, depending on the selected variables.
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Figure 3. The Responsive Party Matrix

Opinion-Policy Distance

40

T2

T3

T4

75

TB

T7

TB

Tam Lag

Opinion

Poicy

Figure 4. The Burkean Matrix
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Finally, Figure 4 describes the Burkean, elitist model o f decision-making, with
politicians pursuing policies according to their own vision, without taking into account
public opinion.

EASTERN EUROPE: TERMS OF ANALYSIS
Responsiveness analyses o f Western governments tend to focus on what specific
cases fall under which causality models, as the previous discussion highlighted. The
analysis o f East European governments’ responsiveness to their constituencies ideally
would do the same.
However, Eastern Europe is neither ripe, nor consolidated politically and
economically enough to permit an analysis o f representation as sophisticated as Western
statistical models. As noted on numerous occasions, the unqualified application o f
analytical tools to the study o f the region may lead to distorted conclusions about the
nature and direction o f democratization, with serious domestic and international policy
implications. This study takes the view that representation in Eastern Europe needs to be
addressed in terms o f direction at this stage o f development o f the region.
Did East European publics support the creation o f a market economy after the
collapse o f the communist regimes? Did East European governments pursue economic
policies designed to bring about the popularly endorsed system? Was the outcome o f
policies conducive to a system that continued to enjoy popular support? Given the
dynamics o f popular support for a market economy, how can government action be
interpreted from the standpoint o f representation?
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In order to observe whether East European societies are moving in the direction o f
a representative democracy, with responsive and accountable leaders, we need to observe
public opinion trends on given policies and trends o f policy outcomes. Government
responsiveness can be inferred if policy and opinion tend to move in the same direction,
over a period o f time. If some or all the countries in Eastern Europe are in the process o f
building representative democracies, we would observe a tendency like the one described
in Figure 2. If governments, or strong leaders, or strong parties define the direction o f
policy and publics follow, then we would observe a trend falling roughly under the model
in Figure 3. Finally, if remnants o f the past are still strong, and governments continue to
set the tone o f policy with disregard for public opinion trends, the observed tendencies
would look like the model described in Figure 4.
The interpretation o f political developments and trends in Eastern Europe based on
any o f the models presented above needs to be extremely cautious, on account o f basic
assumptions about political maturity and data reliability. As early as 1993, Jane Curry
remarked that Western notions o f democracy, controversial though they may be, do not
overlap with East European views o f the term.27 In 1995, Grzegorz Eckiert called for the
identification o f new theoretical and analytical tools for the study o f the region, on account
o f its complex and unprecedented circumstances o f transition. And in 1998, Rose and
Haerpfer cautioned again against the use o f “destination models” that analyze the region
based on idealized goals o f democracy. It was argued that the region is developing
“incomplete” democracies, and that the critical element o f any analysis o f transition should
be the direction in which these democracies are moving, rather than whether they fit
Western models.28
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The above reservations were not made by picky Western analysts. Observed
developments point towards conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the countries in the
region have attained a degree o f maturity in their long-term vision for development
consisting of integration within structures o f Western democracies. On the other hand, the
experience of the past decade indicates that there is contusion about the means and
mechanics of reaching a stage o f development compatible with European Union or (for
those countries who were not included in the first round) with NATO membership.
The same duality exists regarding reliability o f public opinion data. While many
polls have been commissioned in the region on a variety o f topics ranging from
democratization to human rights, it is not always clear what the polls are gauging. A
question on approval o f the state o f democratization o f one’s country may be thought to
gauge public sentiment towards the democratization process. In reality, depending on
respondents’ views o f what democratization means, it could gauge economic performance,
freedom, or satisfaction with politics. Studies point out that questions regarding economic
performance sometimes gauge job insecurity,29 and sometimes satisfaction with the overall
situation in the country.30
It appears that none o f the populations under analysis would prefer to have a
communist regime back in power. It also appears that they want to enjoy better living
standards, more like their Western neighbors, but they are not sure how to bring those
standards about. None o f these criteria, however, can help evaluate where the countries
are economically and politically, nor whether they are “democracies” or close to being a
democratic regime. This is why considerable disagreement persists among analysts
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studying developments in the region regarding the appropriate analytical tools to be
employed.

Concepts and Definitions
An important caveat in cross-national comparative analyses is conceptual.
Bringing concepts to a common denominator that is acceptable and recognizable across
cultures is a notoriously contested task. If the definition o f public opinion needs some
leveling work, the concept o f “government policy outcome” poses far more problems.
With respect to the concept o f ‘public opinion’, the differentiations found in the
literature are o f limited use. The dichotomies between ‘special’ and ‘general,’ or
‘attentive’ and ‘general’ publics would be methodologically useful if consistent studies
showed that only certain categories o f publics vote. The outcome o f elections, the issues
o f importance, and the approximate pool o f representatives favored by constituencies
would then be more easily identified by polling a sample o f the category o f publics who
voted. However, even if substantial research has been done in the area o f voting behavior,
there are no acceptable results o f the kind suggested above. If politicians knew who their
targets were, they would win elections by addressing those audiences only. That,
however, is not the case.
Some public opinion studies generalize public preferences across subgroups o f an
entire population by employing representative samples o f selected populations (the
equivalent o f a ‘special publics’ category). That approach would not be o f much help in
finding out who would win general elections, what issues are likely to win popular
attention, or which policies are o f interest to whom. Political campaigns are run on broad
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political agendas precisely in order to reach as large o f a voter population as possible
because there is no guarantee o f voter turnout. This is why in the late twentieth century,
politicians tend to pay attention to public preferences expressed through public opinion
polls sampling the general population, which comprises the country electorate.
One good example o f the fact that special publics, and therefore special interests
do not win general elections is the case o f Hungary’s 1994 general elections, where the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) ran on a specialized agenda o f concern for the
Hungarian minority outside o f Hungary. The party lost the election despite pre-election
polls showing significant popular support for the issues raised during the campaign.
Studies have shown that the insistence o f party leaders on a narrow issue made them
unattractive to the general population, even if preliminary polls showed concern for the
Hungarian minority living outside Hungarian borders.31
Romania’s Party o f National Unity Greater Romania (PUNR) is another case in
which special interests have not won general elections. PUNR’s political agenda is
primarily concerned with defending the rights o f Romanians in a region o f the country
with a large Hungarian population. PUNR does win votes in general elections and gains
representation in the country’s Parliament, but they never made a government, nor are
they welcome in governing coalitions. The narrow interests that their party represents
gives them less legitimacy to speak for the entire electorate.
A preliminary conclusion is that if V.O. Key is right, and “public opinion is the
opinion that governments find it prudent to heed” then we should consider the views
expressed by the constituency o f a country through representative sampling o f the general
population as the politically relevant opinion. Many polls have been taken, covering many
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topics. Some o f them, like CBS or radio talk shows polls, are not “representative,” which
makes the findings good for general consumption, but not necessarily relevant to those
representatives who run for reelection, or who are trying to get into office.
The opinion polls used in this study were commissioned by the European Union
and collected by institutes for public research from the region.32 The polls sampled the
general population, and asked roughly the same questions regarding the desirability o f the
introduction o f a market economic system in each country. The opinion polls are followed
between 1990 and 1997 to assess the direction o f public support regarding the selected
policy issue.
With respect to the concept o f government policy outcome, each element needs to
be treated separately. Constitutionally, “government” in Eastern Europe is understood to
be the executive branch. However, with the exception o f the President, who is elected by
universal suffrage in all the countries under discussion except for Hungary and the Slovak
Republic, none o f the public servants in the executive branch are. Arguably, that would
not make them directly representative and responsible to public opinion.
Executive servants are, however, designated to serve the public by, and sometimes
from, the ranks o f elected representatives. In Hungary, the elected National Assembly,
which “derives its rights from popular sovereignty,” elects the President, the Prime
Minister, and other senior public servants. The Prime Minister in turn designates the
cabinet which is afterwards approved by the elected legislators. In the Slovak Republic,
the National Council, whose members “shall be the representatives o f the citizens,” elects
the President, who in turn designates the Prime Minister. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Romania, and Poland, the President, elected by universal suffrage, designates the Prime
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Minister, who in turn forms a cabinet that will start functioning only after the endorsement
o f each Minister by the elected body o f legislators.33
In the discussion o f responsiveness o f representatives, how is, then, “government”
to be operationalized? As the legislative branch, which is directly elected by voters to
represent their interests, as the executive branch, which is indirectly designated to serve
the public by its elected representatives, or as both?
The answer is offered by the Constitutions o f these countries. Bills, laws, or
policies are submitted to the Parliament for approval both at the initiative o f the executive
and o f the legislative branches. The exception remains Hungary, where the National
Assembly drafts not only legislation, but also the program o f government priorities.
Arguably, assessing “government policy outcome” should then involve observing
legislative and executive policy initiatives at Ministerial and legislative level.
“Government policy” is here defined as a complex conglomerate o f legislative and
executive decisions pursued on the basis o f recommendations made by the people’s
representatives. “Policy outcome” is the resulting state o f the economy reflected in
empirical indicators.

Selection o f Issue: Rationale
Defining which policy issues are “important” to the constituency relative to the
large number o f issues that governments and representatives consider during their term in
office is always a daunting task. Pierce and Converse find that even if one could design a
list o f issues ranked by importance to a particular constituency, identifying which
individual citizens are part o f that constituency remains a fairly impossible task.34
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The selection o f the policy issue to be analyzed in conjunction with public opinion
in Eastern Europe was driven by two factors.
First, the general feeling o f the electorate towards the issue had to be strong
enough to be relevant to the analysis. As the available data shows, concern with the
disastrous effects o f the command economy was accompanied by strong popular demands
for the introduction o f the one economic system known to have created prosperous
countries, the market economy. Although in none o f the countries in the region the word
“capitalism” was spelled out as the goal of the new societies in transformation, “market
economy” or “market o f Western type” were the phrases used in reference to the desired
economic system in each country. To use a less academic illustration, a popular joke in
the Communist world read like this: “What is Communism?” “Communism is the longest
and most painful route from capitalism to capitalism.”35
In Poland, the first post-communist minister o f finance and main architect o f the
Polish reform program, Leszek Balcerowicz, announced the government’s intention to
“transform the Polish economy into a market economy, with the ownership structure
changing in the direction o f that found in the advanced industrial economies.”36 The
program was widely supported by the population.
In Bulgaria, after 35 years o f ruling the country with old-line orthodox
communism, Todor Zhivkov resigned, admitting in front o f the Central Committee that the
government had been unable to make a break-through in any sector o f their work. Mr.
Mladenov, his replacement, warned the Communist Party that there was no alternative to
restructuring Bulgaria’s ailing economy and tightly controlled political apparatus. He told
the Central Committee that “We have to turn Bulgaria into a modern, democratic and
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lawful country,” just as popular demonstrations were starting to take place in Sophia
demanding change.37
In Romania, the first post-revolutionary manifesto issued by the Front o f National
Salvation stipulated that Romania will seek the transformation o f its economy into a
"‘market economy.”38 It was met with hails by large crowds gathered in the public squares
o f Bucharest to witness the December 1989 Revolution.
Table 1 summarizes trends in public opinion support for the creation o f a market
economy between 1990 and 1997 in the six countries under study.39 Support in most
countries was strongest in the beginning o f the transition period, with decline in support to
be observed in mid to late nineties. Strong support at the outset o f the transition period
was observed in countries where reforms were introduced at an early stage o f the
transition, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Weak support at the outset o f
the transition period was observed in countries where reforms were slow, such as
Romania and Bulgaria.

Table 1.--Public opinion on the creation o f a free market economy____________________
Country
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria
(right)
46
62
55
47
40
39
44
52
(wrong)

24

16

19

29

42

33

32

29

(don’t know)

29

22

26

24

18

28

24

11

58

61

55

51

47

42

42

28

(wrong)

13

20

32

36

36

36

41

50

(don’t know)

29

19

13

13

17

22

17

22

Czech Republica
(right)
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Table 1.--Continued.
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

(right)

62

65

56

46

44

38

37

37

(wrong)

13

11

17

25

24

33

30

31

(don’t know)

26

24

27

29

32

29

33

32

(right)

61

56

56

53

49

62

60

62

(wrong)

14

21

23

24

23

16

24

19

(don’t know)

25

23

21

23

28

22

16

11

(right)

35

65

52

71

64

79

64

(wrong)

48

24

23

21

26

15

26

(don’t know)

17

11

25

8

10

6

8

(right)

51

40

42

39

40

35

(wrong)

36

44

42

39

42

45

(don’t know)

13

16

16

22

18

21

Country

1997

Hungary

Poland

Romania

Slovak Republic

Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. Between 1990 and 1997, the Eurobarometer question
was "Do you personally feel that the creation o f a free market economy, that is one largely
free from state control, is right or wrong for (country’s ) future? Except for 1990, the
‘don't know’s were inferred from the data. It is possible that some fraction o f this
percentage represents missing data. Romania was not included in the 1990 survey.
a 1990 and 1991 figures are for Czechoslovakia.

Even if expressed public and government support for the creation o f a market
economy seemed to go together in the beginning o f the transition, it remains unclear if
either publics or governments had a good understanding o f the complexity o f the system
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that they were supporting, or the associated costs needed to bring it about. Public opinion
studies reveal that “market economy” was often times equated with “the better life o f the
West” or abundance and consumption, and less often with competition, hard decisions
about closing down unproductive plants and the associated layoffs, or business and
managerial skills that needed to be acquired before abundance resulting from economic
growth could occur.40
Eurobarometer analysts also noted that, although publics supported the creation o f
a market economy, a third o f the respondents did not express an opinion in 1990, at the
outset o f the transformation period. This was interpreted as a signal that publics were
poorly equipped to understand and participate in the upcoming transition, and that
governments needed to provide more education about the principles o f a market economy
and the implications o f transition in order to maintain popular support.41 Large
percentages o f “don't knows” are maintained throughout the period in Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Poland, which raises questions about the publics’ knowledge about the basics o f the
system they were supporting, and their preparedness to accept the hardships o f the
transition.
The state o f the economy was a widespread concern at the beginning o f the
transition, and the popular demands for the renunciation o f the command economy were,
as noted above, loud and clear. Observing public support for the introduction o f a market
economy was an issue o f interest to many constituencies, therefore worthy o f analysis.
The second reason for choosing the introduction o f a market economy for the
analysis o f representation in the region had to do with the governments’ own motivation
to introduce reform policies. All the governments o f Eastern Europe expressed their
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intention to be integrated within Euro-Atlantic structures such as the European Union and
NATO. Demands on emerging democracies prescribe the presence o f a functioning
market economy as a prerequisite for integration. East European governments had to be
motivated to change their economic system and to become part o f the Euro-Atlantic
structures that they aspired to. The penchant o f governments to introduce market
economy policies, laws, and structures imposed itself as the appropriate topic o f analysis.
Additionally, observed indicators o f national growth per Figure 5 below indicate
that governments have taken actions conducive to a general trend o f improvement o f the
economic situation in the countries o f the region, although the trend is not steady nor
without surprises.

Change in GDP
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
■ Bulgaria
■ Poland

■ Czech Rep ■ Hungary
^ Romania H Slovak Rep

Figure 5. Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product in Eastern Europe
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994- 1998).
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East European government efforts at reforming their countries’ economies are
reflected in the resulting growth o f their national economies. Figure 5 summarizes the
change o f GDP growth across eight years o f transition in the six countries under analysis.
Figure 5 shows that in some countries which started their reform programs immediately
after the collapse o f the communist regime, like Poland and Hungary, growth resumed
relatively fast and stayed positive. Other countries which started their reform policies
early witnessed a period o f growth, then o f negative growth, only to end the period in
economic recession, as in the case o f the Czech Republic. Finally, Figure 5 shows that
countries which started their reform programs more slowly, such as Romania and
Bulgaria, have witnessed fluctuating and inconsistent growth, with negative growth as the
common element for most o f the transition period. It is indeed fair to say that it is not
clear at all if these two countries have started transitioning to a market economy, nor
when they would see a more predictable pattern o f growth.

Analysis
For each country, the direction o f trends in public opinion are analyzed in relation
to the direction o f trends o f macro-economic indicators. Trends in public opinion are also
analyzed in relation to the direction o f European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development indicators o f transition, to observe government progress in the introduction
of policies conducive to the establishment o f a market economy.
Finally, since public support in some cases declines as economies grow and seem
to do well, opinion trends are analyzed in conjunction with additional data such as
economic security, support for democracy, and election outcomes. We are looking for
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possible explanations for the decline o f public support that could be attributable to causes
other than government performance on the question o f a market economy.
Public opinion polls addressing the introduction o f a market economy, GDP
growth, and unemployment are charted in line diagrams as measures o f policy outcomes.
The diagrams are then analyzed for direction and distance between opinion support and
policy trends. Within each country and across the region comparisons are thereafter
offered.
A section on election results completes the analysis. The intent is to observe
whether publics punish governments by voting them out o f office, or if they reward them
by supporting re-elections. Due to the limitations o f the data and o f the terms o f analysis,
a direct link cannot be drawn between the selected policy and the overall response o f the
electorate. However, if governments tend to be responsive to their publics, we would
expect to see some political arrangements confirmed in office. If, for instance, public
support for a market economy is matched by a strong economic performance, we would
expect to see the government who delivered on the state o f the economy to be re-elected.
If support for the introduction o f a market economy is accompanied by poor economic
performance, we would expect incumbent governments to be voted out o f office.
Additionally, a discussion o f political circumstances for each case is offered.
The reality is that a sound market economic system needs time to grow and
develop into a solid, popularly accepted structure. In Eastern Europe, competence in
designing such a structure is still questionable. Most o f the countries in the region have a
legacy o f forty-five years on average under a totalitarian economy. The good intentions o f
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any elected government to design and implement a market economic system cannot and
should not be expected to yield happy consumers in the first years.

Hypotheses
In the beginning o f this chapter, three possible models o f responsive government
behavior to popular support for a particular policy were hypothesized based on a rich
literature. They are the responsive model, where the policy line adjusts in response to
popular calls for a change o f policy; the elitist model, where the government drives public
support for a policy; and the non-responsive model, where the government pursues
policies irrespective o f public support.
As noted in the above preliminary observations, the dynamics o f public support
and o f government action on policy are somewhat more complex than three possible
models in Eastern Europe. Governments can act on policies without successfully
delivering the expected results, with resulting decline in public support for reform; does it
follow that governments were unresponsive? Governments can pursue policies that end
up being unpopular due to insufficient institutional skills, or other factors related to lack o f
preparedness for a market economic system: does that mean that governments did not
originally take their cues from the public? If governments take their lead from the public
and attempt to reform the economy but the task proves too daunting and complex to
produce the desired results o f growth and well-being, should that count against their
responsiveness to constituencies? Finally, publics may think they support policies without
having a clear image o f the possible implications o f those policies; does it mean that
policies should not be pursued unless the public shows signs o f maturity and knowledge
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on the subject matter? None o f these questions would be answered in the affirmative even
in an advanced market economy. A note o f caution in the interpretation o f events in
Eastern Europe should therefore be in place at the outset o f any analysis o f government
responsiveness.
A minimum of four hypotheses can be formulated to explain the dynamics of public
support and government responsiveness in the region.
First, in accordance with the responsive model, publics support a market economy
and governments heed to that public voice. Governments take action and formulate
reform programs intended to introduce a market economy. Public opinion polls and
EBRD transition indicators should be high, indicating strong support for policy and high
levels o f government action to implement policies o f economic reform. If the outcome of
policies is resumption o f economic growth, we can infer that policies were designed to
enhance the collective well-being o f the nation. Increased GPD, good levels o f foreign
investment, and associated low levels o f unemployment and o f inflation are good
indicators o f a growing economy; increased GDP per capita and growth o f nominal wages
should indicate an increase in individual well-being.
Since growth and collective/individual well-being result from these programs,
publics continue to support them in order to maintain the levels o f growth. Opinion polls
should indicate continued support for a market economy, even if fluctuations may be
noted, to allow for the impact o f transition hardships on the public mood.
If all o f the above follow largely the direction hypothesized, we can infer that
Eastern Europe is moving away from a tradition o f government ego-centrism into a
direction o f government responsiveness and possibly accountability to their constituencies.
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Even if programs o f reform are not always selected in the right order, o f sufficient depth
or intensity, or implemented at the right speed,42 if the outcome o f years of transition is
resumption and maintenance o f growth, then East European governments must be talcing
the introduction o f a new economic model seriously. That outcome in itself should count
as a government commitment to represent the aspirations o f millions o f voters in the
region.
If recorded indicators confirm this line of reasoning, publics should confirm
governments in office during elections, to reward them for responsiveness. An analysis o f
electorate vote o f confidence will conclude the analysis.
Second, if the elitist model is more prevalent in Eastern Europe, we should observe
that governments pursue policies irrespective o f public support. In this case, we should
observe strong public support for a market economy and weak transition indicators. If
that were the case, we can assess that publics expressed their choice towards the economic
system, but governments chose to follow their own judgement. This type o f behavior
would be highly reminiscent o f old leadership patterns, and a note o f caution should be
made about the direction o f the country in which such governing tendencies prevail.
For the elitist case, publics would vote governments out, to reward them for not
heeding to their voices.
A third possibility allows for a dynamic model o f representation, where public
support and government responsiveness move together in the same direction and
eventually result in diminished support for policies. This hypothesis is somewhat counter
intuitive, but not to be ruled out o f the existing possibilities.
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If this hypothesis is correct in the East European case, we should observe support
for a market economy m ain tain ed at high levels together with high indicators o f transition
until the economy starts to grow. As soon as growth is resumed, per macro-economic
indicators, publics could turn their attention towards other policies that need sustained
attention. Public support level can diminish since constituencies do not see the economy
as the main concern o f the transformation o f their countries.43
If the above is true, we should expect public support to diminish as economic
growth resumes, and we may see policy-makers voted in or out o f office, depending on
public perception o f the next priority elements o f transformation. A look at additional
opinion polls will be necessary, to see in which direction the public moves in terms o f
priority policies, and how the govemants who lost elections dealt with those issues.
Finally, it is possible that economic growth and satisfaction with personal well
being may not weigh as much in people’s opinions as Western models hypothesize. In that
case, corruption scandals, dissatisfaction with politicians and public morals,
disillusionment with the works o f democracy, or other issues may weigh more for East
European constituencies than is usually believed. It is possible to observe increased levels
o f growth associated with a decrease in popularity for a market economy despite evidence
o f individual growth o f well-being.

Indicators
For the question on the introduction o f a market economy, policy outcomes
translate into indicators o f a healthy economy, including growth o f Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), low unemployment, good proportion of private sector share o f GDP, and
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reform o f enterprises, markets, and financial institutions. These indicators are available
from the annual transition report o f the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
Assessments o f the success o f the economic transition from a state-run economy to
a market economy have been made during the past ten years by various commissioned
studies and policy papers.44 These studies have used a combination o f growth,
privatization, unemployment, inflation, and trade patterns indicators, to evaluate where
each country was in the beginning o f the transition, and in which direction they moved
during the nineties. Overall, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak
Republic are considered the most advanced towards a market economy, with some studies
considering them “consolidated markets”. Bulgaria and Romania are evaluated to have
started the implementation o f reforms more slowly, with Romania originally ahead o f
Bulgaria in the early nineties, then lagging behind by the end o f the period.
Within each category, opinions differ regarding degrees o f advancement o f a
market economy within and between countries. Some analysts consider Poland more
advanced than Hungary, for instance, or Bulgaria ahead o f Romania. These evaluating
differences arise from the use o f methodology to assess the introduction o f the market
economic system. Unfortunately, measures and ratings are different enough to make their
combined use irrelevant from a comparative perspective.
The decision to use the ratings o f progress towards a market economy by the
Transition Report o f the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the
present chapter is justified by several considerations.
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First, the Transition Report is an annual publication that has employed the same
measures and indicators for growth and change in the region since 1994.45 This gives the
researcher the possibility o f comparing trends across a longer period o f time, within
country, and across a region.
Second, by comparison with similar studies, the Transition Report takes a more
ample comparative look at three distinctive elements o f a market economy: privatization,
liberalization, and institutional change. It looks simultaneously at the rate and depth o f
privatization (differentiating between large and small scale privatization, and restructuring
degrees), at the degree and pattern o f liberalization o f markets and trade (looking at price
liberalization, trade and foreign exchange systems, and competition policy), and at
financial institutions reform (with ratings in banking reform, securities markets, and non
bank and other financial institutions). Third, the EBRD ratings are considered reliable by
institutions such as the World Bank, who use them in their own evaluations o f future
programs to be developed in specific countries.
A few preliminary clarifications regarding the terminology and methodology
employed by the Transition Report are necessary. Numerical indicators ranging from 1
(lowest) to 4 (highest) rank progress in a particular category. The indicators are intended
to represent cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy to
market economy in the following four categories: private sector share o f GDP, enterprise
restructuring and privatization, markets and trade liberalization, and financial institutions
reform. The indicators do not reflect the rate o f change in the course o f each year.
For each category, the following clarifications are necessary. The “private sector
share" o f GDP represents EBRD estimates based on available statistics from official and
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unofficial sources. The underlying concept o f private sector value added includes income
generated by the activity o f private registered companies as well as by private entities
engaged in informal activities wherever reliable information was available.46 The
classification system for transition indicators build on the judgement o f the EBRD’s Office
o f the Chief Economist.47
For the enterprise restructuring category, three indicators are calculated to reflect
progress in large- and small-scale privatization, and in governance and enterprise
restructuring. A score o f “ 1" indicates little private ownership or progress in
restructuring. A score o f “2" indicates that comprehensive programs are designed and
ready to be implemented, but that action is delayed on implementation. A score o f “3”
indicates that 25 per cent o f large-scale enterprises are privatized, a comprehensive
program for small-scale privatization is being implemented, and sustained actions to
promote corporate governance effectively are being taken. A score o f “4" indicates that
more than 50 per cent o f state-owned enterprises and farm assets are in private hands,
privatization o f small companies is complete, and substantial improvement in corporate
governance can be observed.
For the markets and trade liberalization category, three indicators are calculated to
reflect progress in price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, and competition
policy. A score o f “ 1" indicates that the state still formally controls prices, imports and
exports, and that there is no competition legislation or institutions. A score o f “2"
indicates that prices, imports and exports are somewhat relaxed but most o f the important
categories are still state-regulated, and that competition policy institutions and legislation
are set up. A score o f “3" indicates substantial progress in price liberalization, removal o f
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almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions are removed, and
some enforcement actions to reduce abuse o f market power and to promote a competitive
environment. A score o f “4" indicates comprehensive price liberalization, including utility
pricing which approaches economic costs, removal o f all import and export restrictions
(except agriculture) and tariffs, full current account convertibility, and significant
enforcement actions to promote a competitive environment.
For the financial institutions category, two indicators are calculated to reflect
progress in banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and in securities markets and
non-bank financial institutions. A score o f “ 1" indicates little progress in either area. A
score of “2" indicates significant liberalization o f interest rates and credit allocation and
the formation o f securities exchanges. A score o f “3" indicates substantial progress in
establishment o f bank solvency and o f a framework o f supervision and regulation, and
substantial issuance o f securities by private enterprises. A score o f “4" indicates
significant movement o f banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards, and
securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards.
In the following country-by-country analysis, all the transition indicators are listed
in tables showing the rate o f progress towards the establishment o f a market economy.
Since the Transition Report was initiated only in 1994, there are no available indicators
calculated according to this methodology for the first four years o f transition, a period in
which major economic changes were initiated. As a result, the line diagrams generated for
these indicators are relatively uninteresting since they begin and end around the same
value. Superimposing a public support curve with one transition indicator curve was
therefore found to be o f limited use; similarly, superimposing eight curves o f transition
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indicators with the public support curve proved to lack clarity and usefulness. Cumulating
all eight rating indicators to create one indicator o f transition also proved to be an
unrealistic option since it would oversimplify the available data.
Consequently, two indicators were selected to reflect policy outcome curves in the
line diagrams: GDP per capita and unemployment rates. The GDP per capita curve is a
good indicator o f the health o f a country’s economy, which in turn is primarily a function
o f sound economic policies. (The private share o f GDP curve was found to follow
roughly the direction o f the eight transition rating indicators; consequently, by using it we
could approximate the general direction o f policies during the transition period.).
The use o f the unemployment rate indicator is justified by the vast literature which
argues that a healthy and growing economy is not necessarily an economy without
unemployment, but rather one in which unemployment is maintained low at a low level.
The restructuring o f the communist economies was bound to bring about losses o f jobs; it
was also bound to create jobs if the privatization o f that same sector was done
simultaneously and efficiently. The use o f the unemployment indicator in conjunction with
growth o f GDP per capita will prevent hasty conclusions about the health o f the economy
or the direction o f the new economic system.
Several key lessons have been learned since the Transition Report was launched.
First, just as there are many forms o f a market economy, there are many paths o f getting
there. That is well illustrated by the varied ways in which countries considered frontrunners in the process o f transition, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
have approached their transitions. Strategies o f transition vary from shock therapy to
gradualism, with resulting resumption o f growth.
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Second, there are important common features o f well-functioning economies and
o f effective transitions, such as liberalization o f markets and trade, and massive
privatization.48 The EBRD transition ratings help identify the development o f such
features within countries and across the region.
Third, while liberalization and privatization may be acted upon relatively quickly,
by relaxing state control over the regulation of the economy, other aspects o f a wellfunctioning market economy take substantially longer, such as the development of
institutions and business practices required for the maintenance o f a well-functioning
market economy. “For markets to function well there must be robust entry into, and
disciplined exit from markets to ensure that the most efficient and innovative producers
are those that operate in the market.”49
Finally, transition and development are two different things. While transitions are
difficult and complex processes which are usually associated with social costs, stress, and
hardships, development entails economic growth and the advancement o f standards o f
living.50 For most o f the period under discussion in this analysis, Eastern Europe has gone
through a period o f transition which does not necessarily guarantee growth, nor popular
satisfaction.
At the end o f the nineties, the EBRD Transition Report concludes that the
imbalance between the development o f markets and o f institutions to sustain those
markets is starting to be felt across the region. While recognizing that the costs o f
transition are the highest for those who should be the beneficiaries o f reform, that is the
constituencies, the EBRD report acknowledges that East European governments have still

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
to deal with the resulting growth o f poverty and the increasing inequalities in income and
wealth brought about by unsound practices o f privatization and corruption.
In many East European countries, popular resentment towards reform stems from
the fact that people with political influence, many times former communist bureaucrats,
have made fortunes for themselves by the appropriation o f well-functioning stateenterprises. The term “economic tunneling” is also starting to be used in conjunction with
the practice o f acquiring privatized enterprises, stripping them o f money which is
afterwards diverted illegally to private use, thus driving the enterprises into bankruptcy.31
Corrupt practices, coupled with insufficient attention to reform o f social services, and to
providing a sound strategy for alleviating the impact o f unemployment on masses o f
people can lead to a decline o f support for economic reform and a market economy.52
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
THE CZECH REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
After starting the transition to a market economy in 1989 from the most
advantageous position o f all the countries in the region, the Czech Republic ended 1999 in
economic recession, behind all the other front-runner countries in the race to transition to
a market economy.
If by 1995 the Czech Republic witnessed a growing economy, characterized by
macro-economic stability and balance, strong internal currency, growing investments, low
inflation and unemployment, and a transition that was remarkably less painful than
anticipated,1starting in 1996, the GDP was in constant fall until the Czech economy fell
behind the economies o f Poland and Hungary, in 1998 and beyond. While throughout
most o f the early nineties, the Czech government was applauded by Western institutions
for its economic reform program and consistency, recent EU reports evaluating progress
towards accession into the European Union are critical o f the sluggishness o f the Czech
government to implement needed institutional structures for compatibility with EU market
pressures.2 Figure 5 traced the curve o f GDP percentage change, with a steady ascending
line between 1991 and 1995, and negative growth until 1998.
In 1989, the economic situation o f then the Czechoslovak Federation was
characterized by a balanced budget, low inflation, and insignificant external debt. The
proximity o f the country to developed countries interested to invest, together with what
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was considered a good reform strategy by the government put Czechoslovakia ahead o f
Poland and Hungary for the first years o f transition to a market economy.3
Between 1990 and 1992, the Czechoslovak Federation witnessed economic
growth and the launch o f market economy reforms, although the Czech Republic remained
steadily ahead o f the Slovak Republic with respect to GDP growth, unemployment rates,
and inflation. The contribution o f the private sector to the creation o f jobs also varied
from republic to republic, with the Czech Republic leading in this sector as well.4
The story of the Czech Republic starts with the “velvet divorce” from the Slovak
Republic at the end o f 1992. The peaceful separation o f the Czechoslovak Federation into
two states on January 1, 1993 was facilitated by several factors. The rise o f nationalist
ferment in Slovakia became more evident after the collapse o f the communist regime;
Slovaks have long held that “rule from Prague” curtailed their national rights to selfdetermination. The political ambition o f the leading nationalist figure and subsequent
Prime Minister o f Slovakia, Vladimir Me£iar, was also a driving force in the maintenance
o f a rhetoric o f national self-determination. His electoral campaign o f 1992 centered
around increased political autonomy and full independence for Slovakia, which won him
public sympathy and votes. The decision not to hold a referendum on the future o f the
federation after the 1992 elections further curtailed the possibility that the Czechoslovak
Federation would remain one state.5 Slovak popular support for more state involvement
in the economy also ran counter to the general trends towards a market economy in the
Czech Republic.6
The Federation eventually split in the aftermath o f the 1992 elections. The Civic
Forum, the group of political dissidents who negotiated the demise o f the communist
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government in 1989, not only lost the elections, but did not gain representation in the
parliament. This election surprise signaled the public desire for change. The separation o f
the Federation was negotiated by the winners o f the elections, Vladimir Meiiar, the winner
o f the Slovak elections, and Vaclav Klaus, the winner o f the Czech elections. Their failure
to negotiate a settlement on the make-up o f the Federation led to the agreement on the
separation o f the Federation into two sovereign states.7
Each country pursued thereafter its own economic policies which, although
emphasizing different priorities, continued to be characterized by economic growth. The
Czech Republic remained steady in its pursuit o f mass privatization, liberalization o f the
economy, and a policy o f encouraging investment, whereas the Slovak Republic pursued a
more left-oriented line, with the state more involved in economic decisions than the
Czechs, or Western lending institutions, would have preferred.

TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS
The transformation o f the Czech Republic from a command economy to a market
economy has been placed by economists in the “fast track” privatization and liberalization
category, together with Poland. A market-oriented reform process was initiated during
1990, and a comprehensive program was adopted in January 1991. The program
stipulated that rapid privatization and liberalization were its two main goals for the first
stage o f transition to a market economy. Symbols o f the state-run economy were
disbanded, such as the State Planning Commission which was abolished before the 1990
parliamentary elections. Small-scale privatization and price liberalization were launched as
early as January 1991 .*
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A sell-off o f state assets was pursued in two waves o f privatization. The first wave
was launched by the Czechoslovak Federation in May 1992, and completed by mid-1993.
It involved the distribution o f shares in state firms through a voucher-based privatization
scheme which created shareholders in both republics.9 The balance o f the assets was sold
through direct sales and public tenders. The second wave o f privatization started with the
distribution of vouchers in September 1994. Internal debates over the most appropriate
method o f privatization delayed the completion o f the second wave. In mid-1995, the
government approved amendments to the privatization law which, in effect, canceled the
second wave of privatization.10
A third wave o f privatization commenced in the latter part o f 1995, which
consisted primarily of the consolidation o f ownership of many enterprises. This type o f
privatization was led by the Investment and Privatization Funds (IPFs). IPFs, primarily
run by o f banks and other financial institutions, have emerged as a result o f the first two
waves o f privatization. They are dominant shareholders, holding at least two-thirds o f the
voucher points assigned between 1992 and 1995. In 1996, it was estimated that IPFs
controlled approximately 30% o f the existing shares, with holdings concentrated in 10 o f
the largest funds. Since IPFs were restricted in the amount o f holdings they could have
(no more than 20% of the shares o f any one company, and the holding o f one company
could not represent more than 10% o f the IPF’s portfolio), some funds converted into
holding companies which did not have to comply with the maximum holdings per
company."
The Transition Report indicators o f progress towards a market economy (Table 2)
show that the Czech government pursued a steady policy line o f reforms on restructuring
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and modernizing its economy. These indicators mean that, with respect to privatization,
the Czech Republic had over 50% o f state-enterprises and farm assets in private
ownership and had completed the privatization o f small companies as early as 1993. They
show that significant and sustained actions were taken to promote corporate governance
effectively, to liberalize prices and eliminate state procurement at non-market prices. They
also show that trade restrictions were largely removed, promoting thus a free market
exchange in and out o f the country. In general, indicators show that some measures were
taken to promote a competitive environment and that substantial progress was registered
with respect to banking securities reform. The legal framework for encouraging
investment was reasonably clear and well administered, with no discrimination between
foreigners and domestic investors.
Given the Czech government’s commitment to reform, reflected in good ratings o f
transition from a command to a market economy, its relative advantage starting on the
road to a market economy in 1990, and the amount o f foreign support that went into the
Czech Republic’s economy, why did the economy witness a decline in the latter part o f the
nineties?
Table 3 lists selected macro-economic indicators for the period 1991-1998. Most
o f these indicators follow an ascending curve o f economic performance until 1995, and a
descending curve between 1996 and 1998. Domestic growth and direct foreign
investment were at their peak in 1995. Unemployment in 1995 was also close to its
lowest rate in eight years (2.9 %; the lowest rate registered during this period was in 1992,
with 2.6%), whereas the situation is reversed between 1996 to 1998 (unemployment going
up to 5.2% in 1997, the highest rate in seven years o f transition).
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Table 2.—Czech Republic: Indicators o f progress in transition to a market economy
1994 1995 19& 1997 ----------------------

m

Private GDP share

65%

70%

75%

75%

75%

Large scale privatization

4

4

4

4

4

Small scale privatization

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Governance and restructuring

3

3

3

3

3

Price liberalization

3

3

3

3

3

Trade system

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Competition policy

3

3

3

3

3

Bank reform

3

3

3

3

3

Securities reform

n/a

3

3

3

3

Investment law

n/a

4

4

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).

Levels o f GDP growth and unemployment are directly related, with GDP rates
going up and unemployment rates going down until 1995. Conversely, GDP growth rates
went down between 1996 and 1998, and unemployment rates went up. This indicates that
national growth was related to the creation o f jobs.
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TjftteT—CzeciniegublM^

GDP at constant prices
Consumer prices (average)

1991 1992 1993 1994
(Percentage change)
-11.5
-3.3
0.6
3.2

1995

1996

1997

1998

6.4

3.9

1.0

-1.0

56.6

11.1

20.8

10.0

9.1

8.8

8.5

11.0

-39.9

8.5

3.0

5.8

9.0

8.9

5.0

n/a

2.9

3.5

5.2

n/a

Gross average monthly
earnings in industry (annual
average, adjusted
for consumer prices)3

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

4.1

2.6

3.5

3.2

(in billions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance

-0.5

-1.9

-0.3

-0.9

-3.7

-5.9

-4.6

-3.0

Foreign Direct Investment

n/a

1.0

0.6

0.7

2.5

1.4

1.3

1.0

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 213.
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.

The gross average monthly earnings in industry indicates fluctuations in personal
earnings, a phenomenon that is not surprising for transition economies. This statistic also
shows a decline in average wages after 1996, although more data is needed to observe if
the trend remained on the decline. Overall, this statistic indicates that wages grew during
the period under discussion, even if the growth was neither steady, nor consistent. As will
be noted below, this statistic does not indicate that the government followed a policy of
wage restraint, which was highly recommended by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in order to improve the trade and current accounts.
The balance between exports and imports was negative throughout the period,
indicating that imports remained the dominant element o f foreign trade. If this imbalance
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was at relatively modest rates until 1994 (under one billion dollars), starting in 1995 it
jumped three-fold (close to four billion dollars). This trade deficit indicates that massive
amounts o f foreign currency were going out o f the country as a result o f increased
domestic demand for foreign products. This phenomenon further depleted the national
reserves and weakened the economy.
Finally, inflation (as measured by changes in consumer prices) decreased between
1992 and 1997, when the Central Bank was forced to let the koruna float. Details o f this
action will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
It appears that some o f the problems that the Czech economy encountered since
1995 go back to the implementation o f policies designed to introduce a market economy
environment. The IPFs and the voucher scheme were two such mechanisms that are
regularly mentioned in the literature o f transition as having produced the opposite results
than expected or designed.
As mentioned previously, most IPFs were still state-owned banks and other
financial institutions who acquired large shares in formerly state-owned enterprises.
However, upon acquiring the shares in state-owned enterprises, IPFs failed to follow the
recommendations put forward by economic advisors for rapid restructuring. IPFs
continued to subsidize the former state enterprises, which was in itself a disincentive for
more profitable and competitive production. A net decline in profitability o f IPF-owned
enterprises was registered at the end o f 1996. According to the Ministry o f Industry, the
tax profits in companies with more than 100 employees fell by 40%, and the rate o f return
on equity in non-financial organizations fell to 4.1%. General concerns were also
expressed regarding potential conflicts o f interest between the IPFs, the financial
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institutions that managed them, and the industrial companies. In 1997, the government
announced that the relationship between IPFs and the main banks would be reviewed.12
By 1998, the muddled situation o f these IPFs became so evident, and subject to so
much international criticism, that the Czech Parliament approved a law setting restrictions
on IPF administration and functions. These measures were intended to strengthen fiscal
discipline and make the funds more transparent in order to regain credibility.13
The voucher privatization scheme was also designed with short-term goals in
mind, without thinking o f the long-term implications o f the policy. Originally leading to
steady and massive privatization and an increase in the private share o f GDP in the first
half o f the nineties (see Table 2), the voucher scheme also had downsides that were not
thoroughly evaluated before it was launched.
It appears that a large share o f the population who acquired vouchers sold them
for instant cash to IPFs, which did not pressure the newly privatized firms into
restructuring. The banks continued to subsidize the enterprises through loans, which was
a disincentive to modernize and become efficient economic entities. As a result, former
state enterprises ended up being largely owned by investment funds controlled or owned
by state-owned banks, which continued to do what they knew to do best: subsidize lossmaking economic entities.14
Finally, the economic decline was enhanced by the decline o f the Czech currency.
Throughout the first half o f the nineties, the currency was the most stable one in EastCentral Europe. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus argued that it w as even more stable than
the currencies o f Western Europe.15 The increase in the trade deficit (see Table 3) and
speculative attacks against the currency in 1997 caused it to fall. While the Central Bank
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intervened by raising the interest rates sharply and introducing temporary restrictions on
access to foreign currency, in May 1997 the Bank was forced to let the koruna float after
effective devaluation.16
Other causes o f economic decline and recession are related to market pressures
inherent in a free market system. The imbalance between supply and demand for Czech
products on the domestic market, associated with an increased demand for foreign
products, contributed to slower growth rates o f domestic production. The difficulty of
Czech producers to penetrate new markets and the weak demand for Czech products in
Western Europe further hit domestic production rates.17
While the Czech government took the position that these macro-economic
developments could not have been foreseen, international advisors to the government
argued otherwise. The Czech Republic enjoyed significant degrees o f technical assistance
from international organizations which gave them advice on how to counter these
deleterious but inevitable results o f competition in an international environment. Agenda
2000, to mention just one o f these available sources o f expert advice, recommended that
wage pressure be kept under control and enterprise restructuring be sped up, so that
domestic products become competitive in external markets as well.18
It appears that the government failed to act in time. Table 3 shows that wage
pressure was not kept under control. Between 1992 and 1996, the annual average o f the
gross monthly earnings in industry increased constantly. In 1993, some restraint seems to
have been recorded, with five percentage points drop from the previous year. However,
this drop may reflect the shift in statistical calculations caused by the break-up o f the
Federation.
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The same failure to act on recommendations was observed with respect to the
recommendation to speed up restructuring o f enterprises. As o f 1997, the restructuring of
enterprises was considerably behind, according to the Transition Report. This delay was
partly due to the control that IPFs retained over the most promising o f the domestic
enterprises. Legislation passed in 1996 and 1997 finally dealt with the influence o f IPFs
on the restructuring o f the economy, but steps were still needed to implement the
legislation.
The trade balance deficit in Table 3 supports the hypothesis that market pressures
have contributed to economic decline in the latter part o f the nineties. The much higher
volume o f imports relative to exports coincides with the beginning o f the economic decline
and recession period in 1995. Until 1994, the trade balance was negative, but was at a
modest level o f under one billion dollars (with the exception o f 1992, when it surged up
almost two billion dollars). Starting in 1995, the negative balance quadrupled, reaching
almost six billion dollars in 1996.
Finally, flaws o f leadership and o f the reform program, and lack o f political vision
were considered cumulative effects that led to the poor showing o f the economy after
1995. Between 1992 and 1996, the Klaus government seems to have created the
conditions for recession by not acting on recommendations, and by not insisting on the
efficient implementation o f the government’s reform program. The manner in which the
restructuring o f the industrial sector took place in mid-nineties was acknowledged by
government insiders as well, who described restructuring as having had the most negative
influence on economic output.19 The weakness o f the banking system that was neither
fully private nor state-controlled, and whose rules o f functioning were evasive and subject
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to interpretation was another element o f domestic economic instability.20
Alter 1996, the lack o f political consensus and economic vision o f the Zeman
government contributed to and maintained the recession. The lack o f economic vision on
an industrial policy compatible with the EU was considered the one main downfall o f the
administration that followed Klaus.21

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS
How did the outcome o f economic policies affect public support for a market
economy? Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public
support for the introduction o f a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns
o f government responsiveness to their publics?
Figure 6 below traces the curve o f Czech public opinion support for a market
economy, and two indicators o f policy outcome: the rate o f GDP growth per capita, and
the rate o f unemployment. Figure 6 points to puzzling results. Between 1991 and 1995,
while the economy was experiencing economic growth, illustrated by growing rates o f per
capita GDP, and relatively low levels o f unemployment, public support dwindled and was
in constant fall after 1991. In other words, as the economy was improving as a result o f
the introduction o f market economy mechanisms, the public did not seem to believe that a
market economy was the right system for the country any longer.
What factors account for the steady decline o f public support for a market
economy, and how should we interpret the relationship between public support and
government policy? If the decline in support may be justified between 1996 and 1998 on
account o f the decline in economic performance discussed above, what factors account for
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the decline in support between 1991 and 1995, at a time when the economy was
performing well and very well?22

Czech Republic - Market Transition

1990

1991

1992

pubic opinion

1993

199*

1995

- s - Unomptoymant

1996

1997

1996

GOP par copto

Figure 6. Czech Republic: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 213, and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).

The direction o f the curves in Figure 6 points to a minimum o f three alternative
hypotheses regarding the relationship between public opinion and government policy on
the issue o f market reform in the Czech Republic.
First, drawing on the literature o f dynamic representation, as public preferences
change, policy changes to adjust to public demands. As the public favors a certain policy,
policy starts to move in the direction o f meeting popular preferences. In the Czech case,
majorities o f respondents supported the introduction o f a market economy between 1990
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and 1993, albeit with support felling by ten percentage points during this period. Policies
o f liberalization and de-centralization started being implemented, per transition indicators,
to meet public expectations. The outcome o f the packet o f policies was a better
performance o f the economy, reflected in increased GDP (per capita), modest increases in
personal monthly earnings (for industry employees), and low levels o f unemployment.23
However, this model cannot adequately explain the reasons why, at a time when
policy outcomes continued to move in the direction o f meeting public preferences
(between 1993 and 1995), public support for a market economy continued to drop.
Dynamic representation is predicated upon the idea that policy adjustments to meet public
preferences take place over a period o f time, and that levels o f policy compatible with
levels o f public support will only be noticed after a time lag since the observance o f public
preferences. Figure 6 however, points to a different phenomenon. As policy adjusts to
meet the original public preference for the introduction o f a market economy, public
support shifts to the point where equal, then more respondents think that the introduction
o f a market economy system (therefore the associated policies needed to implement it) is
wrong, rather than right for the future o f the country.
Figure 7 below illustrates the dynamic o f public opinion change on the question o f
whether the introduction o f a market economy is right for the country.
In the beginning o f the period, as large numbers o f respondents believed that the
market economy was the right answer for the future o f their country, few respondents
believed that it was wrong. As time elapsed and policies were introduced, lesser numbers
believed that a market economic system was right, and more that it was wrong for their
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Figure 7. Czech Republic: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f
a Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

country. Finally, the proportion of respondents who did not know what to answer with
respect to the introduction of a market economy was larger in the beginning o f the period
than at the end o f the period. This rightfully indicates that in the beginning o f the
transition, there were more questions about the core principles o f a market economy
among the population, as World Bank and transition experts found. A steady rate o f
twenty percent or more o f respondents not willing to venture a response on the question
o f a market economy was maintained for four years o f the period under discussion. This
steadiness may indicate that as market mechanisms were introduced, people had more
questions about the viability or appropriateness o f the selected mechanisms for the
introduction o f a market economy.
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Overall, the dynamic representation model o f analysis is o f limited use to explain
the dynamics of public support and government policy outcomes in the Czech case.
A second hypothesis suggests that there is a reverse relationship between policy
outcomes in the transition to a market economy and public support for the introduction o f
a market economy. This is a counterintuitive hypothesis worth exploring, given that as
indicators o f a growing economy go up (Table 3), public support goes down.
This hypothesized reverse relationship is commonly attributed to the hardships o f
transition, the costs o f unemployment, and the decline in personal standards o f living
brought about by competition, privatization, and restructuring. According to this
hypothesis, as market economy mechanisms are introduced, associated social costs such as
high unemployment are witnessed. Higher unemployment, determined by the shut down
o f unprofitable enterprises and privatization creates insecurity at the personal level. This
insecurity is conducive to diminished support for the conditions which brought about
unemployment, in this case market economy policies adopted by the government.24
A closer look at the direction o f curves in Figure 6 offers a different picture. As
unemployment goes markedly down between 1991 and 1992, and afterwards fluctuates
around three percent until 1995, public support remains in constant fall. This seems to
indicate that there is no direct relationship between unemployment and public support for
a market economy. It is not rational to hypothesize that the public does not support
policies that keep unemployment on a steady and low level, compatible with other market
economies.
Additional information regarding personal standards o f living confirm the view that
there is no direct relationship between public support and costs o f transition in the Czech
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Republic case. Table 3 indicated that the gross average monthly earnings in industry
witnessed positive growth throughout the entire period under discussion, with the
exception o f 1991. The Czech Republic, among the other countries in Eastern Europe,
had better purchasing power and lower inflation rates which allowed the economy to
grow, and the citizens to be comparatively less stressed than the citizens o f countries like
Romania or Bulgaria, for instance.
Table 4 below also shows that the Czech public did not feel threatened by the costs
o f transition. Even if in the first year o f transition (1990) markedly more respondents
believed that their personal financial situation would get worse (61%) rather than better
(6%), the trend changed starting in 1991, with more respondents believing that their
personal financial situation would either get better or stay the same (a cumulated 58%),
than those who believed that it would get worse (34%). From 1990 until 1996 (the
available data), the category o f respondents who believed that their personal financial
situation would get worse was in steady decline (from 61% to 26%).

Table 4.—Czech Republic: Public opinion on financial situation in the household for the
next 12 m onths

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Will be better

6

21

25

28

23

25

21

Will be same

27

37

37

37

43

43

45

Will be worse

66

34

33

31

28

25

26

Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. 1990 and 1991 figures are for Czechoslovakia. In 1990,
the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how will your own financial situation
change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the next 12 months, do you expect the
financial situation o f your household will get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same.
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get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a lot better’ and ‘get a little better’
categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and ‘get a lot worse’ categories were
cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped from questionnaires.

The high percentage o f respondents who believed that their situation would get
worse in 1990 is an understandable phenomenon for the beginning o f the transition. In
1990, few people had an understanding o f market economy mechanisms, or how those
mechanisms would impact their personal lives. On the other hand, the steady decline in the
rates o f respondents who believed that their situation would worsen between 1991 and
1996 indicates low levels o f stress regarding the changes that were being brought about by
the new economic system.
On the other hand, Table 4 shows a fair split among the three categories o f people
who believed that their personal situations would get better, stay the same, or get worse.
The category with the largest percentages throughout the period (except for 1990) is the
middle category, o f respondents who believed that their situation would not change in the
following year. These numbers indicate that Czechs got used to the patterns o f
transformation o f their economy, since they did not feel threatened in their personal
financial situation, and they did not see the transition getting worse for their households.
The steady increase in the rates o f respondents who believed that their personal
situation would stay the same also point to two alternative hypotheses regarding public
perceptions: either people felt that the course o f the economic transformation was
predictable enough and they had nothing to fear for their future; or they felt that “nothing
will ever change”, therefore there was not much they could do about what was going on in
their country. Studies have repeatedly pointed towards an increased public apathy in
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Eastern Europe in general, reflected in lower levels o f voter participation, and a tiredness
associated with democratic politics.25
The latter o f the two hypothesis may merit attention at the end o f the 90s, where a
case could be made about public apathy resulting from a protracted period o f political and
economic instability. This hypothesis does not, however, explain early steady rates o f
respondents who believed that their situation would remain unchanged. The more likely
hypothesis is that Czechs did not feel threatened by the economic changes in their country.
This hypothesis, in turn, supports earlier thinking about the relationship between
public support for the introduction o f a market economy and the associated costs o f
transition. There is little data to substantiate a hypothesis that the steady decline o f public
support for a market economy observed in Figure 6 is the result o f social costs of
transition that Czechs incurred. Low unemployment rates and steady increases in average
monthly earnings for a large segment o f the working community, the industrial sector (per
Table 3), as well as confidence about the future (per Table 4) indicate that in the Czech
Republic, the public did not feel threatened by the introduction o f a market economy. If
they did not feel threatened in their personal situation by the macro and micro-economic
changes that the country was going through, what factors can better explain this steady
decline o f support?
A third possible explanation for the decline o f public support for the introduction
o f a market economy is another counter-intuitive hypothesis, which has been formulated
by Adam Przeworski in 1993, with respect to the Polish case but as a reflection o f general
trends in the region. Przeworski argued that East European publics hold somewhat
irrational beliefs with respect to the future o f the economy, indicative o f individual
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myopia. He argued that publics support the introduction o f reforms in order to see the
economy do better, even when reforms have a deleterious impact on their personal lives.
They lessen their support as soon as beneficial reform outcomes are felt, and the economy
is in better shape. Since they understand the need for difficult reforms and personal
sacrifice in order for the economy to get better, they accept reform programs even when
they are harsh, create substantial unemployment, and lower standards o f living. People
believe that these short-term effects o f the introduction o f a market economy system are
necessary, and accept difficulties in the expectation o f future personal well-being. Once
the economy starts doing better, they think that reforms worked, therefore there is no
need to continue them. He likened East Europeans with a patient who starts feeling better
as a result o f treatment, and then does not finish the “medication” despite the doctor's
prescription.26
If we apply this hypothesis to the Czech case, the following line o f reasoning
results: Czechs supported a market economy as long as the economy was in bad shape.
As soon as the economy started doing better, Czechs felt that it was time to abandon
continued reforms since their country was on a better course already and lowered their
support.
This is an intriguing hypothesis which poses major analytical problems o f
compatibility with known models o f analysis. It also suggests that individual lack o f
understanding o f the requirements o f a market economy, which has been repeatedly
noticed by transition specialists, may be the strongest inhibitor o f continued public support
for transformation in the region.
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If Przeworski’s hypothesis applied across the region, we should notice decreased
levels o f public support in the Czech Republic as the economy got better, and increased
levels o f public support for the introduction o f market economy reforms as soon as the
economy started to decline, in 1995. What we see instead is decreased levels o f public
support for the introduction o f a market economy irrespective o f how the economy is
doing. In other words, if up to a point this hypothesis seems to explain the relationship
between public support and government policies, when the outcome o f policies reverses
(decline o f economic growth), public support does not reverse as well (public support
does not grow). The Przeworski hypothesis is also o f limited use in explaining the Czech
case.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT
Having tried to interpret the situation o f the Czech Republic with the analytical
tools offered by a broad literature of representation, we are forced to admit that existing
models can only partially help explain the dynamics o f government responsiveness and
public opinion support. If there is little doubt that the Czech governments between 1990
and 1998 took action to follow the lead that their constituencies gave them with respect to
the introduction o f a market economy, a large question mark remains regarding the decline
o f public support for the introduction o f this economic system despite government action.
A better perspective over this paradoxical situation is offered by the literature on
elections. An analysis o f the dynamics o f public support versus the outcome of
government policies from the perspective o f after-the-fact responsiveness offers less
quantifiable, but nevertheless strong indications for the decline o f public support for
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market economy policies, as well as popular perceptions o f government actions. These
indications are in keeping with the observations o f EBRD and World Bank specialists
regarding public expectations and disappointments, institutional weaknesses o f the
economic system in the making, and widespread corruption.
In essence, the after-the-fact model o f representation is an elitist model. It argues
that politicians run electoral campaigns, convince voters to elect them in office, then
proceed with the implementation o f their electoral promises. Before the next elections,
voters have little or no possibility to reward politicians for their actions in office. When
new elections take place, politicians perceived to have ignored, or not acted in conformity
with their original promises are voted out o f office.
In the Czech Republic, constituencies voted out o f office, or weakened the
position o f incumbents to allow them a lesser executive power in virtually all rounds o f
parliamentary elections. Table 5 below shows the decline of support for the main party
that replaced the Civic Forum at the helm o f the Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic
Party (ODS), throughout two consecutive parliamentary elections.

Social Democrats

1992
% o f vote
seats
6.5
16

1996
% o f vote
seats
26.4
61

1998
seats
% o f vote
74
32.3

ODS

29.7

76

29.6

68

27.7

63

ODA

6.0

14

6.4

13

14.1

35

10.3

22

11.0

24

Parties

Communists

Data from RFL/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 29 (17 July 1992), pp. 1-8; FBIS-EEU96-150 (2 August 1996), pp. 16-17; FBIS-EEU-98-128 (September, 1998), pp. 14-15.
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The results presented in Table 5 are oversimplified for the purpose o f analysis and
do not reflect all the political participants in the elections between 1992 and 1998. The
after-the-fact model o f representation allows for the following analysis in the Czech case:
Voters did not have adequate political or social leverage mechanisms to relay to
their representatives their dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the government, or
the manner o f politics altogether. As a result, they expressed their dissatisfaction by
voting incumbents out o f office in 1992, giving them insufficient votes to form another
majority government in 1996, thus forcing them into a coalition that did not work, then
finally voting incumbents out o f office in 1998.
In the 1992 elections, the highly praised and much acclaimed Civic Forum which
successfully negotiated the peaceful dissolution o f the Communist regime in 1990 did not
get representation in the country’s legislature. The most often quoted reasons for this
failure were the tiredness with the elitism of the Civic Forum, and a public perception that,
as a party, the intellectuals who initiated and negotiated the political change in 1989 were
in actuality removed from the everyday realities and needs o f their voters.27 As a result,
policies pursued by a party perceived to be removed from its constituents ended up being
unpopular even when the public believed that the policies were actually necessary for the
country. When the confidence in the bond between voters and political leadership is
weakened, support for whatever policies are pursued drops irrespective o f outcome o f
policies. “Transition weariness” was the common denominator for the outcome and
surprises o f the 1992 elections, and later of the 1996 elections.
In the 1996 elections, tiredness with the politics o f the Klaus government, political
infighting, corruption scandals, and disunity among the top leadership, led to a public
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posture o f “I have had enough already.”28 Since 1996, the phrase “the malady o f Czech
politics” has meant a communication crisis in which “everyone does his thing” with no
consideration for a national goal, or to building consensus on issues o f middle to long
term relevance to the country. Vaclav Klaus came to be perceived as an astute politician
who, apart from being a good economist, was more interested in calling the political shots
than in building the future o f the Czech Republic. His arrogance, while being no secret in
1992 when he was voted in office, became his most notorious characteristic, despite the
many good things he accomplished for his country. Transition indicators show that the
most serious and remarkable measures to introduce a market economy in the Czech
Republic date back to the Klaus administration.
In the 1998 elections, political cleavages were further exacerbated by the desire to
gain representation in the Parliament, and to secure enough votes to create a majority
government. The term “political tunneling” was launched in 1999, to describe the
phenomenon where “at crucial moments, top politicians put their own interests and those
o f their parties above national interests.” “Deformed individualism” and “Bolshevik
thinking” were other phrases designed to capture as much o f the voter dissatisfaction with
the works o f their new political and economic identity as possible.29
Additional civic manifestations emphasize the notion that the Czech public is
generally dissatisfied with the works o f the new system and unprepared to recognize or
accept the responsibilities o f the new system. Recently, a civic group called Impulse ‘99
called on the government to resign, underlining the reasons for their request. The lack o f
government interest in finding out how the Czech public felt about the manner o f post
communist politics, generally characterized as self-absorbed and insensitive to the public
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voice, the absence o f communication between government and constituencies, and a
general public sense that post-communist politics turned out much like communist politics
determined Impulse ‘99 to adopt the banner “Thank you, now go.”30
Figure 8 below traces public support for the introduction o f a market economy
versus public satisfaction with the works of democracy. Figure 8 indicates that there may
be a strong relationship between public perceptions o f democracy, as a political system,
and public perceptions o f market economy, as the supporting economic system.

Czech Republic - Public Approval

i “

■ 40

1967

1906

Figure 8. Czech Republic: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

Dissatisfaction with transition economics does not have to be associated with
dissatisfaction with democratic politics but in the Czech case it seems to be. Levels o f
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public satisfaction with the works o f democracy remain below a majority percentage even
at their peak, in 1993. Moreover, levels o f dissatisfaction with both the political and the
economic system brought about by the 1989 changes are related after 1993, going in the
same direction at roughly the same levels. This observation supports the hypothesis that
in the Czech Republic, public support for economic policies went hand-in-hand with public
support for elected govemants, and not necessarily with the outcome o f policies per se.
One last comment is worth making. According to Figure 8, public support for
democracy was on the rise until 1993, and on the decline afterwards. Since 1993 is the
year when the Federation broke apart, it is fair to consider the possibility that the general
public dissatisfaction with the works o f democracy was also related to the failure to keep
the Czechoslovak Federation together. While that is a significant possibility, it not enough
to account for the steady growing dissatisfaction with democracy and a market economy
as registered in this chapter.

CONCLUSIONS
From a representative democracy perspective, the Czech case can be best
explained by an elitist model o f representation. Figure 6 in effect shows that government
policies have not been sensitive to the public mood over the course o f the transition, or to
the associated disillusionment with politics. In a representative democracy, the decline o f
public support for an originally popular policy, which is widely believed to be the only
answer to an existing crisis, would be a strong signal to political representatives to listen
to their constituencies' voice. In the Czech case, continued decline in public support
seems to indicate that an adequate dialogue was not established between the political
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leadership and the voters, and points o f discontent only exacerbated with time. The
literature on elections highlights many intangible inhibitors o f public support for the
introduction o f a market economy which point in the direction of public apathy, but also in
the direction o f a reaction against a leadership insensitive to the public need for
information and adequate preparation for change.
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CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
HUNGARY

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
At the end o f 1999, Hungary was viewed as the most promising market in Eastern
Europe, favored by foreign investors over Poland due to its higher stage o f economic
development.1 This could have hardly been predicted in 1990, or even in the mid-nineties.
The unforseen and difficult twists o f the transition to a market economy, accompanied
until the mid-nineties by unexpected rates o f GDP decline, high inflation, unemployment,
and recession would have made such a premonition next to impossible. After years of
declining trust in the direction o f the economy, and o f their country, hope and confidence
seem to be making a modest come-back among the Hungarian population. The governing
coalition voted in power in 1998 enjoys high approval rates after a year and a half of
administration.
O f the other East European countries that underwent a seemingly successful
transition to a market economy, Hungary had the most liberalized economy prior to the
change o f 1989.2 Some private ownership and business was allowed by the communist
regime as early as 1980, conducive to a minimum o f market-oriented practices in services
and tourism. A degree o f decentralization was allowed in the area o f large industrial
organizations between 1980 and 1986. Wage policy deregulation followed in 1988, and
imports were liberalized in January 1989.
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When the train of regional political transformation reached Hungary in 1989, the
first post-communist, liberal government o f Joseph Antall promised the population rapid
and irreversible economic growth, conducive to higher standards o f living and to a
modem, Westem-like society.3 Election promises regarding the improvement o f standards
o f living did not materialize during his administration, nor during the administration o f the
Socialist Party, which followed at the government helm in 1994. Sustained transition
hardships on the population led to a steady decline o f popular confidence in a market
economy and in democracy in general. The imbalance between the costs o f transition to a
market economy and the costs o f social programs to offset the burdens o f the population,
unclear economic policies, over-emphasis on preferential political and economic priorities
and, not in the least, political infighting and disunity have all contributed to a much poorer
economic showing in the first half o f the nineties than anticipated.
Hungary’s post-communist economic development followed what is largely called
“gradual” transition to a market economy.4 Except for thorough and immediate
liberalization o f trade barriers in 1989, Hungary was much slower at adopting other
market economy rules-of-thumb, such as price and wage liberalization, large-scale
privatization, and restructuring o f state-owned enterprises. In fact, concern with the social
costs o f rapid passage to a market economy ‘rules’ was the major inhibitor o f the first
reform program, the Kupa program (named after Mihaly Kupa, the first post-communist
Finance Minister o f Hungary). The underlying philosophy o f the transition to a market
economy o f the Kupa program merits quoting:
There are only two solutions: Either you focus on a very rapid transition to
markets expecting that the profits generated by the private sector will then be
distributed to those abandoned along the way, or you proceed more prudently,
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committing yourself not to exclude anyone from this process o f transition. Since
the actual state o f our economy does not permit the first solution, we have adopted
the second, placing priority attention on the social aspects o f reform.5
Public opinion polls show that the Hungarian population was highly appreciative o f
this approach at the time. The highest support for a market economy registered between
1990 and 1998 was recorded during 1991, the year when these statements were made (see
Chapter 3, Table 1).
The gradual transition to a market economy advocated by Kupa and Antall was
characterized primarily by a strict monetary policy, to be assured by the creation o f a
Central Bank; wage regulation, so that inflation be kept under control; and subsidies to
prices and to industry, to prevent massive bankruptcies. 1991 was defined as the year o f
privatization and the definition o f property rights, 1992 as the year when inflation would
be lowered and the convertibility o f the forint would be prepared for, and 1993 as the year
when growth would resume.6
By 1993, however, growth did not resume (although it was in sight), the general
public mood was characterized by political and social exhaustion, and the appropriateness
o f the gradual approach to the transition to a market economy was more questionable than
ever. Figure 5 showed that between 1991 and 1993, the economy witnessed negative
growth, even if it managed to reduce the handicap somewhat in 1993.
Misplaced political priorities and the inability to reach consensus among the
members o f the coalition government are the factors found to have contributed to the
decline o f the economy and the popular dissatisfaction with the course o f reform. The
first post-communist government was made up o f a coalition o f liberal parties, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Smallholders’ Party (ISP), and the Christian
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Democratic Peoples’ Party (CDPP) who advocated a return to the political line followed
by the Horthy regime before World War II. Their political strategy was focused on three
main directions: the well-being o f the countryside gentry, sometimes accompanied by
neglect for the needs and appropriate policies for the rest o f the Hungarian social strata;
reclaiming the glory of a larger Hungarian state; and insisting on a return to Christian
values and social norms.
The over-emphasis on the role and benefits o f one particular social stratum in post
communist Hungary was one instance o f misplaced priorities. The political persistence on
the need for restitutions o f land property confiscated by the communist regime led to
making the current land owners insecure about their future.7 Additionally, the
implementation o f the restitution law was fraught with delays and bureaucratic obstacles,
leading to a postponement o f the first auctions of land until 1993. In the words o f a
political analyst, by the end o f 1993 the entire program was going “nowhere.”8
Reclaiming the policy o f the Horthy regime was another instance of misplaced
priorities. The open advocacy o f a return to the Horthist territorial lines o f the Hungarian
state (which included parts o f Romania and Slovakia) strained relations with Serbia,
Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and hurt Hungary domestically and internationally.9 These
positions, taken as Hungary was officially applying for EU and NATO membership,
reinforced the impression that the government was paying lip-service to the requirements
o f membership in both international bodies. One important requirement of membership is
that member states abandon territorial claims beyond the borders which they had when
entering either NATO or the EU. Another requirement is that member states have good
relations with their neighbors. It took Hungary until 1995 to sign the good neighbor
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treaty with Romania, and even longer to sign the treaty with Slovakia.
Prioritizing foreign policy over domestic economic policy was another instance o f
misplaced government focus. While the Antall government was assiduously pursuing a
policy o f Euro-Atlantic integration, domestic analysts were pointing o u t that the
administration did not have an economic program to take Hungary into any o f the desired
Western institutions.10 Some analysts even contended that the government was pursuing
economic policies guided by foreign economists, in order to gain their approval and
recommendation in the pursuit o f European integration, rather than in order to secure a
successful transition domestically." For instance, they considered that the liberalization o f
imports under the conditions o f the collapse o f the COMECON m arkets left domestic
producers exposed to hard foreign competition and eventually led to sustained trade
imbalance and high inflation. A more strategic liberalization o f imports could have been
designed to accommodate integration requirements as well as domestic growth goals, and
would not have hurt the domestic producers so badly.
Finally, the inability o f the coalition members to reach consensus on most policies
greatly contributed to popular dissatisfaction with post-communist politics. Political
infighting, together with the perceived attempt that the government was trying to replace
the communist ideology with an ideology o f nationalism and religion accompanied a
fifteen percent drop in popular support for the creation o f a market economy within a
three-year span.12
The absence o f cohesion among coalition members was not aided by strong
leadership either. Antall was frequently accused o f setting priorities by himself, not
consulting with the other governing partners before making decisions or announcing them
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publicly, and sometimes ignoring the coalition altogether. By the beginning o f 1992, the
health o f the coalition was seriously weakened and the polarization o f political opinions
led to a split within the governing coalition.13
It took the voting out o f office o f the liberals o f Joseph Antall (who died before he
saw the collapse o f his administration) and the voting in power of the Hungarian Socialists
for a market economy strategy to be formulated. In 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party
won the lion’s share o f the popular vote and formed a majority government in coalition
with the Alliance o f Free Democrats. The coalition immediately enacted an agreement
with the IMF conducive to the stabilization o f the economy.
The agreement came at a high price: the IMF imposed a severe austerity package
in return for additional credits. With the adoption o f the austerity program and the
finalization o f privatization legislation in 1995, the signing o f a new IMF program for
development in 1996 and the convertibility o f the forint in 1996, the harmonization o f
competition laws with EU requirements in 1997,14 Hungary’s woes seemed to come to a
halt and economic growth to resume through the end o f the nineties. In 1998, Hungary
was formally invited to start accession talk with the European Union. By that time, the
population’s trust in the introduction o f a market economy decreased to below the fifty
percent threshold and the public was reported to be apathetic about politics and
democracy in general.15

TRANSITION BEGINS. GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS
The Transition Report indicators o f progress towards a market economy, Table 6
below, summarize the progress o f the Hungarian government in establishing market
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economy legislative structures and institutions between 1994 and 1998, a progress that is
remarkable and puzzling in many ways.

^ib l^^^lu n g ar^ ^n d icato rso fjjjro g g sy n tn ttisitio in c^M rark e^ co n o n ^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share

55%

60%

70%

75%

80%

Large scale privatization

3

4

4

4

4

Small scale privatization

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Governance and restructuring

3

3

3

3

3.2

Price liberalization

3

3

3

3.2

3.2

Trade system

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Competition policy

3

3

3

3

3

Bank reform

3

3

3

4

4

Securities reform

n/a

3

3

3.2

3.2

Investment law

n/a

4

4

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).

These rankings do not differ significantly from those o f the Czech Republic.
Hungary had over 50% o f state enterprises and farm assets in private ownership by 1994,
instead of 1993 as the Czech Republic. The privatization o f small companies was
complete by 1993 as well, and standards o f performance typical o f advanced industrial
economies were in force as early as 1994, together with effective tradability o f land.
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Significant and sustained actions were taken to harden budget constraints and to
promote corporate governance effectively through privatization combined with tight credit
and subsidy policies by 1993.
Despite a slow start, substantial progress on price liberalization was made by 1993,
moving in the direction o f comprehensive price liberalization starting in 1996.
The trade system was liberalized by 1993, with the removal o f most tariff barriers
starting in 1994, matching the progress o f the Czech Republic. Some actions were taken
to reduce abuse o f market power and to promote a competitive environment throughout
the period, but with no progress beyond these attempts.
In banking reform, despite earlier assessments which argued that the Hungarian
market resisted privatization and reform o f their banking system,16 the Transition Report
indicators consider that Hungary was ahead o f the Czech Republic starting in 1996. From
1996 on, Hungary moved from mere progress in the establishment o f bank solvency and o f
a framework for prudential supervision and regulation, to significant movement o f banking
laws and regulations towards BIS standards, well-functioning banking competition, and
effective prudential supervision. Transition indicators, however, do not gauge progress in
bank privatization per se, which accounts for the difference in views regarding the
efficiency and solvency o f Hungarian banks.
In the area o f securities reform, Hungary also went further than the Czech
Republic to secure substantial issuance o f securities by private enterprises, to establish
independent share registries, secure some protection to minority shareholders, and to
assist the emergence o f non-bank financial institutions.
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The legal framework for encouraging investment was clear and well formulated,
with no discrimination between foreign and domestic investors. In this respect, both
Hungary and the Czech Republic are ranked on an equal footing.
Table 6 indicates that the Hungarian government also pursued a policy line o f
economic reforms intended to lead to the introduction o f a market economy, in response
to initial popular demand for a market economy. More importantly, it indicates little
variation between the outcomes o f policies in a gradual approach to transition to a market
economy, such as the case o f Hungary, versus outcomes o f policies in a more rapid
approach to transition, such as the case o f the Czech Republic.17
Overall, one would have expected that Hungary would have been equally, if not
more prosperous, than the Czech Republic, rather than suffering the economic decline o f
the early nineties. In turn, the expected public reaction to a growing economy should have
been support for the administration pursuing market economic reforms, in anticipation o f
future growth and improvements in standards o f living. Transition indicators, however, do
not shed light either on the reasons for the economic decline, or for the revitalizing o f the
economy in 1997.
Macro-economic indicators listed in Table 7 give insights into the dynamics o f
economic growth throughout the period. These indicators also show that the Hungarian
economy did not grow at the same pace as the Czech Republic’s economy.
Despite the good and very good progress in transition illustrated by the transition
indicators, transition policies did not amount to positive economic growth until 1994. It
should be noted, however, that GDP per capita, when measured in U.S. currency, grew
steadily, although in small steps until 1994.
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Table 7.—Hungary: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994
(Percentage change)
GDP at constant prices
-11.9

1.3

4.4

4.6

23.6

18.3

15.0

4.7

-6.9

-2.0

3.8

n/a

10.4

10.5

10.4

n/a

VO

1998

to

1997

1
o
b\

35.0

1996

■
u>

Consumer prices (average)

1995
1.5

23.0

22.5

18.8

28.2

Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)3

-9.4

2.9

2.2

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

7.4

12.3

12.1

10.4

(in billions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance

0.2

0.0

-3.2

-3.6

-2.4

-2.6

-1.7

-2.4

Foreign Direct Investment

9.1

10.1

11.3

11.2

15.3

16.8

21.4

24.4

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 217.
a Calculated by author from ERBD data

The macro-economic indicators that best describe the impact o f transition policies
on the population, inflation and unemployment respectively are high throughout the entire
period. This indicates that the pursuit o f the gradual approach led to a protracted loss o f
purchasing power and high job insecurity at the individual level.
Additionally, the gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing are fairly
unpredictable, with modest increases during years o f recession, and dramatic decreases
during years o f growth. Since until 1996 (the available data) the share o f industry in GDP
was over three times larger than the agriculture share in GDP,18 we cannot attribute the
incremental increases in manufacturing earnings to shifts in the agriculture production or
trade. The growth o f average monthly earnings must have been the result o f policies in
the industrial and manufacturing sectors.
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The government favored subsidies for some sectors o f activity, to offset the social
costs o f transition. It is highly possible that the inconclusive growth in earnings was due
to government subsidies to loss-making industries, to counter the effects o f transition on
the population employed in industry and manufacturing. Government subsidies prolonged
the recession and delayed the recovery o f the manufacturing sector by avoiding the
necessity o f restructuring or privatization. In effect, subsidies deepened the recession
rather than easing the pain o f the electorate. A more determined approach to restructuring
could have turned loss-making industrial and manufacturing entities into productive units
and would have spurred the growth o f the national wealth at an earlier date.
The trade balance and foreign direct investment taken together, and in relation to
the growth o f the national wealth, also suggest interesting insights. While the trade
balance was in excellent equilibrium and direct foreign investment was ten times higher
than in the Czech Republic between 1991 and 1992, national growth was still negative but
the plummeting growth rate was slowed dramatically.
Conversely, as the national wealth experienced positive growth, twice as much
foreign investment was coming into the country by comparison to the first two years o f
transition, and twice as much wealth was going out o f the country, per negative trade
balance between 1993 and 1998. It appears that even if domestic production was starting
to grow, less domestic goods were exported and more foreign goods were imported. This
imbalance is a source o f trade deficit.
In addition, the privatization o f land led to an increased possibility for foreign firms
to acquire land in Hungary and set up new enterprises. The products o f these enterprises
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were sold domestically, but primarily abroad, leading to a drain o f currency and a weak
domestic market.
The power o f foreign companies to acquire land and set up new enterprises
imbalanced domestic producers further. The possibility for domestic producers to set up
and market their products successfully dropped, while an intolerance o f foreigners rose
steadily among all categories o f Hungarians. In 1997, eighty-nine percent o f Hungarians
believed that foreigners should not acquire assets in Hungary without restrictions, while
seventy-nine percent believed that Hungary would end up in foreign hands. Sixty-five
percent o f Hungarians believed that market competition should be restricted, eighty-four
percent believed that domestic producers and buyers should be favored in the process o f
privatization o f state enterprises. Towards the end o f the nineties, an image o f fear o f the
influence of foreign direct investment in Hungary emerges.19

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS
How did the outcome o f economic policies affect public support for a market
economy? Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public
support for the introduction o f a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns
o f government responsiveness to their publics?
Figure 9 below traces the curve o f public opinion support for a market economy,
the curve o f GDP growth per capita, and the curve o f unemployment.
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Figure 9. Hungary: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 217; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).

Figure 9 permits the following analysis o f representation. First, as high levels o f
popular support for a market economy were maintained (between fifty and sixty percent
until 1992), government policy slowly started to move in the direction o f meeting popular
demands. GDP per capita grew at a slow pace during the first four years o f transition.
GDP at constant prices experienced positive growth for the first time in 1994, one year
later than the Czech Republic, and two years behind Poland (see Fig. 5 and Table 7).
Second, in the process o f moving in the direction o f meeting popular demands,
deleterious policy outcomes such as high unemployment and inflation (see also Table 7)
also resulted. Both amounted to negative impacts on popular support for the policies
which produced such outcomes. This is illustrated by the steady decline o f support for the
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introduction o f a market economy after 1991, when the rate o f unemployment sky
rocketed.
Third, starting in 1993, policy and opinion move almost in parallel, indicating a
meeting o f minds o f popular expectations and government action. Policy was originally
pulled up by support for market economy policies until 1993. After 1995, policy is ahead
o f public support, but both curves go in the same direction and the distance between them
remains small. This indicates that the public continued to support market economy
policies, albeit not at the same rate as in 1990. It also indicates that policy stayed the
course o f transformation and moved to meet popular demands.
This analysis allows for two preliminary conclusions. First, the Hungarian
governments between 1990 and 1998 tended to be responsive to their publics and adopted
policies resulting in the introduction o f the desired market economy. Second, necessary
difficult transition decisions resulted in deleterious effects on the population such as high
unemployment. These effects, together with the faulty implementation o f economic
policies discussed previously, corruption, and other political disunity led to a decrease in
public support for a market economy.
These deleterious factors, however, do not seem to have amounted to popular
rejection o f the market economy per se. The curve o f public support did not continue to
go down, as in the case o f the Czech Republic. Instead, it stabilized around thirty-five
percent after 1995, and remained at that level through the end o f the period.
Additional data confirms and complements these conclusions. Figure 10 below
traces the curves o f public opinion on the question o f whether a market economy was
right or wrong for the country. Figure 10 shows that as high percentage levels o f
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Hungarians believed that the free market system was right, low percentage levels believed
that it was wrong, in the early nineties. As costs and hardships were experienced, fewer
Hungarians thought that a market economy was right, and more that it was wrong.
Finally, when the economy stabilized and growth resumed, levels o f approval and
disapproval o f a market economy stabilized as well, between thirty and forty percentage
points, with slightly more Hungarians believing that the market economic system was
right, than that it was wrong. The situation o f the third category, o f Hungarians who did
not know how to answer the question, will be discussed in the next section.
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Figure 10. Hungary: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f a
Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
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Figure 10 also suggests that even if more Hungarians were in favor o f a market
economy than against it, the Hungarian society was polarized on the question o f the
appropriateness o f the system for the country. Less than ten percentage points separate
supporters from non-suporters o f the system. This indicates that the benefits o f the system
were not as equally spread across the social spectrum as the government originally
intended. This polarization also supports the views found in the literature about the fear
o f Hungarians o f a take-over o f their country by foreigners.
Additionally, Table 8 below supports the preliminary conclusion that deleterious
effects o f the transition, such as personal economic insecurity, were a major factor in the
decline o f popular support for a market economy. Questioned about the odds that their
personal financial situation would improve in the next twelve months, consistently larger
percentages o f Hungarians believed that their personal situation would get worse than that
it would get better between 1990 and 1996.
Table 8 displays a sustained contrast between the percentage o f Hungarians who
believed that their situation would get better, and those who believed it would get worse.
The proportion o f ‘better’ to ‘worse’ is 1/12 in 1990, 1/2 in 1991, 1/4 in 1992, roughly
1/3 through 1994, 1/5 in 1995, and roughly 1/3 in 1996. The maintenance o f this trend
throughout six years (granted, the harder years) supports the conclusion that transition
costs resulted in high economic insecurity, which is in itself the strongest deflector o f
public support for reform.
The Hungarian case is somewhat more predictable than the Czech case, in that
decline o f public support for a market economy can be linked to negative outcomes o f
economic policies, such as high levels o f unemployment, inflation and negative growth.
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T able 8 ,—H u n g a ry : Public o p in io n o n financial s itu a tio n in h o u seh o ld
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18
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23

19

26
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74

39

52

46
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63

53

Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation o f your household will get a lot
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped
from questionnaires.

Analysts o f the region have long held that fear o f unemployment overwhelms the
effects o f all other economic variables combined, and makes people turn against reform.20
Unemployment alone can thus account for the fact that, despite resumption o f economic
growth in 1994, the Hungarian population was skeptical about a market economy and no
longer supported it as strongly as in the beginning o f the transition.
This phenomenon o f gradual decrease o f support, however, is understandable, and
was predicted by World Bank and other economic analysts. Skepticism arising from the
difficult conditions o f a transition should not count against the governments’ willingness to
take the chance o f becoming unpopular by introducing a system that was both desired by
the population and assumed to produce better standards o f living in the future. The
element that counts in an analysis o f representation is the direction o f policy and opinion
considered together. From that standpoint, the Hungarian case points towards a
responsive government.
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GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT
Does an analysis o f after-the-fact voter behavior offer additional insights into the
relationship between the Hungarian governments of 1990 and 1994, and their publics?
Table 9 lists the results o f three consecutive parliamentary elections, and the voters’
reaction to these administrations.

T abl^^fE ingar^>arliam entar^lectiorw «sult^l990^98^B^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Bi>^ ^ B^ ^ ^ ^ B
Parties
1990
1994
1998
% o f vote Seats % o f vote Seats % o f vote Seats
37
17
11.7
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) 42.9 164
Hungarian Socialist Party (MszP)

33

32.9

209

32.2

134

Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) 23.8

92

19.7

70

7.9

24

11.4

44

8.8

26

13.7

48

Christian Democratic (KDNP)

5.4

21

7.1

22

2.6

0

Young Democrats (FTDESz)

5.0

21

7.0

20

28.2

148

5.5

14

Smallholders’ Party (FKGP)

Hungarian Life and Justice (MIEP)

Data from Keesing’s Record o f Word Events, News Digest for April 1990, p. 37380 and
News Digest for May 1994, p. 40015; Edith Oltay, “The Coalition Government,” Report
on Eastern Europe, No. 48 (29 November 1991), p. 51; Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander
Motyl, and Charles Graybow, Nations in Transit 1998; Civil Society, Democracy and
Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (Freedom House:
1998), pp. 278-279.

Table 9 shows strong popular support for market economy-oriented parties in the
first post-communist elections o f 1990. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the
Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), and the Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) who ran on a
platform of economic reforms came in first, second and third. The Socialist Party (MszP),
formerly the communist party won weak popular support, gaining a small number o f seats
in the parliament. The HDF, SzDSz, the FKGP and the Christian Democratic Party
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(KDNP) formed a coalition government and started introducing the first market reforms.
As a result o f these reforms, policy and opinion started moving in the same direction
towards the end o f their term in office, per Figure 9.
In 1994, the HDF was clearly voted out o f office, gaining only a fourth o f the
popular support that brought them to power in 1990. They lost to the Socialist Party and
the Free Democrats, who also formed a coalition government and continued the
introduction o f market reforms through 1998. Figure 9 shows that throughout the four
years o f the Socialists’ administration, policy and opinion moved together in the same
direction.
Despite government responsiveness in the area o f economic reform, the Socialists
also lost re-elections in 1998. However, they lost by a small margin and gained enough
representation in the parliament to be a strong opposition to the winning coalition
government o f the Young Democrats. In effect, the number o f voters who voted for the
Socialist Party was virtually the same in 1994 and in 1998 (32.% versus 32.2%). Why did
the voters punish incumbents in the Hungarian case? Since both the HDF and the Socialist
administrations showed responsiveness to the public’s demand for the introduction o f a
market economy, and their concerted policies eventually brought about economic growth
and international praise for the manner in which the transition took place, how can we
interpret the voters’ dissatisfaction with incumbents in these two elections?
If we look at these two administrations’ decisions on the manner in which to
proceed with the transformation o f the economy, versus electoral promises, factors other
than economic policies stand out as possible explanatory variables. It appears that the
mechanics o f the introduction o f market economic measures, the lack o f systematic
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information and education o f the public on the hardships of transition, and the pace o f
reforms versus popular expectations all contributed to a tarnished public image of these
administrations, and turned the public against them. Political infighting and “crazy
parliamentary debates” further exhausted public patience, while corruption scandals, many
times associated with dubious deals with foreign companies lowered the public’s trust in
the incumbent administration.
First, the mechanics o f the introduction o f a market economy were not well
considered. The 1990 government led by Antall formulated a vision for where the
Hungarian economy should be by 1993. A vision, however, does not translate into a
sound economic program. Several economic analysts pointed out that the implementation
o f the economic program was short-sighted and uncoordinated with domestic and
international factors of economic development. The policy o f restitutions did not
coordinate with a policy o f property security for current real estate owners, creating
nervousness and insecurity at all levels. The slow reform in the banking sector did not
coordinate with the booming o f small and medium-sized enterprises which needed credits
in order to be able to compete on the newly created market. The liberalization of trade did
not coordinate with a policy o f either protection, or efficient restructuring o f domestic
enterprises, to avoid the destruction o f domestic production.
Finally, privatization was done, as in many other places across the region, in a
faulty manner, creating a false image o f the amount o f former state property transferred to
private hands.21 During the period o f greatest privatization (1992-1993), public support
for the introduction o f a market economy dropped twenty percentage points and never got
back to the levels of the early nineties. In 1995 and 1996, Prime Minister Horn himself
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admitted that the mechanisms o f implementation o f a market economy had been faulty,
which delayed the anticipated well-being for the majority o f the population.22
Second, the public was caught unprepared by the tremendous changes o f the early
nineties. The public was not informed, nor educated on issues such as the difficulties
laying ahead in the process o f transition,23 or the associated costs o f transition. Both the
1990 government o f Antall’s liberals and the 1994 government o f Horn’s socialists kept
the Hungarian population marginally informed about the likely negative effects o f the
policies they were pursuing. The large and increasing percentages o f Hungarians who did
not know how to respond to the question on the introduction o f a market economy
observed between 1990 and 1997, per Figure 10, confirm this lack o f information. If the
polarization o f the population on the policy issue is understandable, with a third in favor
and a third against the market economy, having a third of the population not
knowledgeable about the issue indicates a serious problem o f communication between
proponents of policy and recipients o f its results.
Third, the pace o f reform versus popular expectations added to the general
weariness against the economic transformation process. Prime Minister Antall fostered
the promise o f a better life for a majority o f the population during his administration. The
slow pace of reform, the negative GDP, the high inflation and unemployment did not bring
about any o f the promised well-being during his administration. On the contrary, after two
years, he was considered to be a Prime Minister who pursued policies to please one
segment o f the society while ignoring the others. He was also thought to have discredited
the notion o f democracy and o f market economy by underperforming.
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Prime Minister Horn also promised rapid improvements in living standards, against
the advice o f his party’s chief economist, Lazio Bekesi. Bekesi went as far as to publish
his protest against the “populist” electoral strategies o f his party, warning that promising
the social security o f the Kadar years was political demagoguery meant to take advantage
o f the public nostalgia for those times in order to win over as many voters as possible. In
the medium-term, he warned, the Hungarian economy would witness more contraction,
and social welfare would have to be curtailed since there were no more funds to support
expensive social programs.24
The Socialist Party won the 1994 elections, but within six months, Prime Minister
Horn was forced to admit that the social welfare system could no longer be sustained at
the current levels. The loss o f a majority o f votes in 1998 can be traced back to his
recognition o f failure on the issue o f social safety net, as well as on several other failures
to meet electoral promises.
Overall, public dissatisfaction with political leaders translated into lowered support
for a market economy and for democracy as well. Figure 11 shows that the public
satisfaction with democracy maintained itself at low levels throughout the entire period,
oscillating between the twenty and thirty percentage point line. The public apathy and
dissatisfaction with politics in general, mentioned so often in the literature is evident in this
figure.
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Figure 11. Hungary: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

CONCLUSIONS
O f the front-runner countries in the race to transition to a market economy,
Hungary remains the country that took the longest to experience positive GDP growth.
At the end o f ten years o f transition, it is also the country considered to be the best
environment for foreign investment among the other East European countries.
In terms o f government representation o f constituency interests on the question o f
the introduction o f a market economy, Hungary points in the direction o f a responsive
governing style. Two consecutive administrations pursued, with higher or lower degrees
o f success, the introduction o f policies conducive to the creation o f a market environment,
per transition indicators, and to economic growth, per macro-economic indicators.
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However, the slowness o f reforms and the long time Hungarians had to wait to experience
economic growth contributed to a decline o f popular support for the policy pursued.
Even with the 1999 positive evaluations o f the economy, it remains unclear if the
general population is comfortable with the economic direction o f their country. Polls
show widespread dissatisfaction with the disproportionate amount o f foreign investment
vis-a-vis domestic investment in the country, and with the low degree of control
Hungarians feel they have over their economy. It remains to be seen whether the
improvement o f the economy will generate more public trust in a market economic system
and will restore trust in democracy.
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
POLAND

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
At the outset o f political transformation across Eastern Europe, Poland was the
country with the most publicized and widely known economic and political crisis across
the region. It had the highest external debt among East European countries ($40 bn), and
an economic crisis accompanied by serious social implications. It also had a strong grass
roots movement against communism and towards economic and political transformation
that none o f the other communist countries in the region had. It was called “Solidarity”
and it consisted o f trade unions which were demanding political and economic reform.
At the end o f the nineties, Poland is the only country in Eastern Europe whose
governments resolved to respond to grass-root calls for change by undertaking a shock
therapy approach to transition. It also remains the only country in the region that did not
lose popular support for the introduction o f a market economy, resumed economic growth
at a very early stage in the transition period (1992), and is headed in the direction o f
integration in the European Union at a steady pace.
Poland’s economic crisis started in late seventies, with a combination o f large
foreign debt, budget deficit, wage pressure, and overextended investments. Trade union
strikes and the formation o f Solidarity ensued, forcing the government into an open
political crisis and a military coup d’etat in 1981. Martial law was imposed throughout
Poland between December 1981 and July 1983, and all trade union activities were
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suspended. Continued worker unrest and violent clashes with security forces during mid
eighties weakened the legitimacy o f the communist government and forced Jaruselski’s
government to consider reforms. In October, 1987, the government announced plans for
economic and political reforms, and it decided to start talks with Solidarity and other
social groups.
The last communist government, headed by Mieczyslaw Rakowski (appointed
Prime Minister in September 1988), tried to reform the economy, only to see it sink
further towards the end o f 1988.1 The main characteristics o f the reform program were
the abandoning o f the central planning system, the enhancement o f enterprise autonomy,
and a reform o f the tax system. The reforms did not bring about the end o f economic
recession, but created a popular and government attitude that was more prone to change
and reform in Poland than in the other East European countries.2
By the late eighties, it became clear that the political status quo could no longer be
maintained in Poland. Lech Walesa, then leader of the Solidarity movement, negotiated an
agreement with the communist government o f President Wojciech Jaruzelski for broad
political and economic pluralism. Free elections were scheduled in July 1989.3 The
Solidarity movement secured all but one o f the 100 seats in the Senate, and all 161 seats
that it was permitted to contest in the Sejm.
With Jaruzelski’s agreement to resign in September 1990 and permit direct
presidential elections, the formal demise o f the communist system was sealed in Poland.
Lech Walesa ran for President and won. Walesa’s first nominee for Prime Minister, Jan
Olszewski, failed to form a government. He then proceeded to appoint a radical
economist for the position o f Prime Minister, Jan Bielecki.
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The program undertaken by the government headed by Jan Bielecki was the most
ambitious and radical among East European countries. Most remarkably, it was backed
by public support despite open government acknowledgment that reforms would come at
a high social cost.4 Against the background o f hyperinflation, a budget deficit that was
more than 8% o f GNP, and a noncompetitive economy, the Bielecki government declared
that it would “transform the Polish economy into a market economy, with the ownership
structure changing in the direction o f that found in the advanced industrial economies/'5
The Bielecki government started applying a program o f economic reforms
designed by Lescek Balcerowicz, the first post-communist Finance Minister and artisan o f
the Polish economic recovery plan. The so-called “Balcerowicz Plan” combined
aggressive liberalization measures which resulted in the stabilization o f the economy
within six months. Reduction o f government spending, stabilization o f the exchange rate,
wage restraints, reduction o f government subsidies, and reduction o f tariff and non-tariff
barriers helped increase domestic competition, led to the convertibility o f the zloty,
reduced the budget deficit to the 5% limit imposed by international lending institutions,
and boosted trade.6
These measures were designed to stimulate growth and create an attractive market
for foreign investment. Figure 5 showed that positive GDP growth resumed in Poland as
early as 1992, and that GDP continued to grow throughout the end o f the nineties.
Foreign direct investment also grew steadily, reaching $4 bn in 1998 (per Table 11 below).
Measures to privatize and restructure the Polish economy also helped GDP
growth. Legislation introduced in the late eighties allowed state-owned enterprises to
transform themselves into joint-stock companies. The distribution o f privatization
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vouchers, much along the same lines as the Czech vouchers, led to the creation of
investment funds and other types o f institutional investors in 1990. The “privatization
offensive” undertaken by the Minister o f Ownership Transformation, Janusz
Lewandowski. in 1991 led to the commercialization of some big state-owned enterprises.
Privatization through liquidation, small privatization, and “spontaneous” worker
privatization also added to the overall outcome o f increased share o f GDP resulting from
the private sector.7
Such economic measures led international lending institutions to grant Poland a
debt forgiveness o f up to 50%. The Paris Club adopted a resolution on March 15, 1991,
according to which three-fifths o f 50% o f the debt Poland was carrying was to be forgiven
immediately. The rest o f the debt forgiveness was to be granted contingent upon Poland’s
coming to an agreement with the IMF to restructure its economy, and its fulfillment o f the
second IMF accord. Such decisions sent a strong signal throughout the region that if
governments were determined to switch to a market economy, the international lending
organizations would be willing to help.8
Two irreconcilable positions dominated Polish politics throughout the nineties.
One advocated a radical approach to reform, which was characterized by austerity
measures, allowing the market forces to operate freely, and getting the government out o f
economics. This was the position fostered by Balcerowicz, Walesa, and the Solidarity
Post-Electoral Action (AWS). The second position favored more state intervention into
economic decisions, and a more protectionist industrial policy and trade. This is the
position fostered by Mazowiecki (first post-communist Prime Minister), the Socialist Party
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(SLD), the Peasant’s Party (PSL), and the Movement for the Reconstruction o f Poland
(ROP).
Between these two positions, Poland witnessed a highly unstable political
environment in the early nineties, with governments failing to acquire enough
parliamentary support to pass legislation, or failing to convince political groups to form
majority coalitions. As a result, between 1990 and 1992, Walesa changed the government
composition six times, and won himself a reputation o f being an “authoritarian” politician.
This reputation cost him the presidency when he ran for re-election.
Despite polarization in the early nineties on the pace and depth o f reform, the
remarkable aspect o f the Polish program o f economic transformation remains its continuity
across the political spectrum. Given the frequent changes in governing coalitions and a
fairly tumultuous political life, the Poles maintained the line of the Balcerowicz program in
their approach to reform.
Popular disenchantment over the manner o f politics and the implementation o f
reforms led to the voting out o f Solidarity, and to a victory of the Socialist Party in the
parliamentary elections o f 1993. In their electoral campaign, the SLD promised a reversal
o f the logic o f transformation o f the previous years, more spending on social programs,
and more state intervention in privatization and restructuring decisions. In light o f the
socialist electoral platform, a return to a state-interventionist strategy was predicted and
expected by foreign investors.
With all the rhetoric o f change, and the accompanying gloomy forecasts o f a slow
down o f the reform in Poland,9 the economic strategy followed by the SLD government
was very much along the lines o f the Balcerowicz’s program. In presenting the program
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o f the leftist governing coalition to the Sejm, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz
announced the maintenance o f a policy line o f state financial discipline.10 Marek
Borowski, the first minister o f finance under the socialist coalition simply carried out the
1994 budget that had been drafted by his reform-oriented predecessors. Grzegorz
Kolodko, the second minister of finance and a severe critic o f the Balcerowicz program,
continued the language and practice o f discipline in public spending, curtailment o f budget
deficit, and the opening o f the Polish markets to foreign investment. Whether due to
accords signed with international financial institutions, or to the fact that after four years
o f liberalization the tide o f economic transformation could no longer be reversed, the
socialist government chose to continue the program o f economic reform that returned
growth to Poland.
Overall, unlike other East European countries, Poland managed to stick to its
original plan o f economic transformation throughout the nineties, to end 1999 with the
same finance minister who started the reform, Lescek Balcerowicz. This consistency, with
ail the deviations and flaws o f implementation, won the country the reputation o f reliability
in the eyes o f international institutions, foreign investors, and eventually o f its own
constituencies. Even when governments were being changed every other month in the
early nineties, seemingly on account o f insensitive economic policies towards some social
layers, from Balcerowicz to Olszewski, Pawlak, Suchocka, and then to the leftist
governments o f Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Kolodko, all Polish governments chose to
continue the radical plan o f introduction o f market economics through a policy o f shock
therapy.
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TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS
As a result o f the economic trends described above, when the EBRD transition
indicators started being calculated, the progress o f the Polish government towards reform
looked promising. Table 10 below summarizes these ratings.

^ b l^ ^ ^ o lm id ^ n d icato r^ fg ro g csy i^ ran sitio iU ^ jn ark eteco n o in ^
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Private GDP share

55%

60%

60%

65%

65%

Large scale privatization

3

3

3

3.2

3.2

Small scale privatization

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Governance and restructuring

3

3

3

3

3

Price liberalization

3

3

3

3

3.2

Trade system

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Competition policy

3

3

3

3

3

Bank reform

3

3

3

3

3.2

Securities reform

n/a

3

3

3.2

3.2

Investment law

n/a

4

4

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).

An analysis o f Poland’s ratings compared to Hungary’s and the Czech Republic’s
reveals that, in many respects, Poland was actually behind the other two countries in the
introduction of reform policies.
With fifty-five percent o f national wealth coming from the private sector, Poland
was on a par with Hungary and behind the Czech Republic in 1993, but behind both in
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1997 in the private share o f GDP category. This is surprising because economists have
long held that the growth o f the Polish economy was largely due to its private sector. If
this argument applied across all countries, or at least across those countries that are
considered front-runners in transition policies, both Hungary and the Czech Republic
should have experienced growth about the same time as Poland, if not sooner. On the
contrary, both took much longer to experience growth than Poland. Additionally, both
ended the period with a higher share o f GDP coming from the private sector than Poland
(75 and 80 percent to Poland’s 65 percent).
A similarly puzzling situation is reflected in the ratings o f large-scale privatization.
Poland lagged behind the Czech Republic and Hungary, with a mere 25 percent o f largescale enterprises privatized or in the process o f being privatized, to the latter’s more than
50 percent o f state-owned enterprises in private ownership.
In small-scale privatization, all three countries have similar scores, moving from
complete privatization o f small companies to establishing standards o f performance typical
o f advanced industrial economies.
Why did Poland resume growth so much faster than the other two front-runners if
in terms o f privatization, it was actually behind them? A comparison o f progress in the
other transition ratings does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the growth
differentials among these three countries, nor does it explain the relative success o f the
Polish economy over the economies o f Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Ail three countries had similar ratings o f promoting corporate governance (3
rating), with Poland and the Czech Republic one year behind Hungary in terms o f moving
towards actual improvement in corporate governance in 1997. Price liberalization was
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substantial for all three, with state-procurement at non-market prices largely phased out.
Poland followed Hungary in the implementation o f comprehensive price liberalization,
with utility prices approaching economic costs in 1997. The Czech Republic remained at a
lower level o f price liberalization.
With respect to the trade system ratings, all three countries witnessed similar
progress by removing import and export restrictions, and all significant export tariffs. All
three countries also moved towards standards o f performance norms o f advanced
industrial economies, removed most tariff barriers and became members in the World
Trade Organization.
In competition policy, all three countries had the same level o f progress,
introducing some enforcement actions to reduce abuse o f market power and to promote a
competitive environment.
In banking reform, Poland followed Hungary starting in 1997, but with more
modest achievements in moving towards banking laws and regulations compatible with
BIS standards, and effective supervision and substantial financial deepening. With respect
to the establishment o f bank solvency, full interest rate liberalization, and the start-up o f
lending to private enterprises, Poland and Hungary were on a par, with the Czech
Republic lagging behind.
Both Poland and Hungary reached the same level o f progress towards securities
reform, moving from the establishment o f independent share registries, secure clearance
and settlement procedures, towards securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO
standards.
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All three front-runners established a clear framework for encouraging investment.
No legal discrimination was allowed between domestic and foreign investors.
Overall, Poland’s transition ratings taken individually indicate that the government
undertook reforms to take the economy on the path o f transformation to a market
economy. Poland’s transition ratings taken comparatively indicate that the country was
behind both Hungary and the Czech Republic in the introduction o f some reforms.
Despite this finding, at no point during the period under discussion was the growth o f
either Hungary or the Czech Republic equal to or higher than Poland’s.
While this appears to be a counterintuitive situation, we need to recall that
transition indicators describe stages o f reform in individual sectors towards an ideal point,
a functioning market economy. They do not gauge the degree to which these indicators
contribute towards resumption o f growth; nor is there a methodological assumption that if
indicators are fairly advanced, growth should automatically follow. There is, however, a
methodological caveat regarding the distinction between indicators o f development, which
gauge the enhancement o f the national economy and o f the individual standards o f living,
and indicators o f transition.
Additionally, an important element o f distinction between the situation o f Poland in
the beginning o f the transition and the situation o f the other two countries was their
starting point. Poland started its economic transformation with a large external debt, sky
rocketing inflation, large unemployment rates, and wage pressure. Elements o f private
sector industry existed, however, which helped the country in its development o f a vibrant
private sector after 1989, in services and small, family-run enterprises. The Czech
Republic and Hungary started out from low external debt, virtually no official
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unemployment, a partially liberalized economy, and some modicum o f private enterprise.
Their transition ratings reflect their more advanced starting point in the transition.
However, the relative slowness o f reforms in Hungary (the gradual approach), and the
sometimes inconsistent approach to reform in the Czech Republic resulted in more
fluctuating trends in these two countries, and less constant economic growth than in
Poland.
Additional macro-economic indicators listed in Table 11 below offer a picture o f
the dynamics o f economic growth and other economic indicators that offer insights into
the reasons why the Polish economy grew more, faster and a steady pace than the
economies of the other two countries.

^bl^^^Poland^M ^cro-econom icindicators
1991 1992 1993 1994
(Percentage change)
GDP at constant prices
-7.0
2.6
3.8
5.2
Consumer prices (average)

70.3

43.0

35.3

1995

1996

1997

1998

7.0

6.1

6.9

5.2

32.2

27.8

19.9

14.9

11.0

4.3

4.9

7.0

6.6

n/a

14.9

13.2

10.5

n/a

-8.2 -11.3

Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)3

-6.8

-5.7

0.1

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

11.8

13.6

16.4

16.0

(in billions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance

0.1

0.5

-2.3

-0.8

-1.8

Foreign Direct Investment

0.1

0.3

0.6

0.5

1.1

2.8

3.0

-14.0
4.0

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 223.
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.
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Steadiness o f trends suggesting a coherent approach to the reform o f the economy
is the one characteristic o f the evolution o f Poland’s economic indicators that was not
noticeable in the economic indicators o f the other two countries.
Inflation rates, gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing, and GDP growth
maintained a steady course throughout the period, with inflation going down, monthly
wages going up, and national wealth going up. Unemployment rates increased in the first
part o f the transition, a phenomenon to be expected in the conditions o f the reorganization
o f the foundations upon which the economy was built, then stayed on a declining slope
through 1998.
These trends concur with earlier positions that Poland maintained a steady
approach to the reform o f its economy. The approach can also be characterized as being
comprehensive, since it resulted in healthy and far-reaching results, ranging from sustained
economic growth, individual earnings growth, better purchasing power, and higher
employment rates.
It should be noted, however, that throughout this period, Poland’s inflation rates
were the highest among the front-runner countries. Given its starting point in the
transition, this reality should not overshadow the efforts made by the government to
maintain a tight fiscal policy. In fact, after lagging behind Hungary and the Czech
Republic, Poland finished the period ahead o f Hungary, and on a par with the Czech
Republic with respect to inflation rates.
Similarly, unemployment rates were much higher in Poland than in the other two
countries throughout the period under discussion. In this regard as well, Poland crossed
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the finish line on a par with rates o f unemployment in Hungary, but with twice as much
unemployment as the Czech Republic.
Fluctuating trends can also be observed. The trade balance and the foreign direct
investment indicators show less consistency in outcomes o f economic policy. The trade
balance was in good equilibrium through 1992. Afterwards, the economy experienced the
phenomenon o f “overheating”, meaning that the economy was consuming more than it
was producing. The surplus o f imports over exports has been credited to the growth in
consumer demand faster than the economy could satisfy the consumer appetite.
Moreover, the lower quality o f the Polish products over imported products led to more
consumption o f imported versus domestic goods, a phenomenon that we have observed in
the other two countries as well. Some analysts have likened the disproportion between
consumer appetite and the economic ability to satisfy it with “living above one’s means,” a
phenomenon distantly resembling the consumption patterns o f the Gierek era."

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS
How did the outcome o f economic policies affect public support for a market
economy? Figure 12 below traces the curve o f public opinion support for a market
economy, the curve o f GDP growth per capita, and the curve o f unemployment.
Figure 12 shows that public opinion support for a market economy in Poland
remained strong throughout the period under discussion, even when the unemployment
rates were soaring. O f all the countries under discussion, Poland’s public support never
sank below the fifty percent line, a strength that is all the more remarkable given the
country’s high unemployment rates.
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Figure 12. Poland: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 217; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).

Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public support for
the introduction o f a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns o f
government responsiveness to their publics?
The public support and economic growth lines in Figure 12 suggest that there is a
direct relationship between these variables, with public support pulling the policy line
upwards. The trends observable in the Polish case come the closest to the responsive
government model described in Chapter 3, Figure 2. Strong public support for a policy
led policy to largely follow the direction of public support. The relative distance between
the two lines became narrower after an observed time-lag. As policy makers reduced the
distance between policy outcomes and public support for those outcomes, they engaged in
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responsive behavior characteristic o f a representative democracy system. O f the frontrunner countries in the race to transition to a market economy, Poland is thus the first
country that fits the responsive government model.
Additional data supports the finding that strong public support was present and
justified the tough economic policies that were implemented in order to bring about the
desired economic system. Figure 13 below shows consistency o f the dynamics o f public
support for a market economy.

Poland
Dynamics of Public Opinion
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Figure 13. Poland: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f a
Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

As noted, public support for the introduction o f a market economy was
consistently high in Poland, within ten percentage points below or above the sixty percent
threshold. Conversely, the percentage o f Poles who did not believe that a market
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economy was the right system for their country was consistently low throughout the
period. Similarly, the percent o f Poles who did not know how to respond to this question
was low, and declined steadily after 1994. This suggests that the public was relatively
informed about the implications o f a market economy, and made an informed choice on
the questionnaire. At the height o f public uncertainty about the economic direction o f the
country, after the 1993 elections which brought the socialists to power, over twenty
percentage points still separated those who believed that the market economy was the
right policy to pursue versus those who did not believe that to be the case.
It remains interesting to point out the differences in policy outcomes and public
support across the three countries with respect to the introduction o f a market economic
system, especially in light o f the ratings o f transition indicators. These differences help
explain why, on occasion, hypotheses explaining the dynamics o f public support in
Hungary and the Czech Republic do not necessarily apply to Poland.
Poland undertook a shock therapy approach to economic reforms early in the
transition, maintained that approach throughout the entire period under discussion, and
was the first among these countries to resume economic growth. It also maintained its
public support for this approach to reform throughout the period. Despite the resumption
o f growth, transition ratings place Poland behind Hungary and the Czech Republic with
respect to private sector share o f GDP, and lagging behind them on a few other indicators
(per previous discussions).
Hungary started with a gradual approach to economic reform, did not resume
growth for several years, went through a recession and diminishing standards o f living,
and eventually witnessed substantial decrease o f public support for the introduction o f a
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market economy. Despite the recession, transition indicators place Hungary ahead o f
Poland on several counts, and largely on the same footing with the Czech Republic.
The Czech Republic started reforms at (what economists consider) a rapid pace,
but applied them in an inconsistent fashion. After a short period o f growth, the country
sank into recession. For economic policies, but more likely for political reasons, the
country steadily lost public supporters for a market economy, and for a democracy in
general. Transition ratings also place the Czech Republic ahead o f Poland on several
counts.
While economists offer a variety o f reasons to explain the differences in the
outcomes o f these three economic strategies, a majority agrees that the strongest variable
in Poland’s favor was the consistency with which the reform program was implemented.
Since this is a subject which deserves another volume of attention, we shall return to the
issue o f the dynamics o f public support for the economic programs o f the three countries.
A minimum o f two hypotheses explaining the difference in the dynamics of public
support between Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can be found in the literature.
The first hypothesis is unrelated to the dynamics o f popular support and government
policies: the point o f departure in the transition, commonly referred to as “the starting
point” gets credit for this difference.
Briefly stated, this argument is based on the hypothesis that if the point of
departure in the transition to a new economic or political system is relatively weak,
meaning that the economy is in bad shape, the political system is not liberalized, and the
general situation o f the country is generally poor, the public’s expectations for a better life
within a short time after the transition started are low. Conversely, if the starting point is
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relatively good, the economy has witnessed some liberalization measures, and a degree o f
political freedom exists, the public is more likely to expect wealth and a well-functioning
system fast.
Applied to the three countries under discussion, Poland fits the first hypothesis,
while Hungary and the Czech Republic fit the latter. Poles started out from a difficult
economic situation in 1989. Their level o f expectation for a better life was low, and thenlevel o f patience to wait until the economic situation got better was high.
In Hungary and the Czech Republic the situation was reversed. The economies o f
these countries were in fairly good shape at the outset o f the transition. When the political
change occurred in 1989, Hungarians and Czechs had higher expectations about the future
o f their personal economic situation. The immediate results o f transition policies must
have come as a shock to many people, and resulted in disappointment about the emerging
system commensurate with the expectations. This disappointment translated into lowered
support for the economic and political system believed to have caused the decline o f
personal and national well-being.
This approach helps explain why Poles had a better sense o f endurance o f the post1989 events, while Czech and Hungarians had less endurance which translated in
diminished support for both political and economic developments. Table 12 below
supports the hypothesis that the level o f expectations for a better life o f the Polish public
was modest. Fewer Poles believed that their personal financial situation would get better
during the following twelve months than those who believed that it would stay the same or
get worse. Between 1995 and 1996, when the benefits o f economic growth started to be
felt throughout a larger social stratum, slightly more people believed that their situation
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would get better than that it would get worse. The fact that the largest proportion o f
respondents consistently thought that their situation would not change suggests a degree
o f modesty about Poles’ expectations for the future. Even with these low expectations,
Poles continued to support radical reforms, because they believed that reforms would
eventually bring abundance for large majorities.

Table 12.--Poland: Public opinion on financial situation in the household
___________________ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996_____________
Will be better
24
17
21
24
15
25
24
Will be same

31

33

30

37

37

39

40

Will be worse

24

32

34

23

30

17

23

Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation o f your household will get a lot
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped
from questionnaires.

A second hypothesis explaining the relative differences between the three countries
is relevant from the point o f view o f the dynamics o f public support for the particular
policy. The level o f public knowledge about the implications o f the upcoming transition is
considered a major discriminator between the levels o f public support for reform in these
three countries.
Comparatively, Poles were much better informed about the difficulties o f the
transition period than were either the Hungarians or the Czechs. The Polish government
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repeatedly pointed out to the population that the reforms would be hard, that bad and
worse times would come before better times could come, and that bad times were a sign
that good times were ahead. The government also admitted that unemployment, loss o f
purchasing power, and fewer and weaker social programs were going to be inherent in the
transition before the country could experience growth from which a majority would
benefit. Figure 13 also supports the hypothesis that the Polish public was knowledgeable
about the implications o f a market economy, with rates o f people who did not know
whether a market economy was good for their country o f under thirty percent, and going
steadily down after 1994, to reach ten percent in 1997.
Hungarians, on the other hand, expected a milder impact o f reform policies,
especially in light o f the political rhetoric surrounding the choice o f the gradualist
approach. They were unprepared for the high rates o f unemployment that soared once
reforms started to be implemented, and were largely uniformed about the costs o f
transition and the consequences o f reforms on the general population. Figure 10 showed
sustained high rates o f undecided people on the question o f market reform, with rates
going steadily up between 1991 and 1997.
The level o f public knowledge about the implications o f the upcoming transition
also helps explain why hypotheses for the dynamics o f public support for the introduction
o f a market economy in Hungary and the Czech Republic do not apply to Poland.
In Hungary’s case, the decline in public support for a market economy was
credited to the hardships o f transition, such as high and unexpected unemployment rates.
These accompanying liabilities raised the Hungarians’ insecurity about their personal
situation and undermined support for a market economy.
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In Poland, however, the rate o f unemployment was also high, even more so than in
Hungary, while public support for the introduction o f a market economy was maintained,
even during the times of the highest unemployment rates in 1993. This has only been
explained as a result of the fact that Poles knew that unemployment would go up and were
not surprised when it did, even if they did not enjoy it.
One final point merits attention in the discussion o f dynamics o f popular support
and government policies. As the next section will show, despite sustained public approval
o f a market economy and o f democracy, the Polish public also used the polls to vote
incumbents out. A legitimate question imposes itself: if the Polish public approved o f the
economic policies o f the government, why were incumbents voted out? In other words, if
the government was responsive to their publics by introducing an economic system desired
by wide majorities, why did the government get a no-confidence vote? As we shall see,
popular approval o f post-1989 politics was as important in Poland as we noted in the
Czech Republic and Hungary. To this final analysis we now turn.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT
That popular disillusionment with politics existed in Poland as well is plainly
illustrated by the voter “punishment” o f incumbents for their performance in all three
elections held between 1991 and 1997. Table 13 below lists election results in
parliamentary elections for 1991, 1993, and 1997.
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Table 13.—Polish parliamentary election results (1991-97)
Party
1991
1993
% o f vote seats % o f vote seats
Solidarity
11
60

Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)

20.4

1997
% o f vote seats

208

192
252

Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)

68

Freedom Union
Peasant Party (PSL)

15.4

168

11

Movement for Reconstruction
Democratic Union (UD)

30

13

83

10.6

78

Union o f Labor (UP)

7.3

43

Confederation for an Independent
Poland (KPN)

5.8

22

Non-Party Bloc in Support o f Reforms (BBWR)

5.4

18

Data from Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Charles Graybow, Nations in Transit
1998; Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly
Independent States (Freedom House: 1998), p. 441.
Note: For 1993, seats in the Sejm and in the Senate are cumulated; percentages are for
Sejm only. Union o f Labor (UP) is a party established in 1992, and composed o f
Solidarity o f Labor (SP), Social-Democratic Movement (RDS), and Wielkopolska. For
1997, seats in the Sejm and in the Senate are cumulated.

The most notable rejection o f an incumbent party occurred in 1991, when
Solidarity was one o f 28 other parties who gained minimal representation in the
parliament. After the resounding success that Solidarity had in the July 1989 negotiated
elections, when they won all but one o f the seats that could be contested, the results o f the
1991 elections were desultory and posed a great question mark regarding its causes.
The two years that passed between the 1989 and the 1991 elections weakened
Solidarity. As in many other cases in the region, the group’s unity disappeared as soon as
the common enemy, the communist party, was removed from politics. Solidarity members
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started disagreeing among themselves, and with their leader Lech Walesa, on a wide
variety of issues, from political appointments to economic policy-making. Some Solidarity
members wanted to see their organization withdraw from politics and return to a focus on
workers’ issues. Others advocated the creation o f a political wing o f the trade unions that
would enjoy union support. Some members advocated a more state-interventionist
approach to economic reform, while others, including Lech Walesa, insisted on fast and
radical reform. Many o f these factions eventually transformed themselves into parties or
organizations, further splitting Solidarity’s chances for wide public support.
The poor showing o f the Solidarity group in the 1991 elections was due as much
to internal political infighting as to the overall state o f divisiveness in Polish politics at the
time. The resulting popular tiredness with the bickering o f the emerging political system
translated into a rejection o f the incumbent party.
The fact that the Democratic Union o f Tadeusz Mazowiecki won the largest share
o f the popular vote in 1991 (a lackluster thirteen percent o f the popular vote) suggests a
vague popular endorsement o f a more cautious approach to economic reform.
It is interesting to note the manner in which the electorate seemed to swing
between Mazowiecki and Walesa during the first years o f transition. Mazowiecki came
into conflict with Walesa many times on the pace and radicalism o f reforms. Walesa’s
more radical approach seemed to be the one that the electorate preferred, when he was
popularly elected for President in 1990. The fact that Mazowiecki did not even come in
second in the first round o f the 1990 presidential elections was a blow to him and his
supporters. Only a year later, voters chose to give Mazowiecki’s party one more chance
to form a government that would approach reform in a different, more moderate manner.
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During the parliamentary elections o f 1991, his party won 83 seats, to Solidarity’s 11 seats
in the Sejm.
That chance did not materialize in a different approach to reform, nor did it lead to
a less fragmented political environment. On the contrary, during the two years in which
the Democratic Union was the major governing partner, many coalitions were attempted,
three Prime Ministers were changed, and little agreement was forged on a variety o f
political and economic issues. Eventually, Walesa chose to dissolve the parliament and
call early elections.
The sweeping victory o f the Socialist Party in the 1993 elections again seemed to
suggest popular endorsement for a more moderate approach to economic reform, the one
advocated by the SLD during their election campaign. However, at no time did the SLD
renounce the principle o f a market economy. They did announce that they would try to be
more sensitive to all the social layers affected by the transition, even if they had to modify
previously agreed-to deals, such as Poland’s agreements with the IMF.
As noted in previous sections, the fact that the Socialists did not actually reverse
the economic policy o f their liberal predecessors amounted to continued economic
growth, and resulted in continued support for a market economy.
The Socialist victory in 1993 seems to have also been more a rejection o f postcommunist politics and a sign o f favoring parties that acted and behaved in a more civil
manner than a rejection o f the specific program o f transformation o f the coalition. The
years o f constant political contestation, party infighting, disagreement among members o f
the ruling coalition, and among members o f one and the same party paid off. Analysts
pointed out at the time o f the 1993 electoral campaign that the SLD impressed voters with
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their public image. The party pitched an image o f unity and decency in politics, and a
clear vision o f where they wanted to take the country against the endless infighting o f the
incumbent parties. That image, together with promises for a more sensitive approach to
reform for the disadvantaged social layers turned them into a better political alternative to
the on-going political struggles that the public witnessed until 1993.12
The 1997 elections seemed another instance o f “punishing” incumbents, but it was
less clear what they were punished for this time. The Socialists no longer won a majority
o f the popular vote, leaving room for the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), the political
wing o f Solidarity, to form a government. AWS won a majority of votes and entered into
a majority coalition with another liberal oriented party, Balcerowicz’s Freedom Union.
On careful consideration, the Socialists were not really voted out o f office. In
1997. they won sixteen seats less than in 1993. A loss o f sixteen seats for four years o f
government is not a significant enough loss to indicate a popular vote o f non-confidence
for any party.
Not the same can be said about the SLD’s major coalition partner, the PSL, who
won five times less seats in 1997 than in 1993 (30 to 168). This loss o f 138 seats suggests
strong voter rejection of the extreme attitude and proposed policies o f this party. In
effect, if the PSL were less radical in its interventionist agenda, they might have won a few
additional seats which would have enabled them to form a new SLD-PSL coalition
government.
The 1997 vote suggests that the number o f Polish voters who supported the SLD’s
left-oriented approach to politics and reform stayed roughly the same between 1993 and
1997. The explanation for the loss o f a majority in 1997 is not necessarily voter rejection.
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The explanation for the general election result must lie elsewhere.
Two observations regarding the Polish political life are helpful in understanding
voter behavior. On the one hand, it has been repeatedly pointed out that there is little
substantive difference among the platforms o f parties who advocate market reform and the
introduction o f a market economy (the so-called right-wing forces).13 There is also little
political agreement on creating a unified political force to represent that point o f view in
elections. As a result, voters had difficulty understanding who it was preferable to vote
for, what the differences among political platforms were, and who would best represent
voter interests. The 1991 elections exemplified this public disarray, with twenty-eight
small, and therefore weak, political parties voted in the parliament.
Secondly, due to the fragmentation o f the right-wing forces, the left did not really
have a serious challenger until 1997. On numerous occasions, and particularly around the
1993 elections, analysts pointed out that the weakness o f the right-wing forces in Polish
politics have thrown voters in the arms o f the Socialist Party. At some point, the right
wing forces must have heard those criticisms. Between the 1993 and the 1997 elections,
five small right-wing parties united under the umbrella o f the Solidarity Electoral Action
and ran on a unified platform. At the time that this platform was adopted and signed, the
big surprise was not the existence or the contents o f the platform, but the fact that all the
parties involved in the AWS agreed to it and signed it.14
These observations entitle us to hypothesize that voter behavior was highly
dependent on public satisfaction with post-1989 politics. Figure 14 below shows that
Polish public satisfaction with democracy was lower than satisfaction with the introduction
o f a market economy, although at the end o f the period, the two lines come nicely to meet
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each other between the fifty to sixty percent approval rates. It is also worth noting that
the two lines have an interesting parallelism about them, with the market economy line
(again) pulling the democracy approval line upwards. Both lines see their lowest point in
the same year, 1994, the first year after the take-over by the socialist government.

Poland - Public Approval
90

SO

40
30
20

1990

1991

1992

1993

1904

1995

1996

1997

1968

market economy - e - democracy

Figure 14. Poland: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. I - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

That public disappointment with post-communist politics was present in Poland as
well is illustrated by the figures we used above. The important element o f Polish politics
remains, however, the fact that in spite o f public disappointments, support for the
introduction of reforms never faltered. It also did not lead to such undermining o f both
the notion of a market economy and o f democracy per se as we have noted in the case o f
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The fact that the Polish economy performed so much
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better than the economies o f the other two countries remains the main distinguishing
factor that explains the maintenance o f public support for the system, but not necessarily
for the people implementing it.

CONCLUSIONS
Poland is the first Eastern European country in which the government behaved in a
responsive manner towards its publics, in a manner suggesting that the political system is
moving towards a representative democracy. Strong public support for the introduction
of a market economy pushed the government into sustaining a radical and effective
program o f reform which returned growth to Poland. Throughout this process, the Polish
public did not lose confidence in the principles o f a market economy, even when reforms
came at high social prices. Nor did they lose confidence in democratic principles, even
though disappointment with post-communist politics was reflected in a low approval
rating for the manner in which democracy was performing in their country.
Disappointment with post-communist politics led the public to vote incumbents
out o f office on a few occasions. That disappointment did not amount to turning the
public against the policies o f the government in power is illustrated by the sustained
support for market economic policies, even on the eve o f the 1993 elections, when voters
rejected Solidarity and every party that was associated with it in favor o f a socialist
government. That disillusionment did not amount to turning the public against democracy
is illustrated by the parallelism o f public support for a market economy and support for
democracy in general.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI
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Preworski, pp. 134-137.

3. Walesa negotiated the restoration o f the legal status o f Solidarity and provisions for
the first free elections in June 1989. The agreement provided for open contestation o f
35% o f the lower chamber seats (the Sejm), with the Communists assigned to have
38% o f the seats, and the remaining seats to go to parties formerly aligned with the
Communist Party. Solidarity was allowed to contest all the seats in a new upper
chamber, the Senate, which would have limited veto power over the lower chamber.
The Communists, however, did not get the necessary 50% threshold o f public
support, per agreement, causing them great embarrassment.
4.

Preworski thinks that the large public support for the introduction o f a market
economy despite the evident and continued worsening o f personal economic
situations was due to the successful public campaign that the government organized
to convince voters o f the upcoming benefits o f the system. Poles became convinced
that their situation could not get better before getting worse, so they put up with
reforms and their deleterious effects in the expectation o f future rewards. As a result,
even when things were getting really difficult, Poles were convinced that the economy
was going in the right direction. Preworski, pp. 158-161.
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CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Slovak Republic is the only front-runner East European country in this study
which witnessed continued economic growth during transition, while reverting to more
centralized and state regulated policies. In fact, the Slovak Republic (hereafter Slovakia)
is the only front-runner country to experience growth accompanied by a regression o f the
transition process. Despite economic growth compatible with the other front-runner
countries, at the end o f six years o f transition Slovakia was not on the list o f countries
invited to start EU accession talks, and not a new NATO member like her neighbors, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These consequences, coming at the end o f six
years o f government policies oriented towards state intervention in economic and political
developments prompted the electorate to vote out o f office the political group which
fostered these policies: The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, headed by Vladimir
Me£iar.
Political developments after the September 1998 national elections, which brought
an end to the Me£iar government, marked a turning point in the country’s official
orientation. Between 1999 and the year 2000, the country pursued an aggressive policy of
Euro-Atlantic integration, determined to catch up with the Czech Republic and the other
East European countries who had already been invited to start EU accession talks. The
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beginning o f the year 2000 found Slovakia starting EU accession talks, and struggling to
restore domestic and international credibility.
While the West European countries and the United States embraced the political
changes in Slovakia and promised to assist the country in its efforts to integrate into the
larger family of democratic states, it is becoming increasingly clear that the six years o f
MeCiar rule have affected the country in deeper and more substantial ways than
anticipated. Economic growth and social benefits have been maintained artificially high, in
a manner reminiscent o f the state-controlled approach, and the country is only starting to
understand that the introduction o f a market economy entails preliminary austerity
measures that some social layers are not prepared to support.1 This may undermine the
efforts o f the current government and propel MeCiar into power again.
In the beginning o f the transition to a market economy and a democratic political
system, Slovakia had, like the Czech Republic, a double duty to accomplish: to establish
its statehood and to complete the political and economic transition. While Slovakia did
not inherit established state and government structures like the Czech Republic, the
mechanisms of a market economy had already been activated during the three years in
which the republics were in a federation (1990-1992). As a result, the economic health o f
the country improved each year between 1990 and 1995, although positive growth was
only witnessed after the separation o f the two republics (see Figure 5).
Politically, however, the two republics stood apart. Slovakia did not have a
Vaclav Havel to guide her with his personality and gain domestic and international
credibility. Worse still, Slovakia had fewer former dissidents to lend it credibility and
popularity within international circles. Instead, Slovakia had Vladimir MeCiar and his
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“Movement for a Democratic Slovakia,” (hereafter HzDS) whose influence on the
country’s development negatively marked most o f the period under analysis. Even after
the voting out o f Meciar after the 1998 parliamentary elections, he seems to have
remained a serious concern to those who are attempting to build democracy in Slovakia.
While the story o f Slovakia between 1993, when the country came into existence,
and 1998 is not solely about Me£iar’s politics, his influence on the political, economic and
social life o f the new state should not be underestimated. Unfortunately, that influence has
been likened to the politics and methods o f the former communist regime, characterized by
increasingly centralized and one-sided decisions that impacted on the economic and social
life, restrictions o f freedom o f speech and association, and attempts to discredit or
eliminate any political alternative that did not bow to the will o f the central government.
Me&ar’s influence on the socio-political background o f Slovakia goes back to
1989 when, together with the Civic Movement, MeCiar’s “Public Against Violence” had a
joint influence on the collapse o f communism in Czechoslovakia. After winning the battle
over the communist government, Public Against Violence set out to advocate an even
higher, and more identity-driven goal: independence for Slovakia. MeCiar was an
outspoken advocate o f full autonomy for the Slovak Republic from Czechoslovakia, and
even got himself fired in early 1991 for his strident calls for autonomy.2
The process o f disintegration o f the Czech and Slovak Republics had, in many
observers’ view, more to do with politically charged and populist campaigns from MeCiar
and his political group, than with a real need or overwhelming popular choice for a
separation o f the two republics. It is not clear that without MeCiar’s public campaign the
Federal Republic o f Czechoslovakia would have split. It remains clear that the drive for
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separation came from within Slovakia, specifically from MeCiar’s group.3
After the July 1992 declaration o f Slovakia’s sovereignty by the Slovak National
Council, political developments merely sped up the separation o f the Federation. The
Czech Republic displayed no other resistance against the declaration o f sovereignty than
President Havel’s resignation from his position o f President o f the Czechoslovak
Federation. Within two months o f the declaration o f sovereignty, Czech Prime Minister
Klaus negotiated the terms of the dissolution o f the Federation with Meciar, at the time
the Prime Minister o f the Slovak Republic. By September, 1992, Slovakia adopted a new
Constitution, and in November, at the third attempt and by a margin o f three votes, the
Federal Assembly approved legislation to permit the constitutional dissolution o f the
Federation. On January 1, 1993, the Slovak Republic came into being.4
Up to that point, MeCiar’s influence on the fete o f Slovakia was, arguably,
beneficial. His popular campaign and personal charisma, his appeal to a higher sense o f
national pride and identity rallied a large enough number o f Slovaks around his political
movement and national ambitions.
As soon as the national identity was established, however, the tone o f politics
changed, with an increasing emphasis on personality, centralization o f decision-making
processes, and caution regarding Euro-Atlantic integration. Starting in 1993, MeCiar’s
critics, even from within his own party, got fired from executive positions and, one by one,
established their own political groups. As a result o f firings, and o f further deflections
from the HzDS in protest against M eiiar’s autocratic politics, the HzDS lost the majority
in the legislature in the fall o f 1993, and was forced into an alliance with another extremeright nationalist party, the Slovak National Party. Resignations and deflections continued
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into 1994, and in March, the National Council (the Slovak legislative body) passed a vote
o f “no confidence” in the HzDS government.
For the following six months, a new coalition government was sworn in, with
former Mediar supporter turned political enemy, Joseph Moravcik as Prime Minister. This
government was to act in an interim capacity, until the September elections to the National
Council. The Morav£ik administration used its six months in office to adopt a policy o f
closer integration with West European states, to improve relations with Hungary, and to
revitalize the program o f privatization previously slowed down by Mediar. This policy line
stood in contrast to Meciar’s orientation towards Russia, and his "going slow on
privatization’ line. It also ran counter against his policy o f slowing down the emancipation
o f minorities, exemplified by his lack o f support for the language law which was
subsequently voted down, and the failure to negotiate common grounds on the treaty o f
neighborhood
Despite these developments, HzDS emerged the winner o f the September 1994
elections. Its return to power was followed by a period o f increased state control over the
pace and manner of privatization, and o f the development o f a market economy.5 Prime
Minister Meciar annulled all decisions on privatization made by the Moravcik
administration in late 1994. In 1995, he prompted and supported a law relating to state
interest in “strategic” companies, which would not be privatized.6 Banks were added to
this so-called “negative” list in 1996, together with 45 other companies in which the state
intended to maintain a ‘"golden” share. Further involvement in the development o f the
market economy occurred in 1997, when a law on the “Revitalization o f Enterprises” was
passed, which identified enterprises eligible for state aid in the form o f tax deferrals and
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debt forgiveness. This law induced over 1,000 enterprises to apply for state aid,
weakening market discipline and prolonging false expectations about the manner in which
a market economy functions.7
The period after Mediar’s return to power in 1994 was also marked by increased
political instability.8 The growing enmity between Mediar and the President o f the
country, Michal Kovad, culminated with a vote o f “no confidence” in the President in
1995. In the same year, the abduction o f one o f Ko vac's sons to Austria, and his
subsequent detention on charges o f international embezzlement led to several months o f
political polarization and increased instability. Additionally, in 1996 and 1997, the HzDSdominated government introduced several bills that were aimed at limiting civic freedoms.
These bills sparked domestic and international protests regarding Slovakia’s lack o f
development towards democracy.9 The evident hold o f the HzDS dominated government
over the electronic media, particularly the state television, accelerated public unrest and
dissatisfaction with Mediar’s manner o f governance.10
The final straw in the autocratic handling o f politics during the last years o f Mediar
government was the holding o f a national referendum on Slovakia’s membership into
NATO and on direct presidential elections. The question on NATO membership was
proposed by Mediar’s HzDS. The question on direct presidential elections was proposed
by President Kovad." The referendum was spoiled by then Minister o f the Interior,
Gustav Krajdi who, acting on Mediar’s orders, excluded from the ballot the question on
direct presidential elections. President Kovad called on the population not to vote unless
their ballots included the question on direct presidential elections. The referendum was
consequently boycotted, with less than ten percent turn-out. The Constitutional Court
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ruled that the turn-out was too low and the referendum was declared invalid.12
The failed referendum was considered by many domestic and foreign analysts as
the highest manifestation o f undemocratic practices in Slovakia after 1993.13
Domestically, civic demonstrations against the government continued. Opposition parties
started preparing for a major coalition to run united in the 1998 elections. Despite the
introduction o f last minute amendments to the election law intended to stifle the chances
o f political coalitions to win representation, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) was
formed o f five smaller parties. They garnered a majority o f the popular vote in the
September 1998 parliamentary elections.
The parliamentary victory o f SDK, together with the mid-January 1999
constitutional amendment to provide for direct presidential elections sealed the end o f the
Meciar rule. MeCiar ran for president, and lost to Rudolf Schuster, the Chairman o f the
Party for Civic Understanding, a new party on the political scene. Both Western
European countries and the United States saluted the change o f administration and
welcomed Slovakia’s entrance into a new stage o f political and economic development.

TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS
The above summary highlights the political and economic developments in
Slovakia between 1993 and 1998. Against the background o f these developments,
government action to meet popular demands for the introduction o f a market economy
appears substantial, per Transition Report indicators in Table 14 below. These indicators
also indicate that Slovakia is the East European country in which we observe the largest
number o f reversed trends o f transition indicators, particularly starting in 1997.
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19^4 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share

55%

60%

70%

75%

75%

Large scale privatization

3

3

3

4

4

Small scale privatization

4

4.2

4.2

4.2

4.2

Governance and restructuring

3

3

3

2.8

2.8

Price liberalization

3

3

3

3

3

Trade system

4

4.2

4.2

4

4.2

Competition policy

3

3

3

3

3

Bank reform

3

3

3

2.8

2.8

Securities reform

n/a

3

3

2.8

2.8

Investment law

n/a

3

3

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).

From the standpoint o f privatization, despite political disagreements over the pace,
depth and intensity of the process o f privatization, Slovakia fared well and very well,
especially if we consider transition progress comparatively. In the private share o f GDP
category, Slovakia started 1994 on an equal footing with two o f the three front-runner
countries, and ended the period in third place. In 1994, the country had 55 percent o f
GDP coming from the private sector just as Hungary and Poland, and was slightly behind
the Czech Republic (with 65 percent o f private GDP). By the end o f the period, Slovakia
had caught up with the Czech Republic (with 75 percent o f GDP from the private sector),
ran ahead o f Poland (who had 65 percent o f GDP from the private sector), and was
slightly behind Hungary (which had 80 percent o f GDP coming from the private sector).
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By the beginning o f the year 2000, it was estimated that an approximate 85 percent o f
GDP was coming from the private sector.14
The problem with Slovakia’s privatization seems to have been less the pace but the
manner in which the process was accomplished. The state’s involvement in which
enterprises were privatized and which were sold was evident since the 1995 law o f
essential enterprises. That law allowed the government to have a veto power in the
privatization o f over 30 large state enterprises irrespective o f its number o f shares. The
inclusion o f banks on the list o f essential companies in 1996 made the banking sector even
weaker and non-competitive. The 1997 law on the Revitalization o f Enterprises inhibited
attempts at restructuring and modernization, since the state basically promised and bailed
out non-competitive loans. Since the banks were under government control as well, loans
to non-performing economic entities continued, weakening both the banking and the
industrial sectors.
Another problem with the mechanics o f privatization was the lack o f transparency
and fairness o f various privatizations. The manner in which some famous privatizations
took place have drawn the attention o f the EU. In documentation assessing the readiness
o f countries aspiring to EU membership, Slovakia was criticized for its non-market-based
mechanisms o f price formation and resource allocation. Examples o f these practices were
tithe continued use o f non-competitive and secretive sales in the privatization process, the
refusal to sell a number o f State-owned enterprises that would benefit from privatization,
and the political involvement in the enterprise restructuring process through the Enterprise
Revitalization Act.” The “repeated use o f protective administrative measures” by the
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government was deemed incompatible with EU policies, and the existence o f a functioning
market economy in Slovakia was questioned.15
With respect to large scale privatization, Slovakia started the period on par with
Hungary and Poland, with a “3" rating indicating that more than 25 percent of large-scale
enterprises were in private hands, or getting ready to be privatized. By mid-1998,
however, Slovakia had caught up with the Czech Republic and Hungary, with a rating o f
"4" indicating that the percentage o f large-scale enterprises privatized or in the process o f
privatization had risen to 50 percent, and left Poland behind. As pointed out previously,
among the 50 percent left out o f the privatization process, there was a large number o f
State-owned enterprises which could have benefited from privatization and created
needed revenue for the government.
All four countries ran the same scores in the small scale privatization category
(between a rating o f “4" in 1994, to ratings o f “4.2" thereafter) during the entire period,
indicating that standards o f performance typical o f advanced industrial economies had
been attained, and that there remained no state ownership o f small enterprises.
The above indicators o f privatization suggest continued growth o f the private
sector. This is somewhat ironic given the fact that the privatization policy in Slovakia had
been reversed or stalled many times during this period.
Starting with the indicators o f governance restructuring, markets and trade, and
financial institutions reform, we notice the phenomenon o f reversal o f policies mentioned
in the beginning of this analysis, particularly starting in 1997.
In governance and restructuring, while all the other front-runners stayed the course
o f undertaking sustained actions to promote effective corporate governance, with a “3"
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rating for the entire period, Slovakia went from sustained actions to promote effective
corporate governance (developed by 1994), to a weakening o f legislative enforcement and
to introducing measures that restricted competition (“2.8" rating starting in 1997).
Fluctuations in trade and foreign exchange policies can also be observed, with
Slovakia being compatible with all the other front-runner countries until 1997 (rating o f
“4 ” in 1994, and o f “4.2” thereafter), when it went briefly back to a lower rating (“4").
The brief, one year reversal o f policies, from attaining standards o f performance norms o f
advanced economies to re-introducing some tariff barriers reinforces the observation that
1997 was the year o f evident negative change in the policies o f the government.
In the area o f financial institutions reform, the reversal o f policies is even more
evident, with Slovakia being compatible with the other three countries with respect to
bank and securities reform until 1996 (“3" rating indicates substantial progress in the
establishment o f bank solvency, interest rates liberalization, and the establishment of
lending mechanisms for the private sector; and substantial issuance o f securities by private
enterprises). Beginning in 1997, Slovakia went back to a lower rating in both categories
(“2.8"), indicating a more limited use o f directed credit, and a renunciation o f important
aspects o f the regulatory framework for the issuance o f securities.
With respect to price liberalization and competition policies, Slovakia was
compatible with the other front-runner countries (“3" rating), slightly behind Hungary and
Poland regarding price liberalization.
Overall, the assessment o f the European Union in 1998 was that “a sufficiently
convincing track record o f consistent economic reforms is missing” in Slovakia.16 The
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absence o f reform consistency is also reflected in the macro-economic indicators in Table
15 below.

Table 15.—Slovak Republic: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994
(Percentage change)
GDP at constant prices
4.9
-14.6
-6.5 -3.7

1995

1996

1997

1998

6.9

6.6

6.5

5.0

13.4

9.9

5.8

6.1

7.5

4.9

6.0

8.9

5.8

n/a

13.7 13.1

11.1

11.6

n/a

0.06 •■0.23 -2.29 ■•1.47

-2.12

0.24 0.19

0.22

Consumer prices (average)

61.2

10.1

23.2

Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)®

-44.9

6.3

-0.8

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

n/a

n/a

12.2

(in billions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance

n/a

Foreign Direct Investment

0.08

n/a -0.93
0.10

0.11

0.20

0.05

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 226.
11Calculated by author from EBRD data.

While economic growth was constant until 1995, with positive growth registered
for the first time in 1994, growth slowed down and witnessed a dip in 1998. Analysts
have long maintained that economic growth was artificially stimulated with bank credits to
non-performing enterprises, foreign borrowing and high levels o f public investment. The
growth slow-down is attributed to the stalling o f privatization and the increasing
government interference in the process o f privatization starting in 1995, and to the
unsustainable fiscal and external deficits. The trade balance remained negative throughout
the entire period under discussion, and jumped to -2.29 in 1996.17
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Inflation rates also fluctuated throughout the period, although these rates are low
comparable to other countries in the region. The lower inflation rates were attributed to
high domestic demand (especially in light o f increasing monthly earnings which allowed
for increased consumption), to adjustments o f administered prices, to indirect tax
increases, and to the introduction o f import surcharges.18 Unemployment rates stabilized
around 11 percent after 1996. These rates are compatible with Hungary’s rates, and lower
than Poland’s for most o f the period.
Table 15 also displays encouraging signs o f macro-economic indicators such as the
average monthly earnings in manufacturing, the low inflation and relatively low
unemployment. However, these positive macro-economic signs seem to have been
artificially stimulated by governmental measures, per post-MeCiar economic analyses o f
the state o f the economy.
The only indicator in Table 15 that hints at the fact that macro-economic indicators
were artificially stimulated, and that there was not much depth to the government
economic policy is the rate of foreign direct investment. According to Table 15, foreign
investment was barely present in Slovakia, especially by comparison to the other frontrunners. Slovakia seems to have been unable to convince foreign investors o f the
attractiveness o f its economy and services, given the government interference in the
economy and the regression o f transition. The rate o f foreign direct investment is the
lowest in Slovakia among the front-runner countries, and indicates caution and superficial
investment in the economy.19
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GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS
How did the electorate react to government policies, and what type o f relationship
can be observed between policy outcomes and public support for the introduction o f a
market economy? Figure 15 below traces the public opinion support for the introduction
o f a market economy line, the GDP per capita line, and the rate o f unemployment line. As
in the three previous cases, the GDP per capita line has an ascending direction. Like the
Czech Republic and Hungary, the curve o f public opinion support for the introduction o f a
market economy has a descending direction, although the lowering o f support is not nearly
as dramatic as in the other two cases. The rate o f unemployment is higher than that o f the
Czech Republic, but lower than those o f Poland or Hungary.

Slovak Republic - Market Transition

o

1900

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

puMc

Figure 15. Slovak Republic: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 226; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
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At first sight, the case o f Slovakia resembles that o f Hungary. Unemployment is
high, which contributes to a lowering o f support for the introduction o f a market
economy. As beneficial outcomes o f policies, such as increased GDP per capita take time
to mature, the population gets weary o f transition costs and dwindles in its original
support for a market economy. By the time economic growth trickles down to social
layers, the population is no longer as supportive o f a market economy as in the beginning
o f the transition, or is less convinced o f its appropriateness for the country. As the policy
line goes up, the popular support line goes down.
On more carefiil examination, the public support for the Slovak government
policies should be judged based on their activity while in office, after 1993. If we observe
the dynamics o f public opinion after Slovakia actually became an independent country,
public support did not decline as categorically in Slovakia as in Hungary. More
importantly, public support cannot be assessed as having declined, since between 1993 and
1997 support fluctuated around the 40 percent line, and was merely five percentage points
lower in 1997 than in 1993. This finding does not merit the qualification that public
support for the introduction o f a market economy declined in Slovakia, since the
fluctuations are minimal, and are normal given the changes that the country, as the entire
region were experiencing.
From this perspective, the diagram in Figure 15 resembles more the Polish case
than the Hungarian one. The public support line maintained itself at about the same, fairly
high level (roughly forty percent), while the policy line followed an ascending direction,
towards meeting the public support line in a model resembling the responsive government
model. Even if the available data does not permit the observation o f trends beyond 1997,
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up to that point, the Slovak government seems to have been responsive to public
preferences. This finding is all the more remarkable given that unemployment, the
traditional deflector o f public support for a market economy was relatively high during the
same period.
However, post-1998 analyses o f the state o f the economy and o f societal trends
between 1993 and 1997 point out that both economic growth and popular support for
government policies were artificially stimulated and maintained. Economic growth was
stimulated with excessive levels o f public investment, foreign borrowing and bank credits
granted under non-market conditions, which produced a surge in economic growth.
Analyses in 1998 revealed that the economy was close to an imminent collapse when the
change o f regime occurred.
Similarly, the maintenance o f public support in Figure 15 may reflect other social
phenomena than support for the introduction o f a market economy. Popular support for
government policies was skillfully maintained in Slovakia throughout the entire period
with populist campaigns, nationalist slogans, and with the use o f pro-govemment rhetoric
through the channels o f the state-dominated national television. More importantly, public
support was maintained with expensive social programs which further depleted
government resources while creating the perception that the introduction o f a democracy
and a market economy was an easy and affordable development.
An immediate inference that can be drawn from the results o f these post-1998
analyses is that the diagram in Figure 15 does not reflect real trends. The ascending
direction o f the economic growth line does not necessarily reflect the growth o f a market
economy, but the results o f artificial stimulation o f selected economic sectors, which
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amounted to growth for a short period. The popular support line does not really reflect
support for the market economy, but rather support for a particular government and its
policies.
That economic growth was not healthy, nor nearly as steady or as consistent as it
might look is shown by the reversal o f trends as soon as the government who stimulated
artificial growth policies was out o f office, after 1998. In fact, economic slow-down was
witnessed even before the government was voted out, starting in 1997. The budget, trade,
and fiscal deficits inherited by the government voted in the 1998 elections were so
appalling that austerity measures were needed immediately, and were introduced in a fairly
radical manner.
Additional public opinion data indicate that the so-called support for the
introduction o f a market economy should be regarded with reservation, and questioned.
Figure 16 below shows the dynamics o f public opinion on the question o f the introduction
o f a market economy.
According to this diagram, public opinion was polarized on the question o f the
introduction o f a market economy. About forty percent o f respondents believed that the
introduction o f a market economy was right throughout the period under discussion; and
roughly the same percentage believed that it was wrong. If such results were recorded
during a time o f economic uncertainty, reversal o f economic trends, or other types o f
economic unpredictability, this diagram would have made sense. Instead, the diagram
shows public opinion trends during a time o f economic growth. This polarization
indicates that other considerations besides the introduction o f a market economy were on
people’s minds when answering their questionnaires, and that social groups were evenly
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split for a fairly significant period o f time on the issue o f government pursuit o f a
particular policy. This polarization became more pronounced on the eve o f the 1998
elections.
Slovak Republic
Dynamics of Public Opinion
80

40
30
20

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

dont

Figure 16. Slovak Republic: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction
o f a Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).

The available data does not allow for an analysis o f whether those who believed in
the introduction o f a market economy were in fact MeCiar followers, while those who did
not, in fact rejected the kind o f market economy that he was fostering. Given the amount
o f public manipulation between 1993 and 1998, we can allow for the possibility that public
support merely reflected a polarized vote o f confidence for the government by some social
segments, rather than a vote o f confidence in economic policies that brought about general
well-being.
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Additional data suggest that individual economic well-being was not necessarily
the driving force in public support for the market economy. If support for the market
economy was indeed a result o f increased individual well-being, we should expect
respondents to believe that their personal situation would improve. Instead, the data in
Table 16 below indicate that the largest numbers o f respondents were not in the category
who believed that their situation would improve in the following twelve months, but in the
category o f those who believed that their situation would not change.

Table 16.—Slovak Republic: Public opinion on financial situation in the household
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Will be better

21

27

23

24

22

Will be same

21

26

39

38

40

Will be worse

54

43

33

30

33

Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation o f your household will get a lot
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped
from questionnaires.

If the constant support for the market economy in Figures 15 and 16 reflected
support for the particular type o f market economy being introduced, we should observe
larger or increasing numbers o f respondents believing in the future well-being o f their
household. Instead, in Table 16 above we observe that the category that is consistently
larger, especially after 1993, is the category who believes that their situation would not
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change. This suggests that the public support in Figure 15 reflected a combination o f
considerations about the current government policies but not necessarily support for the
introduction o f a market economy.
This hypothesis is problematic, especially from a methodological point o f view. If
numbers do not mean what they say they mean, then how is a comparative, or a country
analysis to proceed? Unfortunately, the case o f Slovakia until 1998 resembles more the
development and take-over o f political power by communist practices, than the
development o f an open democratic system. Me£iar was often criticized for trying to take
the country back to communism, rather than forward, to a democracy. This may explain
why trying to analyze political and social phenomena starting from the assumptions o f a
democratic environment, and using the tools o f advanced democratic systems may end up
being an attempt to count apples while thinking we were counting pears.
Puns aside, the fact remains that the case o f Slovakia poses difficult
methodological problems to a comparative analysis o f this kind. This is why looking at
more, rather than less data is helpful, in order to match more descriptive assessments with
some hard facts.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT
How did the voters react to these developments and how does voter behavior
corroborate with the assessments in previous sections? Table 17 below summarizes
election results for the Slovak National Council for 1994 and 1998.
The 1994 election victory by HzDS was expected, and should be attributed to
several factors other than the pursuit o f economic policies. National feelings, popularity,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209
and effective electoral campaigns influenced more the public choice o f 1994 than the belief
in the superiority o f the HzDS program. HzDS and its leader claimed victory in restoring

Table 17.~Slovak parliamentary election results (1994-98)___________________________
1994
1998
Parties
% o f vote seats
% o f vote seats
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
35.0
61
27.0 43
Common Choice Bloc

10.4

18

Hungarian Parties Coalition

10.0

17

Christian Democratic Movement (CDM)

10.0

17

Slovak Democratic Coalition (CDM, DUS)

26.3

42

PDL

14.7

23

Data from Europa World Year Book (London: 1999), Vol. 2, pp. 3142-3144.

the national identity o f the Slovaks, and convincingly argued that was the only political
entity who could bring about domestic prosperity and international recognition. The
HzDS leader was highly popular after the declaration o f independence, and had a personal
charisma that no other political leader had. The HzDS electoral platform o f 1994
promised reforms for the future o f the country, and the campaign was highly effective in
rendering the message. Overall, HzDS was the only political group with a sound, wellpresented program, and a well-developed election campaign.20
By comparison, the opposition was not crystalized yet and internal party power
struggles were as common in Slovakia as in the cases o f the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. A weak and disunited opposition made it even easier for the HzDS to project an
image o f saviors o f the motherland, and to win the parliamentary elections o f 1994.
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The fact that segments o f the population truly believed that the HzDS was the sole
hope for the country is reflected in the diagram in Figure 17 below. Prior to the 1994
elections, the direction o f the public mood with respect to satisfaction with democracy
was on the decline. This trend corroborates roughly with the lowering o f support for a
market economy; but as discussed previously, generalizations based on this support line
should be made with care. After the 1994 elections, the public mood with respect to
democracy witnessed a boost o f about ten percentage points, and thereafter oscillated
between twenty and thirty percentage points.

Slovak Republic • Public Approval
90

70

marfcat

Figure 17. Slovak Republic: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission of the
European Community, 1991-1997).

This surge indicates that the public mood was hopeful right after the elections that
brought HzDS to power; and indirectly supports the previous hypothesis that the public
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support line for the introduction o f a market economy in Figure 15 may reflect more than
support for a particular set o f policies, but rather political support for HzDS in general.
However, if the reader has questions regarding the credulity o f the Slovak people
in face o f several years o f populist campaigns and dominance o f the political space by one
party, the Slovak election results show that credulity did not last for ever. In 1998, the
HzDS still won the largest percentage o f votes, but no longer commanded a majority of
votes. Although public support was just twelve percentage points below what the HzDS
gained in the 1994 elections, a cumulative forty percent o f the public voted for parties
opposed to the HzDS. In 1998, the combination o f dissatisfaction with the current
government, the polarization o f politics, the existence o f a political alternative (the Slovak
Democratic Coalition), and the effects o f the failed referendum on NATO membership
corroborated to render the HzDS less powerful than it was in the past. The 1998 election
results suggest that the Slovak public used its power to vote out o f office the political
group it no longer believed in.
Further developments confirm that Me£iar no longer had the confidence o f the
population, and that the 1998 voting out o f office was not an accident. In the spring of
1999, Me£iar ran for president, and lost. His public reaction, displayed on national
television, was to reproach the population for their lack o f gratitude and to promise his
total retreat from politics.21 The popular rejection o f a political figure who enjoyed wide
popularity for many years speaks for the fact that the Slovak society is maturing, even if
its leaders may not.
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CONCLUSIONS
The case o f Slovakia between 1993 and 1998 is probably not fit for an analysis o f
representation. The government in power during this period displayed leadership
characteristics more appropriate for an analysis o f centralizing power than an analysis o f
emerging democracies. While the data reflect progress in the transition to a market
economy by the government in power, developments less likely to be summarized by
numbers suggest that Slovakia developed the appearance o f a market economy and o f a
democracy. The only development that suggests a re-orientation o f the country towards
developing a democratic environment is the voters’ use o f their right to deny leadership to
those who misuse power. It remains to be seen if the country will stay this course, or if
economic hardships and lack o f political skills by the current power coalition will render
M eiiar appealing to the population again.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1.

“If the tendencies in economic policy established by the former government,
particularly over the past two years, would have continued, it is evident that very
serious deformations o f a destructive character could have affected the Slovak
economy,” Slovak Finance Minister Brigita Schmognerova said at a press conference
in November 1998. The imbalance between budgeted and actual expenses, together
with the existence o f a non-competitive market, forced the government that was
voted into office in 1998 to introduce austerity measures that affected government
spending as well as social programs spending. See “Finance Minister Outlines
Planned Austerity Measures,” FBIS-EEU-98-335 (December 1, 1998); “Miklos
Report Warns o f Crisis in Slovak Economy, Society,” FBIS-EEU-98-363 (December
29, 1998). The lack o f awareness o f the state o f the Slovak economy at the end o f six
years o f MeCiar rule among trade unions and other social groups resulted in weak
popular support for government attempts to implement a mid-term economy strategy
which capitalized first on restoring an infrastructure system that would generate
government revenue and, second, on using the revenue for social benefits. See
“Miklos: Unions Show Lack o f Awareness o f Economy’s State,” FBIS-EEU-19990809 (August 6, 1999).

2.

“Slovak Nationalists Agitate for More Autonomy, Oppose Radical Privatization,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Soviet/East European Report,
Vol. 8, No. 25 (March 20, 1991), pp. 1, 4.

3.

Jan Camogusky, leader o f the Christian Democratic Movement which formed part o f
the Slovak coalition government in 1990, advocated more autonomy for Slovakia, but
never pushed for full independence. The Slovak National Party, a more radical party,
associated itself with Publics Against Violence advocating complete secession o f
Slovakia from the Federation. At no point during these debates was President
Havel’s proposal for a national referendum on the future o f the Federation accepted
by the Slovak part o f the Federal Assembly, dominated by Mefiiar’s group. MeSiars
power to convince politicians and large masses o f Slovak voters that independence
was the only alternative for Slovakia seems to have been grounded in populist appeals
to nationalist feelings and a rhetoric that Slovakia had nothing to gain from being part
o f a strong federation. Rather, he advocated, Slovakia had been hurt by the federal
economic policies, particularly those related to privatization. See Jan Obrman,
“Outgoing Prime Minister on the Future o f Slovakia,” (interview) RFL/RL Research
Report, Vol. 1, No. 25 (June 19, 1992), pp.32-33; Jiri Pehe, “The New Slovak
Government and Parliament,” RFL/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 10,
1992), p. 33.

4.

Jan Obrman, “Slovakia Declares Sovereignty; President Havel Resigns,” RFL/RL
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 31 (July 13, 1992), pp. 25-29.
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5.

Increased state control over various aspects o f social and economic life were evident
fairly early after the return to power o f the HzDS. Slovakia’s negative image in
Europe and the United States dates back to early 1995. Insiders have constantly
criticized the centralization o f power, the mingling in the running o f the state
television, the manner o f implementing the promised privatization plan, and the habit
o f “breaking laws” by the central government. See, for instance, “Opposition Party
Says Slovakia’s Bad Image Is Spreading,” Open Daily Digest, Vol. 2, No. 50 (March
10, 1995); “Slovak Trade Unions Continue to Criticize Privatization Plans, Open
Daily Digest, Vol 2, No. 86 (May 3, 1995); “Domestic Political Developments in
Slovakia,” Open Media Research Institute, Vol. 2 (May 29, 1995); also “SDL
Criticizes Government ‘Concentration o f Power,’" FBIS-EEU-95-048 (March 13,
1995). An amendment to the law on the organization o f ministries and other
government bodies led to the shifting o f “the original constitutional situation, without
amending the Constitution, a few millimeters in favor o f the present governing team.”
“Comment: Jurisdiction Law Expands MeCiar’s Powers,” FBIS-EEU-95-050 (March
15, 1995).

6.

“Parliament Passes Bills Increasing State Role,” FBIS-EEU-95-137 (July 18, 1995).
The law basically provided for the state to retain a golden share in the companies
characterized as "strategic." This golden share gave the state the right o f veto
regardless o f its share in the company’s property. The introduction o f the bill was
met by serious debate and protest by opposition groups, who described the law as
“indiscriminate state interference” in economic developments. As a result o f the
application o f the law, enterprises were sold off to a few people, at low prices, in a
clear disregard for the need to generate state revenue for social services, as promised
during the election campaign and demanded by the population. This practice
prompted the first demonstration against the government policy in the social sphere,
which was found to be lacking. See “First Mass Rally by Trade Unionists Since
1989,” FBIS-EEU-95-190 (October 2, 1995).

7.

Transition Report 1997, pp. 198-199; Transition Report 1998, pp. 188-189.

8.

“Duray: U.S. See Slovak Democracy ‘Jeopardized,’” FBIS-EEU-95-138 (July 19,
1995).; “MeCiar’s Attitude Toward Democracy Criticized,” FBIS-EEU-95-194
(October 6, 1995).

9.

One such bill introduced by the HzDS-dominated government was designed to create
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CHAPTER VIII
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA

BACKGROUND
Government willingness to listen to public calls for the reform o f the economy and
the introduction o f a market economy was not as strong in Bulgaria and Romania as it was
in the first set o f countries analyzed. In both countries, publics supported the introduction
o f a market economy, even if not as convincingly in the beginning o f the transition as their
neighbors. In both countries, governments were slow and indecisive at introducing
reforms, with a resulting economic crisis in Bulgaria in 1997, and a recession in Romania
starting in 1996.
The story o f Bulgaria may be one o f those stories o f late-starters that run faster
than contestants already engaged in the race and eventually make a good race. The socalled “good race” comes, however, at the end o f the period under discussion in this
study. As a result, for the period between 1990 and 1997 when the change in the
government’s attitude towards economic reform occurred, there were few indications that
the minimum conditions were in place for an analysis o f representation to be appropriate.
The story o f Romania was found to be equally unfit for an analysis o f
representation. Throughout the period under discussion, the country’s political scene was
dominated by a group o f reformed communists who delayed market reforms until 1994.
Despite popular calls for the introduction o f a market economy, the government chose to
be evasive and indecisive about its program. Once some reforms were in place, the
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government modified the legislative framework to a point where reforms were stifled.
Negative economic growth was the result o f this indecisive line o f economic policies, and
the country entered a period o f recession that continues into the year 2000.
The brief summary o f political and economic developments below highlights the
two reasons why a representation analysis was found to be inappropriate at this time for
either Bulgaria or Romania. First, governments in both countries were indecisive about
reform when popular calls for the introduction o f a market economy were sustained.
Second, while publics demanded the introduction o f a market economy, they voted in
office political groups whose plans for the reform o f the economy were vague, and
sometimes non-existent. These two factors make the case for a lack o f maturity on
constituencies’ part, and o f lack o f willingness to heed to constituencies on the
governments part. These two aspects indicate that publics and governments in Bulgaria
and Romania are not yet ready for the requirements of representation.

BULGARIA
The first post-communist government in Bulgaria, the Union o f Democratic Forces
(UDF), had a poor economic agenda and did not have the needed political skills to govern
successfully. Its poor leadership led voters to elect the former communists calling
themselves Socialists, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in 1990.
The BSP manifested no intention to reform the economy, and vetoed legislative
and executive initiatives which attempted to introduce measures conducive to a more open
market in Bulgaria. In return, then-President Zhelyu Zhelev, UDF leader, vetoed several
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laws that the BSP tried to introduce to increase the government’s control over the media,
the restitution o f land, elections, and privatization.
As the economic situation worsened, civic and labor groups started demonstrating
in the streets, demanding real reform and democracy. Throughout the mid-nineties, labor
unrest remained prevalent, and non-govemmental groups maintained the pressure on the
government for reform. As a former presidential advisor captured the situation, people
were “disappointed with the imitation o f democracy, the imitation o f market economy, and
the imitation o f Western-oriented foreign policy.”1
After seven years o f poor economic performance and a mock democratic regime,
the Bulgarian economy witnessed a major crisis in 1997, with hyperinflation, very low
standards of living, virtually no economic growth, and little privatization.
The socialists were forced out o f the Parliament through the backdoor by angry
masses o f demonstrators who demanded economic reform and political measures
conducive to a democratic regime. The reformed and better prepared UDF was voted
back in power, and started an aggressive program o f economic reform that focused on
macro-economic stabilization, privatization, encouraging foreign investment, reducing
inflation, and liberalizing the economy.
By 1999, many economic analysts and investors in the region considered Bulgaria
to be catching up with the front runner countries, and economically doing better than
Romania, which started its economic reforms slowly, but earlier in the decade than
Bulgaria.
A brief glance at transition indicators reveals how much behind the front-runner
countries Bulgaria was in terms o f reforming its several key sectors in order to set the
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stage for a functioning market economy. Almost in all categories o f transition indicators,
Bulgaria is one or two points behind on the scale o f evaluation o f its reforms.

TabI^8^-Bulgaria^2|dicator^f£roges^ii^^isitioiU ^^narkerecoTO m ^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share

40%

45%

45%

50%

50%

Large scale privatization

2

2

2

3

3

Small scale privatization

2

3

3

3

3

Governance and restructuring

2

2

2

2.2

2.2

Price liberalization

3

3

2

3

3

Trade system

4

4

4

4

4

Competition policy

n/a

2

2

2

2

Bank reform

2

2

2

2.8

2.8

Securities reform

n/a

2

2

2

2

Investment law

n/a

3

4

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).

Among the countries in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria had fifty percent o f GDP coming
from the private sector, the lowest in the region at the end o f 1998. While the front
runner countries had elaborated, passed into law, and enacted privatization schemes,
achieving more than fifty percent o f privatization o f their state-enterprises on average,
Bulgaria was still struggling to elaborate a comprehensive scheme for the large-scale
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privatization. Between 1992 and 1997, roughly twenty percent o f enterprise assets were
privatized. In 1997 alone, transition indicators signal that the country moved more
determinedly towards privatizing o f large-scale enterprises, privatizing around four
percent o f large enterprises in the chemical and metal sectors.2
In the small-scale privatization category, while all the front-runners completed the
privatization of their small companies and were moving towards standards o f performance
typical o f advanced economies, Bulgaria was lagging seriously behind, putting its
comprehensive program together and trying to apply it.
In the governance and restructuring category, indicators signal a moderately tight
credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement and little action taken to strengthen
competition and corporate governance.
In the price liberalization category, and further in the trade and foreign exchange
system, Bulgaria came the closest to being on target with its transition progress. For most
o f the period under discussion, the country had a level o f price liberalization compatible
with the front-runner countries. Indicators do record regression towards re-establishing
state-control over some prices in the middle o f the period, in 1996. In the trade and
foreign exchange system, indicators signal that restrictions were removed from imports
and exports, in a manner compatible with front-runner countries.
In the competition policy category, Bulgaria is again behind the other countries,
although not as far behind as Romania. Indicators reveal that competition policy
legislation and institutions were set up, but without the enforcing mechanisms needed to
make competition a reality.
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In bank and securities reform, Bulgaria lagged significantly behind the other
countries, with rudimentary reforms put in place and vaguely enforced.
The poor showing o f government reform programs and legislation had an
immediate and hard effect on the economy. Macro-economic indicators below show that
for most o f the period under discussion, the Bulgarian economy experienced negative
growth, high inflation, high unemployment, very low monthly earnings, relatively low
foreign direct investment, and a fluctuating trade balance.

g
00

Table 19.—Bulgaria: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1^93 1994 ■ w "TOT 1997
(Percentage change)
-6.9 4.0
-10.9
2.1
GDP at constant prices
-11.7 -7.3
-1.5
1.8
Consumer prices (average)

73.0

96.3

62.0

123.0 1,082

25.0

-50.8 -17.9

-42.4

-4.3

-28

n/a

n/a

333.5 82.0

Gross average monthly earnings in
industry (annual average, adjusted
for inflation)2

n/a

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

11.1

15.3

16.4

12.8

11.1

12.5

13.7 n/a

(in millions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance
Foreign Direct Investment

404

-212

-885

-17

120

209

381

-200

56

42

40

105

82

100

497

300

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 211.
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.

Interposed on this catastrophic situation o f the economy remains the political
instability and indecisiveness o f all the governments which were in office between 1990
and 1997. Political unwillingness to reform, on the part o f the socialist government, and
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political unpreparedness to reform, on the part o f UDF and other pro-reform political
groups led the country to sink in crisis by 1996 and 1997.
Figure 18 below shows how public support for the introduction of a market
economy interplayed with political developments and government action on the reform o f
the economy. Figure 18 shows that as popular support for the introduction o f a market
economy is high, the economy is taking a negative growth direction. Government policies
produced a serious crisis which started technically in 1991, at a time when people were
demanding reform.

Bulgaria - Market Transition

: 12

1900 1991

1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998

GOP per

Figure 18. Bulgaria: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 211 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).

Additionally, Figure 18 shows that government action was not only insensitive to
constituency demands for the introduction o f a market economy, but also to the sky
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rocketing rate o f unemployment. At its lowest, unemployment in Bulgaria was around
eleven percent, and growing as high as sixteen percent.
If the data recorded in Tables 18 and 19 reveal little government interest in
reforming the economy, Figure 18 reveals little government interest in listening to
constituency demands. Overall, an analysis o f representation in this case was found to not
be justified by the available data, nor by the political developments between 1990 and
1997, which show government unwillingness to consider reform, therefore government
unwillingness to heed to constituency’s voice.
An additional element that makes the choice o f representation even less likely in
Bulgaria for the period under discussion is the role that the publics played in the political
course o f the country. While favoring the introduction o f a market economy, the
Bulgarian public voted socialists back in power twice between 1990 and 1997.
It has been argued that the lack o f preparedness for power positions o f reformoriented groups such as UDF was the main element in favor o f the socialist group in the
beginning of the transition. The population was impressed with the lack o f coherence o f
pro-reform parties, a natural posture considering that they were emerging out o f over fifty
years o f communism and had little experience with democratic politics.
The seeming lack o f experience by pro-reform groups, and the seemingly
organized and recognizable pattern o f politics that the socialists proposed, were factors
that weighed heavily in the popular choice o f 1990. However, it is not clear why the
public returned socialists to power in 1994, after the evident decline o f the economy and
the proven disinterest o f the socialists to introduce economic reforms.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

225
Overall, political immaturity on behalf o f both the Bulgarian public and the
governments in power between 1990 and 1997 indicate that a representation analysis is
premature for this country. It remains to be seen if the course that the country took since
it defaulted in 1996 will be maintained. If economic reforms continue, in keeping with
popular calls for the introduction o f a market economy, and if the public gives signs o f
maturity in the selection o f public govemants to carry out the economic program and
other popular mandates, it may be possible to elaborate a representation analysis for
Bulgaria in the next five to ten years.

ROMANIA
Romania’s situation is somewhat ironic, given that the country was run eventually
by former communists with little interest in economic reforms for most o f the period under
discussion in this study. It is ironic because the change o f communist regime in this
country was the only one accompanied by loss o f human lives during a popular revolution
in December 1989. The irony comes as a result o f the fact that after losing many lives to
get rid o f the communist regime o f Nicolae Ceau§escu, Romanians immediately elected a
group o f reform-minded communists. To go further, Romanians re-elected the same
political group after two years o f slow-to-nonexistent economic reforms, in 1992.
The resulting economic deterioration o f the economy eventually prompted a
different, more reform-oriented political group to power. Unfortunately, the
Constantinescu administration voted in office in November 1996 was unable to set a clear
direction for the country’s economy, which ended the nineties in deep recession.
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Romania started the reform o f its economy in low gear. The change o f regime in
1989 found the society quite unprepared for massive changes, and without strong leaders
to take the country into a market economy or a democracy. After the political
transformation o f 1989, two rounds o f free elections were won by reform-minded former
communists under the leadership o f Ion Iliescu. Until 1995, minimal economic reforms
were undertaken. Privatization o f large state enterprises was almost non-existent, and
small-scale privatization was allowed to start only in 1992. Liberalization o f prices was
done in stages, with most prices liberalized only in 1995.
In late 1996, a new administration was elected to power, with promises for
thorough and rapid reform. The coalition o f political forces that came to power under the
leadership o f Emil Constantinescu was a mix o f parties opposed to Iliescu’s PDSR, and
center-right.
Despite the fact that the National Peasants’s Party (PNT-CD) was the strongest
coalition partner, it failed to secure the agreement o f the other coalition partners, primarily
o f the junior party o f Petre Roman, the Democratic Party (PD). This failure led to a slow
and unconvincing set o f reforms, a government crisis in December 1997, another crisis in
February 1998, the resignation o f Premier Victor Ciorbea and appointment o f Radu Vasile
as the next Prime Minister, the sacking ofVasile and the appointment o f the governor o f
the Central Bank to the position o f Prime Minister in February 2000.
Despite these reshuffles, the government coalition still failed to produce the
promised change and reform o f the economy. A package o f reforms was passed in
February 1998, followed by amendments and legislative incoherence which drove
investment out. At the end o f 1999, Constantinescu’s legitimacy as a strong leader was
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questioned, and his chances for re-election in the November 2000 elections were seriously
challenged by Iliescu and other candidates. Provided that the current coalition decides to
take some dramatic steps to reform the economy, which continues to decline, it is not
clear that there is enough time for pro-market political forces to make up for the lost time
and boost their chances for re-election.
Table 20 below shows that the Romanian governments between 1990 and 1997
have little to show with respect to their efforts to reform the ailing Romanian economy.
Transition indicators reveal that Romania is the country which witnessed the lowest level
o f progress towards the introduction o f a market economy, and the largest number o f
reversal o f policies.

Table 20.—Romania: Indicators o f progress in transition to a market economy
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share

35%

40%

60%

60%

60%

Large scale privatization

2

2

3

2.8

2.8

Small scale privatization

3

3

3

3

3.2

Governance and restructuring

2

2

2

2

2

Price liberalization

3

3

3

3

3.2

Trade system

4

4.2

3

4

4

Competition policy

n/a

I

1

2

2

Bank reform

2

3

3

2.8

2.2

Securities reform

n/a

2

2

2

2

Investment law

n/a

2

3

n/a

n/a

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share/ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
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These indicators say that Romania was behind Bulgaria with respect to private
share o f GDP until 1996, with thirty-five and forty percent o f GDP coming from the
private sector. They show that until 1996, Romania was on par with Bulgaria with respect
to large-scale privatization, having elaborated a scheme but not having started to
implement it. In 1996, during a short period o f privatization, the government managed to
privatize around twenty-five percent o f large-scale enterprises. Starting in 1997, that
trend was reversed, with the government going back on its policies and annulling a number
o f legislative and executive decisions made to boost privatization.
In the small-scale privatization area, Romania fared better than Bulgaria since it
had a comprehensive program by 1995, and started to implement the program as well.
With respect to governance and restructuring, and price liberalization, Romania
was roughly at the same rating level as Bulgaria. Bulgaria made additional efforts to
enforce the restructuring scheme starting in 1997, which gave it a slight boost in the rating
scheme (2.2) while Romania remained at a low rating level o f 2.
With respect to the trade system ratings, we witness yet another reversal o f
ratings, indicating a backward shift o f policies. While in 1994 and 1995 Romania was
rating quite high, indicating that restrictions on important and exports had been removed,
in 1996, we see a reversal o f that trend and a return to imposing some trade barriers and
restrictions. Table 21 (Macro-Economic Indicators) below shows that foreign investment
was immediately affected by these changes and going back on policies. In 1996, direct
foreign investment was roughly half the size o f the previous year.
Even less progress was made in competition policy. Until 1997, the country had
no competition legislation and no institutions to promote market competition or to enforce
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it. In the banking sector, Romania witnessed yet another reversal o f trends. After having
made progress in the establishment o f bank solvency, one o f the few areas in which
Romania was actually ahead o f Bulgaria, in 1997 the legislative acts went back again on
what they stipulated two years before and restricted rates, lending procedures, and capital
availability for small and medium size enterprises.
Finally, with respect to encouraging investment, ratings place Romania behind
Bulgaria as well.
These poor transition ratings are reflected in the state o f the economy, Table 21
below.
Table 21.—Romania: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
(Percentage change)
GDP at constant prices
-12.9 -8.8
1.5
3.9 7.1

1996
3.9

-6.6

-5.0

Consumer prices (average)

136.7 32.3

38.8

154.8

60.0

1.0 16.6

-13.1

-56.5

n/a

6.6

8.8

n/a

161.1 210.4 256.1

1997

1998

Net monthly average earnings (annual
average, adjusted for inflation)*-40.5 -40.0

-59.6

(% o f labor force)
Unemployment

3.0

8.2

10.4

10.9

9.5

(in millions o f U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance
Foreign Direct Investment

-11,345-1,373-1,130
37

73

97

-483-1,605-2,494 -•1,971 -2,600
341

417

263

1,224

900

Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 224.
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.

Table 21 highlights the swings o f reversals o f policies in the market economic field.
It shows that the Romanian economy took time to experience growth, until 1993, then
three years later sank into negative growth again. It shows that investment was barely

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230
existent until 1994, which is often credited to the absence o f primary legislation to regulate
the rules o f trade in Romania.
Foreign direct investment witnessed a dramatic boost after the 1996 elections,
when pro-market political forces were elected for office. This popular vote signaled the
investor community that the Romanian population could be ready to switch to reform
policies. Investment during that year jumped six times higher than the previous year. The
following year, in 1998, it went down again, due to inconsistencies in the application o f
the rule o f law, and to reversals o f legislation that affected investment directly..
If transition indicators and macro-economic indicators are not enough to show
how complex and puzzling the Romanian situation was, Figure 19 below leaves the reader
with an even more protracted question mark regarding the position o f the government visa-vis their constituencies.
Figure 19 shows that as unemployment was soaring and public opinion demanded
the introduction o f a market economy, granted with fluctuations and reversals as well, the
policy line was barely moving up to meet popular demands. Why did policy makers move
so slowly on economic reforms and how can government attitudes towards reform be
understood?
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Figure 19. Romania: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998
(London: 1998), p. 224 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels:
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).

There is no simple answer to questions such as the ones above. In this particular
case, just like the case o f Bulgaria, the one explanation that imposes itself is the political
orientation o f the government in power.
Both Iliescu’s political group, which dominated the legislative and the executive
branches between 1990 and late 1996, and the Bulgarian BSP had a more modest change
o f system in mind when they took power. This is reflected in its actions, and sometimes in
their official statements. Before the parliamentary and presidential elections o f 1990,
Iliescu admitted on national television that he was a convinced communist who believed in
the rights o f the many against an economic system that he considered unfair, that is
capitalism.3
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If Iliescu and his group had a right to their political beliefs, why did the Romanian
constituencies vote them in power if, in reality, the wanted a substantial change to a
market economy, which is another word for the capitalist management o f the economy?
Again, there is no easy answer to such questions. It is fair to say that a number o f
hypotheses which have been advanced in the literature also point in the direction o f
delaying a representation analysis for the case o f Romania. The public seems to have been
as unprepared for dramatic changes as the pro-reform groups in the aftermath o f the
change of regime in 1989. Constituency’s level o f maturity in understanding how their
vote would influence the pace o f reform in the country was also low. Overall, the data
gathered in Tables 18 through 21, and Figures 18 and 19 indicate that Bulgaria and
Romania are not yet ripe for an analysis o f representation.
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CHAPTER IX
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: CONCLUSIONS

The present study analyzed the direction o f democratization in the region from a
representative democracy perspective. It is the argument o f this study that the direction,
depth, and irreversibility of processes o f democratization in Eastern Europe cannot be
evaluated outside the requirements o f representative democracy.
Substantively, this study looked at how constituencies across Eastern Europe
started holding their elected representatives accountable, and how government responded
to that call. It shows that, as transition proceeded, governments became increasingly more
responsive to their constituencies on the question o f introducing a market economy, more
engaged in explaining their strategies and policies to constituencies, and more timed to
public voice in general. This finding indicates that Eastern Europe is adapting to the
requirements o f a representative type o f governance, and rules out the view that the region
is not yet ready for a representation approach.
Methodologically, the study offered a comparative interpretive analysis o f
representation. This type of analysis, while statistically less rigorous allowed the
researcher to highlight aspects o f the quality and direction o f democracy in the region that
are not regularly captured by more statistically designed research projects. It looked at
the variations in transition, macro, and micro-economic indicators over a period o f time in
conjunction with popular support for the change o f economic system. In so doing, the
study looked for trends of government policy vis-a-vis popular support, keeping in mind
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that the question on the direction o f the government-public relationship prevails over the
question on the pace o f economic development.
The country by country analysis elaborated in chapters four through eight permits
three types o f conclusions with respect to representation elements in Eastern Europe:
theoretical, methodological and region specific. To these conclusions we now turn.

THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS
Is representative democracy the right conceptual approach to assess the direction
o f democracy in Eastern Europe?
At a minimum, representative democracy poses two basic assumptions imbedded
in the theoretical model that are essential to the question o f how appropriate
representation is to the study o f Eastern Europe. First, representative democracy
assumes that constituencies place value on the notion that the people elected for office
have a mandate to represent constituency interest. Second, representative democracy
assumes that governments heed the constituencies’ opinions towards issues of general, or
specific concern.
These assumptions go to the core issue o f legitimation o f political power. Since
Eastern Europe was under an authoritarian regime for a considerable amount o f time, a
legitimate question must be raised regarding the ability o f constituencies to understand
their own role in the polity. A similarly legitimate question needs to be raised regarding
the elected officials understanding o f their role vis-a-vis constituencies. If government
leaders choose to defend a political position as acting “on behalf o f those who elected”
them to serve in office, they derive legitimacy for their decisions from those they
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represent. Conversely, if voters choose to demonstrate in front o f government buildings
demanding the resignation o f the government, they do so out o f an understanding that
public officials did not do their job in representing public interests.
The representative democracy approach is conceptually appropriate if we observe
that developments in Eastern Europe indicate constituency and government awareness o f
the requirements o f representation.
The data analyzed in the country studies suggests mixed awareness o f
responsibilities, requirements, and benefits o f representation by both constituencies and
governments. This mixture is, in retrospect, normal. The region has gone through many
decades o f authoritarian rule, a type o f governance in which government responsiveness
and accountability is a philosophical impossibility. Therefore, behavior-wise, in the first
years after the collapse o f communism we should expect a lower degree o f awareness o f
requirements and benefits o f representation among both governments and constituencies.
Alternatively, as freedom o f speech and availability o f information become the
status-quo, we should expect an increased public awareness o f the obligations o f
governments to represent popular interests, and more government inclination to recognize
obligations towards constituencies. Referring back to the analysis in chapters four
through eight, here are conclusions about how awareness o f representation requirements
evolved in the analyzed countries.
In the Czech Republic, the public seems to have been aware o f their power to hold
the government accountable for the manner in which they conducted politics and
represented constituency interests at a fairly early stage in the transition. The Civic
Forum, widely perceived as a group concerned with the needs o f the many in 1989 was
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voted out o f office and did not even gain representation in the parliament in 1992. After
two and a half years in power, the public perceived the Civic Forum as too elitist and
removed from the daily needs o f the constituencies, and therefore unfit to hold office.
In 1996, popular perceptions that politicians merely “do their thing” with little
consideration for long-term national goals split the popular vote between the incumbent
Civic Democratic Party o f Vaclav Klaus and the Social Democratic Party. This imbalance
forced the incumbent government to share power with the socialists, which, as expected,
did not produce better policies or better politics. By 1998, the stalemate between the two
governing parties led to early elections. Voters expressed again their dissatisfaction with
the manner o f politics o f the incumbent government, and gave the socialists more votes
than the democrats, although not enough to form a majority government. “Political
tunneling” has been the catch-phrase since 1999 to describe how constituencies perceived
the manner o f Czech politics.
Ultimately, the Czech public became even more vocal about their unhappiness with
the manner in which the government carried out its obligations towards constituencies.
The civic group Impulse 99 organized massive rallies in late 1999 and early 2000,
demanding the government to step down. Their demands were grounded in the perceived
failure by politicians to listen to the public needs, and the public belief that politicians were
focused only on getting re-elected.
On the government side, awareness o f government obligations towards
constituencies is present, although at certain levels and among some politicians. In 1996,
the government acknowledged that it drew legitimacy for its decisions o f economic
transformation from its citizens. The government draft policy statement made public in
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1996 highlighted the commitment o f the government to “continuing the policy o f rapid
social and economic transformation [in the belief] that this is also the wish o f the decisive
majority of the country’s citizens.”1
On the other hand, President Havel voiced his concerns with Czech politics in a
manner that indicates awareness o f what a representative government should do. The
Czech Republic, he argued, lacked “personalities,” people with “political courage to offer
long-term perspectives and explain them properly to the people.” The absence o f political
vision was credited to the fact that “political parties tend to think in short periods from
one election to another.”2 Implicit in his remarks was the recognition that politicians had
been self-absorbed while in office, and that they failed to communicate with their
constituencies, or represent their needs.
In Hungary, the public also seems to have been aware o f their power to hold
governments accountable for their policies, and for the general state o f the economy,
particularly in the early nineties. The voting in office o f the pro-market government o f
Jozsef Antall in 1990 was a popular vote o f confidence in those perceived to be
progressive and market economy oriented. The voting out o f office o f the Antall
government in 1994 was a direct result o f the government’s failure to deliver the promised
economic well-being and to perceptions that Antall and his political group were in fact
governing by themselves, not paying attention either to their coalition partners or to the
general public.
One important element o f civic awareness about what the public considered
acceptable for the government to do, or not do dates back to the battle over the national
media, in 1992 and 1993. During those years, massive rallies and demonstrations were
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organized against what was perceived as the government’s attempt to take control over
the national radio and television.
At the time, the Antall government blamed its rapidly plummeting popularity on
the anti-government media campaign which, the government argued, favored the
opposition and weakened the government’s position in front o f the population. The
government was convinced enough o f its own explanation that it attempted to strengthen
its control over the national media. In 1993, government pressure was placed on media
leaders to resign, and government supporters were appointed. This prompted the civic
group Democratic Charter and student organizations to organize massive rallies protesting
government interference in the national television and radio.3
The instance o f media war in the Hungarian case is a good example o f the mixture
o f awareness o f the requirements o f representation by the government in office. While the
Antall government tried to cover and deny any attempt at taking control over the national
media, President Goncz joined in the popular opposition and criticized the government for
their undemocratic practices and lack o f responsibility towards the public.
Mid-nineties governments also displayed mixed awareness o f their responsibilities
towards the public who elected them. While the Socialist Party came to power largely as
a result o f combined popular dissatisfaction with the HDF governance and popular
enthusiasm with the Socialist electoral platform, the HDF failed to live up to its promises
from the very beginning. Once in office, the Horn government admitted within one year
that the policy o f the social welfare system promised during the election campaign could
no longer be sustained, and that austerity measures were needed to balance the budget and
redress the economy.
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Horn and others in the government knew that their electoral promises could not be
fulfilled even before they got into office. The Socialist Party’s chief economist, Lazio
Bekesi, warned that empty electoral promises were going to cost the government more
than the elections; they were going to cost the long-term credibility o f the government.
Horn chose to disregard Bekesi’s public calls for a realistic budget, and accepted the
latter's resignation when it was forwarded officially.
This type of behavior indicates that in Hungary, some government officials had a
better understanding o f their responsibilities towards constituencies than others. It also
indicates that for some politicians, winning the elections with empty, populist strategies
was not an acceptable political position from which to face the constituencies. This is an
element o f political behavior which indicates that the core values o f representation are
known among government officials, even if not always acted upon. It is an element o f
hope in the direction o f Hungarian politics towards a truly representative government
behavior.
In Poland, the country in which we observed a higher degree o f government
responsiveness to constituency interests than in the Czech Republic or Hungary, the public
also used its power to hold the government accountable. Despite the fact that the Polish
economy was doing well and very well, constituencies still punished incumbents by either
voting them out, or by lowering public support to a level that forced political groups to
form unlikely and inefficient coalitions.
Like in the previous two cases, Poland witnessed many political polarizations,
especially during the first years o f transition, with a record number o f governments being
changed by Lech Walesa. Solidarity and Walesa himself saw the rise and decline o f their
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popular support as a result o f political indecision, increasing authoritarianism on Walesa’s
part, party-infighting, and a public image o f divisiveness.
Interesting enough, additional information dating from more recent political
developments seems to indicate an increased public awareness o f a different aspect o f
representation, that was marginally discussed in this study, that is proportional
representation. In preparation for the most recent SLD Congress, in December 1999,
voivodship congresses held throughout Poland revealed agreement on the fact that some
social groups are heavily under-represented. In the new Polish left, the proportion o f
women and youth is very low by comparison to the larger population. During a
preparatory congress in Zielona Gora, a delegate even noted that “This conference room
does not reflect the structure o f society; here we have mostly men, and most o f them
represent the older generation.”4 The remark was prompted by the fact that out o f 130
participants, only 10 were women.
In a 1996 editorial analyzing the effectiveness o f political parties in Poland,
politicians and parties were criticized for the short-sightedness and narrow scope o f their
political approach, often times unrelated to the needs and aspirations o f their
constituencies. Party infighting, while a healthy process if resulting in a better functioning
political entity were primarily driven by personal interests and political interest for
government positions. The immaturity o f the political system was judged against such
evident situations o f non-responsiveness such as the in-party conflicts. At the time, the
KPN was going through a power struggle, which prompted the leader o f one o f the
factions to declare that the party was “where he was”, and that he would therefore
convene his own congress condemning the other factions.5 The editorial remarked that
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the very fact that a leader o f a political entity in Poland can convene his “own” congress
demonstrated that the intra-party democracy was still an abstract concept in Poland o f
1996. Evidently, some o f the media is attempting to analyze political events from a
representative democracy perspective, which is another element o f hope that this direction
will prevail among politicians as welL
Government awareness o f their obligations as people’s representatives seems to
emerge more often in the second half o f the nineties in Poland. During Walesa’s term in
office, his increasing authoritarian manner disturbed many domestic and international
actors. With the election o f Kwasniewski, we see less executive interference into the
affairs o f the legislative, and more cohesiveness on issues o f policy and method. In an
address to the Sejm, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz acknowledged that “citizens have the
right to bring those in government to account for their results and not just for their
intentions,” and that “politicians are [in the government] to serve the public that can
determine the elections and the makeup o f the political authorities.”6 Even if this may be
interpreted as political rhetoric, we can assume that in Poland, politicians at least have a
notion o f what is expected of them as far as their duties to the electorate goes.
Slovakia is a special case o f representation awareness. It is fair to say that with the
story o f Slovakia, we enter the realm o f strong uncertainty regarding representation
requirements, a realm in which the differences between Slovakia, as part o f the frontrunner group o f countries, and Bulgaria and Romania are evasive.
Slovak public awareness o f the requirements o f representation are unsettled for
most o f the period under discussion. In 1992, the electorate voted into office the political
group perceived to represent their strong desire for an independent state, the Movement
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for a Democratic Slovakia, led by Vladimir Me£iar. In 1994, voters confirmed into office
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, credited for having delivered on the
independence issue, only two years after national existence. In 1998, the electorate voted
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia out o f office when it became increasingly
evident that the position the group was taking domestically and internationally was not
representative o f constituency interests. In the words o f a remarkable Slovak personality
who likened Slovakia to a “sleeping beauty” ready to get dressed after being awakened,
“in the September 1998 parliamentary elections, the citizens o f Slovakia made it clear that
they did not like the attire that the new state had been wearing.”7
Slovakia is a special case o f representation awareness because the issue o f national
aspirations for an independent state cannot be separated from the group who carried it
out, nor from the person who was most vocal about independence, MeSiar respectively.
Undoubtedly, for many years M eiiar was perceived as a national hero and savior, whether
his critics liked it or not. Undoubtedly, his personal charisma and popularity raised the
profile o f the political group he headed, and legitimized actions that his government took
while in office.
It is important to remember that from the standpoint o f representation, MeCiar was
elected in 1992 and in 1996 as a result o f his pro-independence views and his popularity as
a leader who had the country’s best interests at heart. Throughout his term in office, he
was persuasive about the appropriateness o f the policies he pursued, whether they were
veiled pro-Russian, or anti-West. From the standpoint o f representation, Me£iar and his
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia claimed and convinced voters that he and his group
were the best alternative for the country.
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This aspect is important when we discuss constituency awareness o f the
requirements o f representation, as well as government awareness o f their duties towards
those they represented. Even if many international scholars would argue that Me£iar was
using populist tactics to win votes, in reality he was and remains very popular in Slovakia.
Even after his defeat at the polls in 1998, when he lost his bid for the Presidency to Rudolf
Schuster, he publicly acknowledged that he thought he was doing the right thing for his
country.
The major evident mistake of his years in power came in 1997, with the holding of
a national referendum on the question o f joining NATO and on direct presidential
elections. The manner in which the referendum was spoiled, with the removal o f the
question on direct presidential elections without the approval o f the Constitutional Court
was too evident for constituencies to ignore. After the failed referendum, constituency
awareness about the manner o f politics became more astute, and voters became more
demanding o f their politicians. Additionally, civic group action to publicize the mistakes
and manipulation o f public sentiment by the government in power became more intense.
In 1998, Meiiar lost his bid for the presidential position.
It is somewhat unfair to reduce the story o f Slovak awareness o f the requirements
o f representation to the story o f MeCiarism. However, even insiders to these dramatic
events acknowledged that the country was very much taken with the populism o f its
leader.
Fortunately, there were other, more representation prone positions among
politicians as well, indicating that a minimum o f recognition o f government responsibilities
towards constituency existed. President Kovac assessed the position o f the government
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vis-a-vis the population in 1996 as one o f a return o f political elites o f “privileged
individuals who proudly rule citizens regardless o f their essential interests and the
preservation o f justice in the state,” a situation that was generalized under the communist
rule. The President referred to the feet that “grand politics” was becoming increasingly
detached from the everyday needs and preoccupations o f the people, and as a result,
“skeptical views are being spread in society not only about individual politicians, but about
[democratic] politics as a whole.”8 Media analysis warned many times that Slovakia was
still living “mentally in communism which taught people to believe that political power is
allowed to do anything, that it can reward and punish people for nothing. Me£iarism
pretended that it could anything bad that comes to its mind.”9
On the other hand, when the patience o f the electorate ran thin and the tables were
turned on HzDS and its leader, Slovaks were given credit for having said “no” to Meciar’s
politics in 1998.10
It is fair to say that the Slovak case is complex from the standpoint of
representation. On the one hand, the governments in power between 1992 and 1998 acted
on the popular demand for the slower introduction o f a market economy. On the other
hand, the governments in power used populist tactics and influence over the national
media channels to influence the popular choice for a slower strategy for the introduction
o f a market economy. On the one hand, some layers o f the population were aware that
the government was using its political influence to guide the popular choice; civic group
demonstrations and protests were registered starting in 1993. On the other hand, it took
the country five years o f semi-authoritarian governance to vote out manipulative leaders.
The real test o f representation for Slovaks will be to create a stronger link between the
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government currently in office and the constituency, in explaining the policies that are
being followed and the need for patience in order for reforms to work. Without that type
of communication and govemment-voters link, MeCiar or other politicians o f his
orientation may win the voters confidence again with populist tactics and promises that
cannot be delivered. Representative democracy may not yet be ripe for Slovakia.
Bulgaria and Romania remain the major question marks regarding the direction o f
democracy in the region from a representation standpoint. As noted in chapter eight,
these two countries were not deemed yet ripe for an analysis o f representation.
Conceptually, the decision not to perform a representation analysis came as result
of the visible failure o f successive government officials in both countries to respond in a
convincing manner to their constituencies calls for reform. Bulgaria may be ready for such
an analysis in the next four to five years, if the government stays the course o f reform and
listens to its publics’ calls. The Romanian government, however, has not yet started to be
responsive.
In many ways, it is a shame that a representation analysis for these two countries
could not be elaborated in this study. Constituencies in both countries proved on several
occasions that they understand and exercise their right to call the government to
accountability. Bulgarians and Romanians voted government officials out o f power, as did
their better-off neighbors to the West. Civic and labor groups staged many
demonstrations throughout the entire period under discussion demanding real change and
real democracy, probably with more persistence and intensity o f action than in Poland or
the Czech Republic. Awareness o f their power to hold the government accountable for its
policies and actions seems to be present in both countries.
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Unfortunately, constituencies in both countries also displayed considerable
immaturity in their electoral decisions. The inability o f both constituencies to distinguish
the electoral choices that could have offered them more viable economic programs led
them to making the wrong choices. Both Bulgaria and Romania legitimized former
communists in power at the polls. In both countries mass demonstrations were staged as a
result o f the deleterious policies followed by their chosen representatives.
Poland is a case which could be brought forth as proving that former communists
in power are not necessarily a recipe for economic disaster. However, Poland voted
former communists in power after their economic reform program was underway, when
legislation, institutions, and new structures were functional and the clock o f reforms could
no longer be set back. Not the same happened in either Bulgaria or Romania.
Communists were legitimized into power in the beginning of the transition period, and
stayed there for most o f the period under discussion.
An argument can be made that in both Bulgaria and Romania, the communist
regimes were harsher than in the front-runner countries, therefore these countries’ starting
point in the transition to a market economy was much behind the other countries in the
region economically, as well as emotionally. However, this argument does not explain the
fact that despite the harsh times under communism, constituencies returned former
communists to power.
A more likely explanation for this puzzling choice is the argument made in favor o f
deferring a representation analysis, that is for the period under analysis, neither country
was ready for the complex requirements o f representation. Publics were either unable to
discern at the polls which political groups could have imposed a more determined
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economic program, or they were led to believe that the former communists had good
programs to implement. There are studies who argue that the choice o f former
communists in both countries was prompted by the populations’ fears o f the unknown
economic system proposed by more market economic oriented groups, or were led to
believe that the former communists had better, sounder plans than their opponents. In
either case, publics who favored the introduction o f a market economy failed to select
market-oriented representatives to represent their interests in the government. This is a
strong indicator that Bulgarians and Romanians were unable to match public policy
preferences with the available political choices in the period under discussion.
In the next decade, it may be possible to set up a representation analysis for both
countries. Bulgaria is starting to look promising in terms o f government decisiveness to
carry out popularly endorsed market reforms. Romania is not only lagging behind, but it
is also showing signs o f sinking further in its economic recession. Recent estimates place
Romania on a par with Zimbabwe and the Ivory Cost in candidacy for going to default in
the year 2000." Worse still, after changing three Prime Ministers since 1996, the
Constantinescu administration is not finding the political decisiveness to act on economic
reform.
The above summary o f events, attitudes, and public positions by both publics and
governments in Eastern Europe indicates that, as expected, in the beginning o f the period
o f transition there was less government readiness to accept the responsibilities o f
representation, and more public drive towards holding governments accountable for their
policies and behavior. Towards mid-nineties, governments seem more prone to
acknowledge their obligations towards constituencies.
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This finding is critical to the manner in which any researcher should approach
Eastern Europe. It has been held for some time that constituencies do not have the
intellectual or cultural education necessary for a viable democracy to function in the
region. Publics have been viewed as marginally instrumental in the affairs of politics, and
lacking the background o f democratic politics to be involved in a relevant manner in how
governments make decisions that affect everybody’s future. Conversely, governments
have been viewed as more responsible than the present analysis indicates.
The truly remarkable element o f this analysis is the fact that as time went by, and
publics continued to hold governments accountable, either through elections or by other
channels o f civic demonstration, governments started to get the message. In the second
half o f the nineties, we observe less government obliviousness to the public voice, and
more government engagement in explaining policies to their constituencies and justifying
their choices. This makes the point that Eastern Europe is becoming more aware and
responsive to requirements o f representative governance, and rules out the view that the
region is not yet ready for representative democracy.

METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
In chapter three, we have discussed the methodological difficulties that Western
analysts have in the application o f the representative democracy model to traditional
democracies. Congruence, causality, and other various approaches to test theories o f
representation have been experimented for over four decades, with little agreement on the
successful application o f one statistical model over another.
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Recognizing these traditional difficulties, this study has applied a more modest
methodological framework. In essence, the interpretive analysis offered here used
available micro and macro-economic data and ratings o f transition progress to describe the
course and outcome o f economic policies o f each case study. It then used public opinion
approval ratings o f the course o f economic development to observe the interplay between
approval ratings and outcomes o f economic policies. It then used complementary pollsters
to substantiate or refute observed trends.
Lastly, since the macro-economic indicators and opinion pollsters did not always
offer sufficient insights into the relationship between governments and their constituencies,
the after-the-fact representation model was explored. Patterns o f voter behavior towards
incumbents were analyzed in conjunction with the pace o f reform, the pace o f economic
growth, and o f other available data.
While testing o f theories was not performed using the available statistical data, the
analysis allowed for interpretation o f events from different perspectives. In so doing, we
did not limit the possible explanations to a set o f possible outcomes, but rather explored
outcomes that are more counterintuitive.
This approach to the study o f Eastern Europe is viewed by this researcher as
critical to a thorough analysis o f where the region is headed. Statistical analyses are
valuable analytical tools, but they limit the choice o f interpretation to degrees o f reliability,
statistical relevance, or fitness o f models. A less ambitious approach from the standpoint
o f accuracy and reliability, but more broad from the standpoint o f how different data
sources interplay with one another is likely to highlight aspects that are relevant and
critical to the development o f the region.
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One o f the reasons why this author is skeptical o f evaluating the region solely on
the basis o f statistical approaches is because many o f the events in the region are
influenced by people’s perceptions. That is a notoriously difficult category to quantify. In
addition, perceptions about performance have suffered in Eastern Europe, as in traditional
democracies, from media campaigns, the most recent events that impact on people’s
emotions, and lack o f comparative information.
The story of Slovakia makes the case against statistical approaches or fitness o f
models better than any o f the other cases we looked at. If numbers mean what they say
they mean, Slovakia would be a beautiful case o f representation, and o f growth o f the
electorate into higher stages o f demand over their representatives. However, an analysis
o f various data combined with a critical look at events reveal that government
manipulation and voter ignorance can be well masked by good indicators o f economic
performance and of public approval o f government action.
Slovakia is a strong case in favor o f modesty about our methodological approaches
to the region, and about the conclusions we draw from available data. Bulgaria and
Romania are in the same category. In all three countries, there is a danger o f over
simplifying the actual course o f events due to what the data says the events are.
Interpretive approaches give the researcher more freedom to use complementary, nonquantitative data to see how trends can be interpreted, and in which direction the region is
moving.
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REGION SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
Having shown that representation is a conceptually appropriate category to use in
analyses o f Eastern Europe, what are the factors affecting it and how can we best
summarize the manner o f representation currently occurring in the region?
For the selected policy, the introduction o f a market economy, chapters four
through eight indicate that a minimum o f three variables that are likely to affect
government representation of constituency interest in Eastern Europe. They are: the
existence o f an initial reform program, elaborated at the outset o f transition as a guiding
light to take the country into the desired economic system; the consistency o f application
o f the reform program; and government decisions taken in conditions of coalition
governments. We shall discuss each o f these variables in turn, to draw conclusions on the
manner in which they affected representation o f the popularly desired economic system in
the region.

Initial Economic Program
The existence o f an initial reform program which takes into account public views
on the direction o f the country was a requirement for short and medium-term government
credibility. In each o f the cases analyzed, the public started out by supporting the
introduction o f a particular economic system, a market economy. In some cases, public
support was stronger, relative to the region (Poland versus Romania or Bulgaria).
In all the front-runner countries analyzed in this study, an initial program o f reform
was formulated and passed through the legislatures o f each country. In Slovakia, the
reform program was adopted under the conditions o f the Czechoslovak Federation. After
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the separation o f the two republics, Slovakia did not adopt a new program, but slowed
down considerably the application o f the one inherited from the Czech Republic.
In Poland, the Balcerowicz plan was adopted by the end o f 1989, and its
implementation started in early 1990. In Hungary, the Kupa plan was enacted starting in
1990.
Bulgaria and Romania alone struggled with the formulation o f a reform program
until 1991 and 1992. It should be noted that the absence o f a reform plan did not prevent
these countries from introducing measures o f liberalization, in order to conform with
World Bank and IMF conditions for the granting o f loans. However, price and trade
liberalization were not matched by investment legislation, or a medium to long-term plan
o f reform. The lack o f vision de-legitimized the notion o f a market economy for
constituencies, and created false expectations for the society at large.
The formulation o f an initial reform program versus absence o f such program
makes the case for the importance o f this variable for representation in the region. In
those countries in which governments took their constituencies' demands for the
introduction o f a market economy seriously, the reform program was formulated and
adopted fairly early in the transition. As a result, these countries had a head-start on the
reform o f their economies and could claim to have acted on popular demands. In those
countries in which the reform program was adopted with delay, like Bulgaria and
Romania, the economies did not grow, the general economic situation worsened, and the
legitimacy o f the notion that a market economy was diminished by the under-performing
system.
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Consistency in Application o f the Reform Program
In most cases that were analyzed in this study, public support for the particular
policy declined with time. We considered alternative hypotheses found in the literature for
this decline. From job insecurity, to hardships in transition, to more counterintuitive
considerations like those proposed by Przeworski (see the decline o f support likened to
the diminished interest o f a patient to continue medication once the condition o f his/her
health improve), a variety o f factors can claim to have influenced the decline o f public
support for the selected policy.
This researcher found that if a reform program is formulated at the outset o f
transition, but it is inconsistently applied, the program is likely to produce lesser results
than expected. Under the conditions of a post-communist stressed society, lesser results
can and will be interpreted as political incompetence or lack o f willingness to reform. In
either case, popular support and trust in both the government who pursed non-performing
policies and in the policies proposed will be lower than in a well-performing environment.
The second variable found to have made a difference in the transition to a new economic
system is consistency in the application o f the reform program.
Consistency can be measured by the manner in which newly elected governments
chose to continue the program o f their predecessors, or elaborate new strategies and plans
and abandon the initial plan.
The only front-runner country in Eastern Europe in which the initial reform
program was consistently applied, irrespective o f initial deleterious effects on the
population is Poland. Despite the political instability o f the first years o f transition, and o f
the fact that the author o f the program lost his government position in the political
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reshuffling o f the early nineties, Polish governments pursued the same Balcerowicz plan
through the nineties. Even when the Socialists came to power in mid-nineties the program
was maintained. As an interesting turn o f events, Poland finished the nineties with
Balcerowicz back in the government, as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister o f Finance,
as a recognition o f the powerful influence that his economic program had on the course of
the country.
The consistent application o f the Balcerowicz program led to economic growth
very early in the transition, earlier than any o f the other front-runner East European
countries. Growth in turn led to sustained public support for the introduction o f a market
economy. Fluctuations in public support were witnessed, but at the end o f the period
under discussion, Poles were as much in favor o f the program o f reform as in the
beginning.
Not the same consistency o f application o f the reform program was observed in
the other countries. In Hungary, the gradual approach led to dissatisfied constituencies
early in the transition period. In the medium-term, gradualism proved to have been a not
very happy solution for reforming the economy. In addition to non-performance,
gradualism postponed inevitable austerity measures which were eventually taken several
years into the transition, when the population was already exhausted by an ailing economy.
In the Czech Republic, the program o f reform was applied in bursts, with
interruptions, and in an inefficient manner. The voucher privatization scheme was
launched, then it was halted, then it was re-launched with changes that allowed corruption
to flourish and turned the population against vouchers altogether. The restructuring o f
major loss-making industrial enterprises was postponed for several years, allowing these
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enterprises to drain the budget further. Legislation that enabled banks and other financial
institutions to become joint ventures in fact conserved the state-ownership structure and
postponed the introduction o f a modern, efficient banking system.
In neither Hungary nor the Czech Republic did we notice the maintenance o f the
public support for the introduction o f a market economy that we have noted in Poland.
The strongest discriminator that this researcher finds in the manner in which all three
countries approached their mandate is the consistency o f the application of the reform
program. Polish governments did not waver in the application o f the initial program;
Hungary and the Czech Republic did. Poland did not significantly change its initial
program; Hungary and the Czech Republic did. Poland did not lose popular support for
the initial program; Hungary and the Czech Republic did.
This speaks for the fact that representation was affected by the consistency with
which governments applied the program o f reform in these countries. The initial program
existed in all three countries, but was implemented with various degrees o f consistency.
The country in which the governments stayed the course retained its popular appeal as
representing publics’ interest for reform.
It is worth making a side note regarding the quality o f the initial reform program.
The Balcerowicz plan was a shock therapy approach to reform the economy and launch it
on the path o f a market economy. The plan was explained to the population, with all its
negative effects in the short-term, and its expected benefits in the medium to long-term.
The plan produced the expected short-term negative effects (unemployment sky-rocketed
and purchasing power decreased significantly, to name only a few), but it also brought
about the expected growth. The plan was well-thought through and well-explained, so
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that publics could identify the effects o f the program when they occurred. The
government’s credibility was highly enhanced by this strategy, and the level o f endurance
and patience of the population was secured.
The gradual approach was thought to introduce necessary reforms at a slow pace
to minimize the negative effects on the population. The program was explained to the
population from the standpoint o f having everybody’s best interests at heart, as a sensible
approach in which nobody was going to be left behind in the process o f reform. When the
expected effects did not materialize and in fact the large majority o f Hungarians were
affected by the reform program, the credibility o f the government as having everybody’s
best interests at heart was greatly diminished.
While economists and political scientists still argue about the appropriateness o f
shock therapy over gradualism, the reality is that the country which secured growth the
fastest is the country which implemented the shock therapy approach. This is not the
place to pass judgement on which approach is more appropriate; suffice it to point out that
the countries which did not chose the shock therapy approach had a harder time bringing
about economic growth.

Government Decisions Taken in Conditions o f Coalition Governments
Throughout the region, economic and social aspects o f post-communist life were
marked by the fact that politically, countries were run primarily by coalitions, rather than
by strong programmatic parties. The absence o f strong programmatic parties should not
be surprising; in all o f these countries, communism stifled political culture o f a multi-party
dimension for over forty years, and opposition to communism was primarily at the social,
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cultural, or most likely individual level. Political entities, wherever they tried to get
organized, were stifled, destroyed, or their impact on social life minimized. As a result,
post-communist parties were small, weak, with a relative and not necessary loyal degree o f
popular support. Financially, most depended on grants from the government to get
established.
When elections took thus place, single parties did not, and could not muster
enough support to become viable government parties. They had to enter into coalitions
with like-minded political groups. While this development is not necessarily bad in itself,
it led to a fragmentation of political decisions once the government was sworn in. Political
ambitions, struggle for power, disagreements inherent into a body politik that had too
many points o f views left these governments weak and indecisive.
In Poland, observers noted how the long-admired and effective political struggle o f
Solidarity against the communist regime did not translate into an equally effective political
decision-making process after they gained seats in the Sejm, in 1990. Later, in 1998,
desperation that the Socialists would win the parliamentary elections again pushed several
parties to unite into the Solidarity Electoral Action. United, five parties made into the
government, but were less effective at reaching agreements on governing issues.
In the Czech Republic, the effectiveness o f the government was affected by the
disagreements within the governing coalition as well. The inability o f Klaus and Zeman to
agree to disagree have plagued Czech politics since 1996. Their personal enmity spilled
into their governing manner, and led to a stalemate and early elections in 1998. It further
prompted civic groups to demand their resignation starting in 1999.
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In Slovakia-after-Mefiiar, members o f the 1998 ruling coalition admitted that the
effectiveness o f the government was low, and losing credibility by its voters, due to the
fact that so many points o f view were expressed inside the ruling body. While respecting
the right to express an opinion and offer alternative views is inherent in a democracy, East
European governments did not develop consensus-building effectively enough to become
credible governments. As a result, they were voted out o f office. Their bickering,
political in-fighting, corruption scandals, and lack o f cohesion on critical economic and
social issues turned voters towards alternatives, whether those alternatives were called
Socialists or Nationalists.
As we can see, throughout the region, the presence o f coalition governments has
been a blessing in disguise. While on the one hand, the possibility o f having a coalition
empowered political groups to gain legislative and executive power, on the other hand it
weakened their ability to make decisions. That happened primarily because coalitions
were glued together by the desire to oppose another political group (former communists,
socialists, extremists, or incumbents), rather than by a common agenda, previously agreed
to. In turn, the weakness o f political decisions affected the way representation o f people’s
best interest occurred.
The three variables found to have affected government representation o f people’s
interests in Eastern Europe are summarized in Table 22 below.
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Table 22.~Variables affecting representation in Eastern Europe
Country

Initial Reform
Program

Consistency in
Application

Coalition
government

Czech Republic

Yes

No

Yes

Hungary

Yes

No

Yes

Poland

Yes

Yes

Yes

Slovak Republic

Yes

No

Yes

This summary highlights the feet that the differentiating factor in representation of
constituency interest on the question o f a market economy was the consistent manner in
which governments applied the economic program conducive to the introduction o f a
market economy. The country in which the consistency condition was fulfilled is the
country in which the government proved to be the most responsive and representative o f
constituency interests, Poland respectively.

Closing Thoughts
The process o f democratization is likely to continue in Eastern Europe, with
various degrees o f recognition by both the makers o f the process, and the outsider
scholars analyzing it. It remains indisputable that this process will take much more time
than originally anticipated. It is becoming increasingly evident that the process is not
predictable, and that reversal trends are likely. Democratization will continue to witness
changes that may, or may not be analyzable with analytical tools o f traditional
democracies. Therefore caution needs to be exercised in drawing conclusions about the
direction o f the region, or o f individual countries, particularly when those conclusions may
be policy relevant.
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Particular awareness needs to exist with respect to the effects o f reductionist
theories o f the ‘political culture’ type. If used to exhaustion, these arguments can only
harm the on-going process o f democratization in the region. Teleological interpretations
o f the processes in the region merely reduce the story o f Eastern Europe to uninteresting,
but predictable dichotomies (‘if you are on this side o f the Huntingtonian civilizations line,
you are/not likely to become democratic’).12 As Rose has many times recommended, if a
modicum o f democratic practices can be detected, the position that analysts should take is
less to criticize what has not been accomplished but recognize what has actually taken
place away from positions o f authoritarianism.
Many variables influence the democratization process in the region. Even if a
comprehensive list could be compiled, that still leaves us with the question o f which
variables count more or less in what is happening in the region. Even if an acceptable
ranking of variables can be compiled, from more to less likely to be driving forces in the
developments in the region, how do we test their strengths? Regression analyses may be
appropriate and useful in the study o f international relations; applied to democratization
processes, regression is likely to offer misleading answers. That happens because the air
o f infallibility with which regression is still treated in the discipline. A more modest
approach as the one used in the present study may not offer predictable answers, but it will
give a sense o f direction and depth o f the processes that are currently taking place.
Theories are good guides, caution needs also to be applied in considering new
democracies in relation to, or vis-a-vis an ideal o f democracy called Western democracy.
Italy is considered a democracy; but their political system is more corrupt and less stable
than any of those discussed in this study. Turkey and Greece are NATO members on
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account o f their success in establishing some type o f political and economic system that
conforms to NATO requirements. They have also come close to fighting each other many
times since their acceptance into NATO, and have both proven in one manner or another
that they are not nearly as democratic as their West European partners.
Regionally, a conglomerate o f conditions and situations can explain why events
happened in the manner in which they did. There is, however, no guarantee that if the
Czech Republic and Hungary followed exactly the policy line that Poland used, they would
have had the same pace o f development as Poland. Large trends can be observed, but
they do not guarantee any prescription for success in the transition to a democracy.
We can close this study by saying that governments in Eastern Europe did attempt
to transform the economy to a market economy, in keeping with the popular mandate.
The task, however, proved too daunting and complex to produce results that were
immediately favored by constituencies.
This willingness to change indicates that governments were responsive to their
constituencies, but were either unprepared or lacked enough political cohesion to make a
more substantial difference in the manner in which economic policies were conducted. It
should be remembered that a market economy does not grow in a few years even if,
ideally, the best reforms are put in place and made to work, and even if, ideally, attitudes
and work styles change over night.
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Jerzy Szmajdzinski (delegate to the SLD Congress), quoted in “Polish SLD on Eve o f
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Leszek Moczulski, leader o f KPN, condemning a faction within KPN led by Adam
Slomka, quoted in “Parties Prepare for Elections,” FBIS-EEU-96-112 (March 30,
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8.

“President’s State o f the Nation Address,” FBIS-EEU-96-240 (December 11, 1996),
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“CTK Carries Slovak Press Survey for 21 July,” FBIS-EEU-1999-0721 (July 21,
1999), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.

10. President Rudolf Schuster in “Schuster, Havel Discuss Czech-Slovak, Personal
Relation,” FBIS-EEU-1999-0917 (September 17, 1999), http://WNC.
FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
11. Financial Times, 21 April 2000, p. 10.
12. The political culture argument is grounded in a legitimate concern about the ability of
some countries to overcome legacies o f communism, ethnic hatred, lack o f tolerance
for differing religious values, etc. While valid claims can be made that all this
'baggage’ holds some countries back from democratizing faster, particularly in
Southeastern Europe and the Balkans, the political culture argument falls short o f
being determinist. This argument cannot adequately explain change when it does
occur, nor can it account for differences in democratization among the countries
within the region.
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